Public conference "Secularism: a new idea in Europe? "

Paris, 9th February 2019

Claude Wachtelaer, President of the European Free Thought Association (AEPL)

 

The question that brings us together may come as a surprise.

Why should the notion of secularism - and in Paris this inevitably means the 1905 law - be a new idea?

At the very least, in France, secularism is a principle that has been known, documented and even, more often than not, applied for over a century. So what is the point of devoting a conference to it today?

On the other hand, examining the European institutions' vision of this issue is an opportunity to reflect on the strategies to be implemented to advance the values we defend, while taking into account the specific characteristics of the different Member States of the European Union.

If you want to know what the EU institutions - and I will confine myself to them for the moment - think about the question of relations between the Churches and the States, you need to refer in particular to Article 17 of the TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) and quote its first paragraph:

" The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States".

So, at first sight, the EU, in application of the principle of subsidiarity, does not wish to concern itself with Church/State relations and leaves it to the individual Member States to regulate them.

But things are obviously less simple than they appear, since Article 17 does not limit itself to this first statement and adds, in the second paragraph, that :

"The Union shall also respect the status under national law of philosophical and non-confessional organisations.

It should be pointed out that, by philosophical organisations, we must essentially, but certainly not exclusively, understand the Masonic obediences.

So far, there's been no reference to secularism.

The third paragraph is undoubtedly the most interesting. It states that :

" Recognising their identity and their specific contribution, the Union maintains an open, transparent and regular dialogue with these churches and organisations".

In other words, the EU grants these churches and associations a special kind of lobbyist status and gives them the opportunity to have regular contact with the institutions. An observation that will not fail to astonish supporters of an orthodox interpretation of secularism as defined by the French model. For philosophical and non-denominational organisations, this situation can be both an opportunity and a trap.

From a Belgian point of view, this model is less surprising.

I may surprise you, but in Belgium, the principles that form the basis of secularism have been enshrined in the Constitution since independence in 1831.

There is no doubt that the Belgian constituent, largely inspired by the thinkers of the Enlightenment, wanted to affirm the pre-eminence of the civil over the religious by stating that "all powers emanate from the Nation". (art. 33) and that there is no distinction of orders in the State". (art.10).

The 1831 constitution was an exception in its time in Europe, guaranteeing freedom of thought, association and the press; abolishing prior censorship; requiring civil marriage before religious marriage; and stipulating that no one could be forced to take part in religious ceremonies.

Finally, the Belgians (at the time more than 90 % Catholic) chose as their sovereign a Lutheran prince on whom the constituent imposed an oath - the oath of allegiance to the Lutheran Church. "I swear obedience to the Constitution and laws of the Belgian people". - without the slightest religious reference.

My French friends deplore two departures from the principles defined by the 1905 law. The problem of denominational education and the funding of religious denominations.

The question of the legitimacy of funding religious denominations, a concession designed to guarantee the freedoms I mentioned, arose very early on. And the answer was given as early as 1859 by Jules BARA, a liberal MP, Freemason and future Minister of Justice:

"The salaries of ministers of religion are an exception which has no influence on the constitutional principle [the separation of Church and State] since it does not imply any obligation on the part of the clergy towards the State, nor can it be said that privileges or favours should be granted to ministers of religion.

Jules BARA was setting out the principle that has governed relations between religious denominations and the Belgian State since 1831, a principle that specialists refer to as the "double incompetence. To put it simply, the State does not interfere in the affairs of religious denominations and religious denominations do not enjoy a privileged status that enables them to influence public affairs. The pre-eminence of the civil over the religious is preserved and there has never been a concordat between Belgium and the Vatican.

The system of recognised religions - which justifies funding - initially benefited Catholics and Jews. It was then extended to Anglicans (1835), Protestants (1839), Muslims (1974) and Orthodox (1985).

The Belgian legislator has always taken the view that recognition of a religion could not be based on its doctrine because, by virtue of the separation of church and state, the state has no jurisdiction to assess the relevance of a belief. This argument explains why there has never been any legislation against blasphemy in Belgium.ⁱ.

Recognition is therefore based exclusively on the social utility of the religion (and, since 2002, of organised secularism).ⁱⁱ); in other words, the role it plays in connecting society. Services such as chaplaincy, moral support, the organisation of various ceremonies and access to the public media all contribute to this bond and can therefore justify public financial support.

Finally, it should be noted that this system works without creating any obligation for citizens to declare any religious or philosophical affiliation, unlike in Germany with church tax, for example.

Belgium is a country where pragmatism is second nature. We are very comfortable with complexity and we have - sometimes too much, in fact - a certain taste for institutional engineering. A friend of mine often says "If someone explains to you how the Belgian institutions work and you understand, it's because they've explained it badly".. Mutatis mutandisThis analysis can also be applied to the EU institutions, where pragmatic solutions often work better than rigidly defined principles.

The European Free Thought Association (EFTA), taking into account the diversity of national approaches to church/state relations, has therefore deliberately omitted any explicit reference to the French model. However, we defend its main principles, while recognising that the ways forward must be adapted to the specific characteristics of the various EU countries.

It is also important, in order to ensure effective action, to understand how European governance is organised with regard to relations between the major religious and philosophical traditions and the EU.

In view of what Article 17 says, but also, more generally, when we analyse the EU's style of governance, it is clear that the EU's relationship with the Member States is not one of regulation. It cannot therefore be secular, in the sense that we understand it in this House, but it is not concordat either, and so those who speak of a Vatican Europe are caricaturing reality more than they are describing it accurately. On the other hand, the power of Catholic lobbying is obvious and is reinforced by the weight of the EPP (European People's Party) within the institutions; but the institutions are nonetheless obliged to observe a kind of benevolent neutrality.ⁱⁱⁱ.

European governance is therefore not adopting the the regulatory state. On the other hand, it is in line with the notion of d'État animateur insofar as it assumes the loss of centrality of politico-state actors in favour of multi-polar, multi-level, decentralised, informal and non-hierarchical action between the state and social groups.

Relations between the European institutions and religious and philosophical organisations are based on six principles:

• Subsidiarity ;
• Recognition of the positive social role of religion and non-confessional organisations ;
• Recognition of their specificity in relation to other civil society organisations;
• Positive neutrality of the institution with regard to the players ;
• Recognition of religious and philosophical pluralism ;
• A structured legal arsenal on non-discrimination on the basis of religion and belief.

This, whether we like it or not, is the reality we face and within which we are forced to act.

The dialogue organised within the framework of Article 17 is therefore a particular form - assumed by the partners - of lobbying or advocacy. And lobbying is a technique that involves persuasion and must take into account the notion of a balance of power.

The important thing, especially for weaker partners like AEPL, is to be active and relevant in the action. Because institutions are open to proposals from partners and, contrary to popular belief, it's not always the "big boys" who win.

Concrete examples to help me understand.

Our intervention with the EU Ombudsman to remove the theology criterion from the list of criteria for selecting members of the European Group on Ethics was acted upon at the renewal in 2017.

The renewal of the mandate of the EU Special Envoy for Freedom of Religion and Belief outside Europe, to whom we have made representations along with other organisations, has strengthened the recognition of the plight of non-believers, atheists and apostates in the resolution passed last January by the European Parliament.^iv.

The question is therefore how to harness its energy to achieve concrete results that have an impact on people's daily lives.

The question is also, more fundamentally, to see how we can, in relation to the EU, participate in the production of consensus. Should we stick to the cross-cutting consensus defined by John Rawls, pushing divisive issues, such as religious questions, back into the realm of the domestic forum?^v ? Or should we follow the path of consensus through confrontation, as theorised by Jürgen Habermas? As the philosopher Jean-Marc Ferry put it: 

"The model of consensus through confrontation therefore goes back to the principle or formula of dissociation between private values and public standards, or between private convictions and public reason. It relies on the very procedure of an ethic of discussion, conducted publicly and without reservation, to open up the prospect of a practical consensus, of a possible agreement on practical questions that arise in practice.^vi

Over the last forty years, this model has unquestionably worked in Belgium on ethical issues. With great difficulty, in the 1980s, in the case of termination of pregnancy. Much more serenely for the law on euthanasia and - almost naturally - for same-sex marriage. This consensus based on confrontation also served to change the law on abortion in Ireland.

If this model can be useful, it is because it generally leads to the conclusion that the best solution for resolving disagreement over fundamental values is to create a legal space that allows individuals to exercise their autonomous choice. Laws such as those authorising abortion or euthanasia do not force anyone to resort to them. Laws prohibiting these options, on the other hand, are laws that prevent individuals from exercising their freedom. In fact, the system enables secular principles to be put into practice.

In conclusion, rooted in the tradition of the Enlightenment, AEPL opts for a Europe made up of states that are not necessarily secular in the French sense, but impartial (taking up the notion of "secular"). Secular States ") :

• Where the broadest protection goes to the smallest minority, the individual, because citizenship is based on autonomous subjects capable of freely choosing what constitutes their personal identity.^vii.
• Where civil law takes precedence over any other source of law.
• Where there are no restrictions on equality between men and women.
• Where, with regard to a number of ethical issues that are the subject of debate, the authorities legislate in such a way as to enable individuals to make informed choices.
• Where the right to be different does not lead to different rights.
• Where, in terms of education funding, the neutrality of state schools constitutes an objective difference guaranteeing - at the very least - privileged treatment in relation to denominational schools.

We believe that these concrete objectives are achievable throughout Europe, despite the specific characteristics of each country. Progress will be all the faster if we create genuine solidarity between all those who support this approach.

It's not an impossible task. And the European institutions are far from impervious to these ideas.

Two examples to convince you.

Much has been made in recent months of a decision by the European Court of Human Rights of the Council of Europe, sitting in Strasbourg (ECHR), concerning the judgment of a Greek court in a divorce case.^viii. Some newspapers, some secular associations and Mrs Le Pen commented on this decision by declaring that the ECHR wanted to promote the

Sharia law in Europe. These assertions are based on a superficial and biased reading of the judgment, which considers that the Sharia - which Greece recognises by treaty as a source of law in civil cases concerning its Turkish-speaking minority in Thrace - could not prevent the plaintiff in this case from invoking Greek ordinary law to settle the dispute.

Curiously enough, another piece of information on the same subject has been completely ignored by the same newspapers, associations and personalities. This is Resolution 2253 adopted last January by the Parliamentary Assembly of the same Council of Europe on Sharia law, the Cairo Declaration and the European Convention on Human Rights. I will quote just two extracts which should put things into perspective:

The Assembly is also very concerned that Sharia law, including provisions clearly contrary to the Convention, is being applied officially or unofficially in several Council of Europe member states, in all or part of their territory.

The Assembly also recalls that it has repeatedly stressed its support for the principle of the separation of state and religion, one of the pillars of a democratic society, for example in its Recommendation 1804 (2007) on state, religion, secularity and human rights. It is important to continue to respect this principle.

The European Parliament can also adopt texts that should reassure us. Such is the case with its decision defining the mandate of the Special Envoy for the promotion of freedom of religion and belief outside Europe, adopted on 15 January. This text clearly reaffirms the importance of the separation of Church and State, described as an essential constitutional principle; it also insists on the guarantees that must be available to non-believers or people who want to break with or change their religion.^ix.

While the EU institutions are far from perfect, much of the criticism levelled at them is based on misconceptions or prejudices - in short, on a lack of information. This explains the need to develop education for European citizenship, which AEPL called for in a petition and which the EU recommended to the Member States in its declaration at the Göteborg European Social Summit in November 2017 and gave concrete form to in a recommendation approved in January 2018.^x

My experience shows that we can make significant progress in terms of the values we defend, but we can only do so by uniting on objectives and not dividing on definitions or models.

Contrary to what we too often think, the values of the Enlightenment are still progressing. But this progress is causing the enemies of freedom to tense up. The battle is never over, and deserves everyone's efforts. We are therefore obliged to return to this recommendation, to combine the pessimism of reason with the optimism of will.

                                                           

• Freedom of conscience has always been dear to the hearts of Belgians, and Belgian Masons were pioneers in this field when, in 1872, they abolished the obligation for LLs to invoke the Great Architect of the Universe and the immortality of the soul. On this subject, read with interest the work by Hervé Hasquin Belgian Catholics and the FM, Foreword, Brussels, 2011
• Laïcité organisée brings together all the non-confessional organisations that make up the Conseil central des Communautés philosophiques non-confessionnelles de Belgique, or Conseil central laïque for short.
• On this complex subject, see MASSIGNON, B, Gods and civil servants, religions and secularism faced with the challenge of European integration ; Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2007.
• EU guidelines and the mandate of the EU Special Envoy on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EUP8_TA-PROV(2019)0013.
• The paradigmatic spectre in this respect is the war of religion. To prevent or ward off this ever-present risk in liberal thought, particularly that of John Rawls, the solution since Hobbes has consisted in privatising convictions and beliefs - in other words, in what I would call a 'political excommunication' of religion: public reason on the one hand, private conviction on the other. This is the pre-liberal formula for social pacification. This is the basis for the liberal model of consensus by overlap: it is assumed that members of society will be able to find in their private values the good reasons, still private, for adhering to common standards which are public''. (Ferry, Jean-Marc, Proceed democratically, in Revue Nouvelle, Bruxelles, 1-2/2003, pp 10-17), p. 17.
• Ferry, Jean-Marc,, p.16.
• As Stanislas de Clermont-Tonnerre famously said in a speech to the National Assembly in 1789, "The Jews must be denied everything as a nation [today we would say community]. and grant everything to the Jews as individuals. They must not form a political body or an order within the State. They must be individual citizens. This lapidary formula marks the refusal to inscribe the citizen in a membership that he has not defined himself. It should also be remembered that the first act of anti-Semitic regimes has always been to deprive their Jewish citizens of their citizenship, forcibly confining them to a "community" that they had not necessarily chosen (Otto Frank, Anne's father, had served as an officer in the German army during the First World War and certainly did not see himself as an outsider to the German nation).
• Molla Sali v Greece judgment of 19 December 2018
• Considering that the principle of the separation of Church and State is an essential constitutional principle worldwide and in Europe ;

Whereas freedom of religion and belief implies the right of the individual to choose what he or she believes or does not believe, the right to change or abandon his or her religion and beliefs without coercion, and the right to practice and manifest the thought, conscience, religion and belief of his or her choice, whether individually or in community with others or in private or in public; whereas the manifestation of thought, conscience, religion or belief may be expressed in worship, observance, practice and teaching ; that freedom of religion and belief implies the right of believing and non-believing communities to maintain or abandon their ethos and to act accordingly, as well as the right of religious, secular and non-confessional organisations to have a recognised legal personality; that the protection of persons adhering to any religion or to no religion and the effective combating of violations of freedom of religion and belief, such as discrimination or legal restrictions based on religion or belief, are essential conditions for individuals to enjoy this freedom on an equal basis.

EU guidelines and the mandate of the EU Special Envoy on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EUP8_TA-PROV (2019) 0013.

• Council recommendation on promoting common values, inclusive education, and the European dimension of teaching {SWD(2018) 13 final}