Summary.

• The European Free Thought Association has noted with interest the document drawn up by the European Parliament's Research Service on the links between the European Union's external policies and religion.
• However, as non-confessional partners in the dialogue established by Article 17 of the TFEU, we cannot unreservedly endorse the analysis submitted to us.
• We feel that the document, written on behalf of an institution that should be concerned to stand back sufficiently from all issues relating to religious and philosophical convictions, does not provide all the guarantees of impartiality that we might have expected from it.
• We believe that this weakness is due to an ill-advised angle of analysis based on data that is too limited and sometimes lacking in objectivity.
• We also believe that the favoured approach is unbalanced and gives 'religions', and more particularly 'traditional religions', a weight that bears no relation to the support they receive from their own followers.[1]. This imbalance is accentuated by the fact that contact with institutions takes too little account of dissident, heterodox movements and that women are under-represented in their hierarchies.
• We have deliberately limited our analysis to the general considerations of the document. An analysis of national examples would have added to the weight of our document without providing any additional relevant information.
• We remain convinced of the virtues of dialogue, especially when it concerns ethics, but we believe that this dialogue is only meaningful and interesting if all the partners involved do so with humility, without claiming to hold the Truth, and by accepting to confront the point of view of others in order to seek, together, the conditions for a harmonious "living together". We therefore regret that the current organisation of meetings, which systematically separate denominational and non-denominational organisations, does not encourage this type of encounter.

Analysis.

1. General philosophy of the document.

As drafted, the EPRS document[2]As a non-denominational organisation, this poses obvious problems for us.

As defenders of the impartial state, we do not contest the idea of integrating the religious dimension into a reflection on the EU's external policies, but we are nevertheless very surprised by the philosophy that emerges from the document. We question its general tone. It is these questions that we wish to raise in our note, endeavouring to do so in a positive spirit without, however, giving up the possibility of being critical.

a. Where are the non-believers?

The document begins with a statement of principle: religions need to be taken seriously. There is nothing in this introduction, which asserts that religiosity will grow in parallel with population growth, to identify what kind of religiosity we are talking about.

Furthermore, since the aim is to use diplomacy to pacify relations between citizens in European or non-European countries, non-confessionals (non-believers, non-affiliated or whatever they are called) should be taken into account much more clearly.

While we can debate the numerical evolution of this group, we cannot deny its existence, or its contribution to a living together tolerant and peaceful. It is paradoxical, moreover, to assert that modernity has more to do with pluralism than with secularisation.[3] and, at the same time, to conceal the existence of a number of citizens, varying in size depending on the country, who do not adhere to any religion.

The wording of the introduction, because it is confirmed in the rest of the analyses, gives the impression that the reader is faced with texts from the nineteenth or early twentieth century in which authors, believers, asserted - a little like Doctor Knock - that every atheist is a believer who ignores himself.

b. Is secularisation doomed to disappear?

i. An overestimation of the demographic factor.

The - in our view superficial - demonstration in point 1.1 of the introduction seems to us to be highly questionable. It leads to two astonishing assertions.

The first, according to which religiosity will increase solely as a result of demographics, seems to serve as a premise for syllogistic reasoning: if this demographic trend holds true and if people continue to adhere to the religion into which they were born, then it is indeed important to take these religions into account.

As with any syllogism, it is essential to check that the premises of the reasoning are correct before accepting the conclusion.[4] and to invite a little nuance.

The first call for caution concerns the assertion that religious people tend to have more children[5]. Yet research shows that fertility is more closely linked to socio-economic level or level of education than to religious belief. It is also worth mentioning Hans Rosling's warning that, when it comes to statistics, it is always a good idea not to have blind faith in linear growth.[6]. We must therefore consider this hypothesis to be no more than a prediction.

The second is that atheism and agnosticism will only increase in two countries,[7] seems to us to be just as audacious. It is based on a single study and seems to be contradicted by numerous other researchers. In any case, the presentation of the document is factually inaccurate, since the decline in adherence to traditional religions can be seen in European countries other than France.[8].

Furthermore, we fail to see how the demographic growth of certain religious groups outside Europe would call into question the trend towards secularisation in European countries, or the relevance of the European model. And we don't dare imagine that the authors of the dossier are planning to ask us to abandon this model, as it has developed since the end of the eighteenth century, because we would be unable to integrate migrant populations into it in the future.

ii. The question of freedom of conscience.

The exclusively demographic approach, which seems to provide an argument for those who bury secularisation, overlooks the fact that, when the conditions are right, people can distance themselves from traditional religions and above all from the social norms they want to promote or sometimes impose.[9]. It therefore seems essential to us not to separate the question of dialogue with institutions from that of the absolute protection of freedom of conscience.[10]. It is not certain, in this respect, that a dialogue which favours the most 'traditional' and 'institutional' interlocutors will facilitate this aspiration to freedom.[11]. The European and international religious landscape is constantly changing, so the question of who to contact inevitably arises.

The other crucial question in this context is whether the European institutions plan to discuss the legal and political conditions that must be met to guarantee this freedom of conscience.

iii. The question of impartiality

The argument in favour of working with religious organisations (as opposed to civil associations) is based on the sums spent (cf. § 3.2.2), as well as on the possibility of contacting a large number of people. There is no mention of any other evidence of the effectiveness of the work of religious associations, compared with the proven effectiveness of non-confessional NGOs (Amnesty International, Reporters Sans Frontières, Oxfam) in promoting human rights, including freedom of opinion and belief.

The funding of faith-based organisations that carry out social work (e.g. welcoming migrants) inevitably raises the issue of proselytism. Proselytism is, of course, an indisputable right, linked to the exercise of the freedoms guaranteed by articles 9 and 10 of the ECHR, but insofar as these associations are funded by the public authorities for these tasks and are, so to speak, carrying out a public service mission, it seems normal to require them to respect a duty of neutrality in their work.

c. What balance should be struck between institutions and dissidents?

As with the documents distributed at the time of the launch of the 'Erasmus of Religions' project, the EPRS note talks a lot about religion without ever defining precisely what is meant by this term. This shortcoming, which can be explained by the fact that there is no internationally agreed legal definition of the concept of religion, should invite all those who wish to engage in 'dialogue with religions' to exercise great caution. In this context, at least two questions arise.

i. Taking diversity into account.

It is impossible to ignore, especially in the context of the EU's international relations, that what is religion here may not be religion there. The persecution of Jehovah's Witnesses and the status of Scientology, recognised as a church in the United States but sometimes considered a dangerous sect in France or Germany, are just a few examples, but they could be multiplied according to local situations. Specialists are well aware of this difficulty and it is getting worse all the time. Are Pastafarians followers of a new religion or just mild fantasists? Can Wicca practitioners fit into the global religious landscape?

While these questions may legitimately arise, the answers they receive vary widely and show that the institutions that have to respond to them can only do so after careful consideration.

These simple observations show that the reintegration of the religious question into the realm of diplomacy sometimes poses as many problems as it offers solutions.[12].

ii. The question of representativeness.

Traditional religious institutions obviously offer the European Parliament and the Commission the advantage of being easily identifiable interlocutors. But the landscape of modern religiosity should prompt serious reflection on the representativeness of these institutions - and, as a corollary, their legitimacy to influence legislative processes - at a time when the question of adherence to dogma or doctrine is becoming ever more acute.

In Europe, statistics on the gap, for example, between the number of people baptised and the number of people attending religious services show that the concept of a "religious community" is not a simple one. Belonging without believingdeveloped by Prof. Grace DAVIE[13]is fully relevant. Numerous studies have shown that it is possible to define oneself as Catholic, Lutheran, Orthodox, etc. without complying to the letter with the ethical prescriptions of their respective theological authorities.

None of the great classical religious families can be considered as a homogeneous group in its relationship with doctrine. They all include a range of sensibilities, from the most 'fundamentalist' to the most 'liberal'.[14].

d. Where are the women?

It is to be welcomed that among the concerns that the external services of the EU and the Parliament wish to share with religions and the other partners of Art. 17, there are two important issues: conflict prevention and development. And even if we seem to ignore it too often, these two issues concern women first and foremost. For conflict resolution, because they are, along with children, the first victims of conflicts; for development, because their empowerment often has a decisive effect on improving living conditions.

What concerns us about the note's approach is that the strategy that is taking shape mainly involves dialogue with male religious dignitaries, defending doctrines that are not always very favourable to improving the status of women.[15].

2. Sources of information.

a. Pluralistic sources?

Having not consulted each of the many sources cited in the document, it is not our intention to call them into question. However, we do wonder about the predominance of Anglo-Saxon, or even exclusively American, sources. Are European researchers non-existent or incompetent, or is their absence due to the fact that the document is written in English and that European studies are not always translated into this language?

It is nevertheless difficult to believe that, given the difference between the place occupied by religions in the United Kingdom or the United States and that in highly secularised countries such as France, the Netherlands or Belgium, for example, this choice is without consequence for certain orientations.

It is also hard to believe that there is no relevant research being produced in Europe. Initiatives such as the EUREL network, the Observatoire des religions et de la Laïcité de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles (ORELA) and the Understanding Unbelief University of Kent[16] are good examples.

b. Some methodological biases.

It is not our intention to dispute the seriousness of the Pew Research Center's surveys, at least when they are conducted in a normal context. But data relating to religion and beliefs are, by their very nature, sensitive, difficult to obtain and therefore complicated to interpret. It is therefore not out of place to ask whether these difficulties are taken into account in the studies in question.

While it is common practice in the United States to declare one's religion, this is not possible in many other countries. Who would declare their atheism without hesitation in Saudi Arabia, Iran or even Russia? Who would admit to belonging to a minority religion (Copts in Egypt, Baha'is in Iran, etc.) in countries where apostasy is penalised, or even punishable by death? It therefore seems to us that projections on the future evolution of religious adherence should be taken much more cautiously than in current documents.

Lastly, however, there are some real technical questions to be asked about some of the Pew Research Center's forecasts, and these questions cannot be completely ignored, as a number of critical articles have shown.[17]. As Daniel KHANEMAN wrote, you have to be careful with scenarios.[18]

3. Another approach to dialogue.

a. A soul for Europe.

We are particularly disappointed, but also concerned, by the passage in the document relating to the principle of dialogue initiated at the end of the nineties by Jacques DELORS and, in particular, to his wish to give a soul for Europe. Our disappointment stems from the fact that this first attempt is particularly poorly documented and presented here in a completely superficial and incomplete manner. This is all the more regrettable given that the work of a French researcher, Bérengère Massignon, produced a fairly comprehensive and particularly interesting analysis at the time.[19]/[20].

We are also concerned that the dialogue initiative, the brainchild of Jacques Delors, which ran from 1995 to 2005 under the name of Giving Europe a soul and then A soul for Europe - ethics and spirituality. Throughout its existence, this initiative was chaired by the current President of AEPL-EU, Claude WACHTELAER.

We are entitled to wonder about the note's silence on this experience, which preceded the introduction of the Article 17 mechanism. Should we blame a lack of usable archives or was it appropriate not to point out that this initiative organised - in accordance with Jacques Delors' wishes - a genuine cross-disciplinary dialogue including believers and non-believers?

The aim of Une âme pour l'Europe was to encourage reflection on meaning, and included a strong ethical dimension.[21]. One of the evaluation criteria for project funding stated : "Projects must provide for inter-religious or ecumenical/humanist participation, and even cooperation. Projects that include Muslims at local level will be considered with particular interest".[22]

b. Dialogue or clericalism 2.0?

On several occasions we have regretted that dialogue with the institutions is organised in separate groups: believerson the one hand, non-believers', of each other. Of course, the opportunity given to all the partners to dialogue with the institutions is a very interesting one. But 'vertical' dialogue, as opposed to 'horizontal' dialogue, as Jacques Delors intended, perhaps misses out on what is essential in the production of a genuine consensus: the confrontation of ideas.

Each partner in the dialogue has - and this is the rule of the game - the will to promote its ideas and present them to the political authorities of the Union. But the absence of horizontal dialogue between the partners does not help to nuance their respective positions. Each partner, believing - rightly or wrongly - that it holds the truth on the issue in question, may therefore try to influence the political authorities by resorting to all available forms of power relations. In our view, the demand by certain partners to intervene institutionally upstream of the legislative process is not a matter of dialogue - or even lobbying in the strict sense - but of a revisited clericalism that we cannot accept. This drift can also be seen in the imbalance between denominational and non-denominational organisations in terms of meetings organised by Parliament or speakers invited to take the floor. We have already had occasion on two occasions to deplore this imbalance in letters to Ms McGuiness.[23].

4. Conclusions.

The document we have analysed has the merit of existing. But, as you will have gathered, it is far from satisfactory.

It is based on questionable conceptual choices and does not seem to us to offer sufficient guarantees for the defence of the values of the European model of democracy.unity in diversity or pluralist living together.

Of course, in the context of international relations, there is no question of 'selling' our model as the only valid one, and we therefore understand that the document takes account of different sensitivities, including religious ones. But the fact remains that, before there is any dialogue between communities, we need to promote one of the fundamental values shared by most EU countries: complete freedom of conscience. It is out of the question, therefore, to endorse, through dialogue between religious institutions, the many obstacles to the exercise of this freedom that prevent individuals from freeing themselves, whenever they wish, from the confines of their communities.

On the other hand, we welcome the fact that the EU institutions are seeking an ethical perspective on certain issues. But there is no reason to think - as has been the case for too long - that the answers to these ethical questions depend solely on references to one or other form of transcendence, relegating all other approaches to the background. That's why we attach so much value to the calm confrontation of points of view and the pragmatic search for solutions to the problems we all face. The 'A Soul for Europe' initiative highlighted the value of this approach, and other voices are also calling for the practice of dialogue to be broadened wherever possible.[24].

——————————————————

[1] The EPRS document, and more broadly the organisation of dialogue by the EP, deserves the same criticism as that addressed by the philosopher François DE SMET to the decisions of the ECHR when they concern issues of freedom of belief or religion: " While it may seem logical to avoid extending the protection of the Convention to any individual claiming to be a member of his or her own religion, such an approach in fact favours established and hermetic cults, and disfavours new, singular and reforming cults. To use the analogy with the business world, one may legitimately wonder whether the Court is not favouring monopolies and rents to the detriment of the self-employed and small entrepreneurs. DE SMET, F., Deus casino, PUF, 2020.

[2] PERCHOC, P., Religion and the EU's external policies, Increasing engagementEuropean Parliamentary Research Service, PE 646.173, 2020. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/646173/EPRS_IDA(2020)646173_EN.pdf

[3] While pluralism is a system of political organisation that recognises and accepts the diversity of opinions and their representatives, secularisation is about the autonomy of political and social structures from religions. This statement therefore mixes two concepts that are, in our view, perfectly distinct. It is, moreover, contradicted, among others, by Jürgen Habermas, who makes secularisation one of the characteristics of modernity.

[4] This is an opportunity to recall the logical principle 'ex falso sequitur quodlibet'.

[5] 'Religious people tend to have more children', Religion and EU's external policies, p.1.

[6]ROSLING, H., Factfulness, ch. 3, The straight line instinct, 2018.

[7] Atheism and agnosticism are most likely to increase in only two countries USA and France, EPRS study, p.1

[8] SCHREIBER, JP, The evolution of religious beliefs in figures: the singular cases of Belgium and the USA, ORELA, Brussels.

[9] For example, the fact that the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland invokes the authority of the Holy Trinity has not prevented the Republic from authorising voluntary termination of pregnancy and same-sex marriage.

[10] We told Ms MOGHERIINI that it was a mistake, in the context of her Erasmus for Religions project, to set aside these issues while seeking dialogue'.We fail to understand why the LOKAHI report recommends putting aside the questions related with FoRB. What hope do we have to tackle important problems like social inclusion or active citizenship, when, at the same time, we condone scandals like discrimination based on religion, attacks on freedom of speech, condemnation of apostasy?' (our letter of 6 October 2019).

[11] See on the case of Lebanon: JREIJIRY, Roy, The Lebanese political system as an obstacle to collective non-confessional mobilisation: the case of the 'Civil Movement 2015, presentation at the Formatting non-religion in late modern society - Institutional and legal perspectives, Eurel/University of Oslo, 2018.

[12]  It should be remembered that, although the issue of freedom of conscience was not absent from the concerns of the drafters of the first amendment to the American constitution, they refrained above all from establishing a religion, given that it was impossible to agree on which to choose from among those that existed in the founding states! Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion is less the reflection of an ideological choice than a pragmatic way out of a tricky problem.

[13] DAVIE, G. Religion in Britain Since 1945: Believing Without BelongingLondon, 1994.

[14] RIVA, V. The French debate on Europe's Christian roots. A reconversion of political and religious resources, 2006.

[15] On this subject, see Resolution 1464(2005) of the Council of Europe, which states that :

1. Religion continues to play an important role in the lives of many European women. Indeed, whether they are believers or not, most women are affected in one way or another by the position of different religions towards women, either directly or through their traditional influence on society or the state.
2. This influence is rarely harmless: women's rights are often restricted or trampled underfoot in the name of religion. While most religions teach that women and men are equal before God, they assign them different roles on earth. Gender stereotypes motivated by religious beliefs have given men a sense of superiority that has led to discriminatory treatment of women by men, even resorting to violence.

[16] https://research.kent.ac.uk/understandingunbelief/

[17] De Féo, A., Why these figures on the number of Muslims in Europe are unreliable, http://www.slate.fr/story/155276/statistiques-musulmans-europe-pew-research-center, 2017

[18] 'They constructed a very complicated scenario and insisted on calling it highly probable. It is not: it is only a plausible story', in Daniel KAHNEMAN, Thinking fast and slow, London, 2011.

[19] See point 2.2.1 of the document and in particular note 10.

[20] MASSIGNON, B., Gods and civil servants, religions and secularism in the challenge of European integration, Rennes, 2007, particularly chapter IV.

[21] 'We are at a crossroads in European history where the debate on meaning is becoming essential. European integration must be understood not only in its economic and political dimensions, but also in its spiritual and ethical dimensions. Our aim is to encourage those who are aware of this challenge to make their own specific contribution to the unification of Europe', Critères pour l'acceptation des projets, in MASSSIGNON, B., op. cit. p. 184, note 5.

[22] MASSSIGNON, B., op. cit, p. 184.

[23] " [...[ Everybody is of course entitled to his opinions, including M. JUREK or Bishop HOOGENBOOM. But when the meeting gives them the opportunity to speak - so to say - from the pulpit, they occupy some sort of moral high ground vis-à-vis the people who are not members of a Church and who are seated on the backbenches. These few examples justify our repeated requests for a more balanced form of dialogue between the Institutions, the Churches and the non-confessional organizations. Mrs BYRNE rightly pleaded for more progress towards a pluralist Europe. We are convinced that this pluralist Europe, opening the space for a peaceful living together will be better achieved by a dialogue that allows some contradiction into it. Faced with the self-righteousness of one side, the other side will only react by crispation and unwillingness to find common ground for progress. Though we are mostly non-believers, we have no hostility against faith. But clericalism - and by that we mean a domination of civil society by religious groups - is an obstacle to peaceful cohabitation of people with different religious or secular worldviews, worse, it is even an obstacle, for the believers, to the peaceful exercise of religious liberty". Our letter of 12 December 2018

[24]   [6.17] " It has long been recognised that special efforts are required to promote engagement between young people of different faiths and beliefs.There is also a need for more dialogue which focuses specifically on engagement between those who are religious and those who are not, with a variety of patterns of engagement of nonreligious people with dialogue partners from one, two or more religious traditions. As shown throughout this report, it is essential that free debate about secularism and the place of religion and belief in the public square continues apace; however, there also needs to be structured dialogue on the substantive content of different philosophical, as well as religious, traditions.

There is a wide range of non-religious perspectives and beliefs, just as there is among those who have a religious commitment. But there are no non-religious communities in the same sense as there are individual faith communities and this is an important factor in organising broader dialogue processes.

The British Humanist Association, for example, does not claim to represent all those who are not religious. It does, however, currently have a dialogue officer who can help facilitate the participation of humanists in dialogue events.19 In Scotland there has been significant progress in recent years in developing regular engagement between Scottish Churches and the Humanist Society Scotland (HSS). As noted in chapter 4, in 2014 a joint document on replacing the requirement for a regular religious observance in schools with a time for reflection was produced jointly by the Church of Scotland and the HSS".

BUTLER-SLOSS, The Rt Hon Baroness Elizabeth, Report Of The Commission On Religion And Belief In British Public Life, Living With Difference, community, diversity and the common good, 2015

The post Rapport AEPL « Religion et politiques extérieures de l’UE » appeared first on Association Européenne de la Pensée Libre.

The European Union wishes to :

• AI that puts people and citizens first;
• Reliable technologies that you can trust;
• Putting these technologies at the service of a democratic society, a dynamic and sustainable economy and the ecological transition.

AEPL fully supports these objectives. The following suggestions are intended to help achieve them.

We are basing these suggestions on three sources that are fundamental to the way the Union works.

• First and foremost the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and, in particular, Articles 8 (elimination of inequalities), 9 (horizontal social clause), 10 (fight against discrimination), 11 (environmental protection), 12 (consumer protection), 15, 1 and 3 (principle of open governance), 16 (protection of personal data).
• Secondly, the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, in particular Articles 8, 21, 31 (fair and equitable working conditions), 37, 38 and 42.
• Finally, the European Socle of Social Rights, in particular principle 10.

In addition, AEPL calls on the Commission to implement the EP's suggestions on AI, in particular the recommendations set out in the European Parliament document in Annex 1.

The EU's action is aimed at "accelerating the deployment of AI". This deployment obviously requires user confidence. These include mutatis mutandis the logic of the Machinery Directive (1989), drafted in the context of the creation of the internal market, in order to make the free movement of goods more reliable.

Thus, the "trustworthy" criterion motivates a regulatory initiative based on reliability requirements to control risks in order to protect consumers and data. The regulatory objective seems to target the major risks of "high-risk artificial intelligence systems", which call for "clear rules".

Controlling risks in such a way as to generate public confidence is not indifferent to the current pandemic context. The system under study is in fact part of an essential function of the State: the protection of citizens, the taking of decisions and the protection of the environment. treatment preventive marketing and use. Upstream, design; downstream, like the RGPDP, protection      ₂including fundamental public freedoms.

The pandemic is a tragic reminder that this protection and care can be equated with the regalian functions of the State to the point of justifying substantial restrictions on democratic freedoms. This is not the place to settle the debate on the relevance of this justification, but it is the place to point out that protection and care belong to the vertical plane of the res publicathe general interest and the values that have no price and that therefore have to be imposed on the horizontal plane of particular interestsⁱ.

By imposing limits and rules on horizontal trade, strength belongs to the rule of law and not to the law of the strongest.

The democratic quality of decision-making and rule-making processes, the transparency of these processes, the independence of public authorities from vested interests, the consistency of actions with words, announcements and commitments - these are all prerequisites for building public trust.

It is in this spirit that the AEPL is sending you the following warnings and suggestions on the eve of the drafting of the provisions sought by the Union.

   1. Political courage: you can't please everyone

It will not be easy for the European authorities to consolidate the rule of law in the face of the economic de facto states desired by the markets and the AI oligarchies.

Indeed, economic forces on all sides are pressing for as swift a return to "business as usual" as possible, and even for the bracketing of public protections - especially environmental ones - in the name of growth imperatives. There are calls for the 2030 climate targets to be postponed, the Commission's Green Deal idea is under attack, a number of players in the digital sector are vilifying the RGPDP, industry is arguing for national rules to be relaxed, and so on.ⁱⁱ

In other words, a strong political commitment will be required to ensure that the system is in place, i.e. on the vertical axis of the general interest.

2. Bringing the system into line with EU regulatory frameworks.

The system's position on the vertical axis of protection and care calls for the adoption of 'hard' standards - directive(s) - as opposed to 'soft' standards. soft law. Indeed, the effect of such 'soft' standards is to 'bring down' the system on the horizontal axis of individual interests, at best morally tempered by good practices voluntarily implemented under the banner of corporate social responsibility. The point here is not to question the honourability and importance of such practices; it is to highlight their shortcomings in terms of generalisation, enforceability, etc. ₃ for the entire sector, and for sustainability. Compliance with good practice allows for partiality and sporadicity, which the reliability and trust expected by the Commission cannot allow.

Need we remind you of the deleterious effects of soft lawWhat about the social dialogue, paralysed by "voluntary agreements" when the social partners had the power to conclude genuine collective agreements? Or the disappointing results of the open method of coordination which has dashed the hopes opened up by the Luxembourg 'process' in terms of employment?

On the other hand, the budgetary obligations, accompanied by penalties, are as strong as ever.

The safety of AI products requires rules that are all the more robust given the tendency for safety rules to be relaxed, either in the standards governing operating licencesⁱⁱⁱor in compliance with prevention requirements during production^iv. This complacency seems at odds with the growing environmental and safety demands of the general public.^v. It illustrates the effectiveness of lobbies and the lack of foresight in a number of companies.

3. The industry's strategy: mastering time.

The industry wants to retain control over the nature of innovations and the pace at which they are brought to market in a world that is increasingly questioning the purpose of innovations and their impact on the balance of ecosystems.

4. The need to defend the precautionary principle.

In the strategic context described above, at the initiative of the European Risk Forum^vithe industry has developed and is trying to convince public authorities to adopt a pseudo innovation principle (which it controls) that competes with reality precautionary principle the only one existing in law. This pseudo-principle of innovation is used to justify all sorts of delays, twists and more or less long-term exemptions from the legal application of the precautionary principle. The aim is obviously to gain at least de facto at best de jure a principle of innovation that would hold the precautionary principle and regulations in contempt. The AEPL does not accept such manoeuvres.

    5. Distinguish between science and technoscience.^vii

In the same strategic vein, some sectors regularly confuse basic scientific research with technological innovation, and science with technoscience. In the name of this confusion, the latter should benefit from the same guarantees of freedom (academic if          ⁴ It's only fundamental research. This overlooks the fact that fundamental research's free raison d'être - to advance knowledge - and its educational mission of public utility place it on the vertical plane of the general interest. On the other hand, technological innovation on the horizontal plane of commercial relations must be in line with the rules of the general interest.

The confusion is obviously fuelled by under-investment in university research (in Belgium since the late 1970s) and by industry taking over the financial reins.

6. Learning from experience in other areas of technological innovation.

In particular, the agrochemicals sector reveals a very complete typology of time-saving, control and diversion tactics: delaying the implementation of regulations, etc.^viiito cast doubt on inconvenient scientific studies, to discredit the authors of these studies, to circumvent the politicians who are called upon to make decisions, to finance servile research, etc.^ixThe aim is to promote the company's own results, attract and control scientists from public institutions and universities, etc.

Even if, at the end of the day, the result is not what was expected for a particular authorisation, the time saved enables other productions to be developed which will also have plenty of time to take root before possibly being discarded in the more or less distant future.

The so-called "principle" of innovation thus takes on its full meaning, so that industry always has control over time. It is not interested in the long term, but in the short term. the succession of short terms the horizontal level of markets, of innovations that generate profits before possibly being rejected by the vertical level of the general interest. The principle of innovation simply has to precede that of precaution every time, which is logical if the two principles are placed on an equal footing. It is to this end that the industry wants innovation to be recognised. in principle. At that point, the rule of law is replaced by the rule of law, at least for the time needed to make a profit. AEPL cannot and does not want to be part of such a scenario.

In this respect, we would like to highlight the perverse effects of two EU procedures that should not be repeated in the field of AI.

PrimoIn agrochemicals, the "confirmation data procedure", which authorises marketing subject to the manufacturer's obligation to complete the product's safety documentation in the future.

Secondthe repeated trialogue procedures (Council, Commission, Parliament) on the same subject in the event of disagreement in the Council. These successive procedures only serve to gain time for the industry and to encourage the Commission, at each round of negotiations, to water down its proposed levels of protection in the hope of reaching an agreement in the Council.^x. It is             ₅ Parliament.

Finally, the certification of products involving a certain level of risk cannot be entrusted to the manufacturer himself: certification of the product's conformity to the EU's essential safety requirements by a third party is required in this case. The level of risk, the qualifications of third-party certifiers and their independence must be the subject of a broad democratic debate.

"For low-risk AI applications, the Commission is considering a non-mandatory label scheme if they apply higher standards." This undoubtedly implies self-certification by producers. This principle of self-certification merits serious critical examination in the light of its application over the past thirty years.

7. The requirements of independence and transparency.

The citizens of the Union expect the public authorities to be determined in their fight against lobbies, conflicts of interest and collusion.^xiThe European authority must ensure the transparency and openness of the decision-making process. The European authority must ensure that decision-making processes are transparent and public. The invocation of business secrecy or intellectual property rights is a cheap way of ensuring opacity, particularly in the case of expert studies.^xii. Public procedures verified by Parliament must guarantee the independence of the scientists responsible for the assessments.^xiii.

For its part, on 7 March 2019, the Court of the European Union overturned a decision by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). The court ruled that confidential studies on the toxicity of glyphosate must be made public, considering that "the public interest in access to information" in environmental matters outweighs commercial interests^xiv. AEPL considers that the same rule applies in the field of AI.

Specifying its intentions with regard to AI, the Commission also states: "Artificial intelligence systems should be transparent and traceable, while guaranteeing human control. The authorities should be able to test and certify the data used by the algorithms. Unbiased data is needed to train high-risk systems to work properly and to ensure respect for fundamental rights, including non-discrimination."

The Commission specifies that its system does not concern military applications. However, AEPL points out that technology oligopolies make no such distinction. So much so that it was Google employees who recently held up the porosity between civil and military applications. This type of confusion must be taken into account when talking about transparency.

In addition, oligopolies commit astronomical and sometimes unsavoury resources to enforce the law of the strongest and exert vertical pressure on public authorities, which only have the means to do so.

of the Act to protect citizens.                                                                                 ₆

Over and above the issue of security and data protection, the system should also guarantee citizens' right to transparency in the operation of algorithms. A digital right to know should enable algorithms to be critically X-rayed, or audited as Dominique Cardon puts it.

8. Breaking down silos and broadening the debate to include other stakeholders.

Notwithstanding the difficulties mentioned in the previous paragraphs, there has been a change in the balance of power, brought about in particular by the rise of civil society, which is demanding accountability, and the worrying decline in confidence in traditional institutions, including private companies.^xvi.

The need to revise our lifestyles towards greater sustainability, discussed since the Rio Summit in 1992, has been at the heart of the concerns of a small but growing number of economic players, including many industrialists, who have decided to integrate the principles of sustainable development developed by the UN into their corporate strategy.^xvii.

This action has taken a number of forms, as the principles cannot be directly transposed to players whose aim is to make a profit. One of these has been to investigate in depth the notion of responsible innovation, particularly following the EC's decision to incorporate so-called "Responsible Research and Innovation in the Horizon2020 programme. Based on this experience, the attached document Comments on the documents published on 19 February 2020  shows just how rich the debate around these major issues can be, and how different an understanding of complex realities can be when you call on experienced players in the field.

Conclusion.

AEPL sees this debate on system safety as part of a wider reflection on the purpose of technological innovation in terms of its contribution to the well-being and progress of humanity. This progress must be indexed on a growth of being and not of having, in harmony with terrestrial and social interdependencies and therefore focused on the long term. AEPL therefore believes that this regulatory initiative should be part of a democratic process to determine the desirable nature of innovations.

The precautionary principle, combined with the principle of proportion, is certainly one of the keys to correctly approaching an innovation that we hope will be viable.^xviii.

To this end, we call on the European authorities to work with a wide range of players on the ground, to build bridges between the different components of society, with businesses, governments, civil society, universities and investors who practise sustainable finance.

AEPL therefore urges the European authorities to mobilise AI tools to implement the Green       7 Deal and to repair social fractures. There are enormous needs in terms of developing people's skills, the circulation of knowledge, culture, care in all its forms, the development of public services and access to these services for all. If the European Union wants to increase its technological independence, it can do so by implementing a programme of joint projects and developing the tools needed to achieve this. ad hoc. In other words, designing the tools for shared intelligence.

It is on the basis of such a democratically defined project that the equally democratic questions of what data to capture, by whom, for what purposes, subject to what processing, for what contribution to the debate on societal choices, etc., arise. Such data and metadata would then be treated as common property.

June 2020

• Alain Supiot, Governance by the numbers, 2015.
• For example, the lobbying of French employers, Raphaëlle Besse Desmoulières, Jean-Michel Bezat, Cédric Pietralunga and Nabil Wakim, Climate: employers take action to influence standards, Le Monde22 April 2020.
• For example, in France, Service Planète, Le Monde, 9 June 2018, or Stéphane Mandard, Lubrizol: weakened controls at high-risk sites, Id.5 October 2019.
• For example, Stéphane Mandard, Lubrizol: a damning report for subcontractors, Le Monde23 October 2019.
• On the subject of air pollution, for example, in 2018 the European Court of Auditors found that "the health of European citizens remains insufficiently protected". It recommended that the Commission adopt more stringent limits for air pollution.  "strict  (Le Monde, 12 September 2018).
• In this case, the European Risk Forum (European Risk ForumERF), a lobbying platform for chemical, tobacco and fossil fuel companies.
• For example, Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond, There is no guarantee that a civilisation will maintain scientific activityInterview by David Larousserie, Le Monde18 March 20.
• A delay such as that in the process supposed to regulate endocrine disruptors, which led to the condemnation by the European Court, discredits the Commission.
• To see for yourself, take a look at the 25 discussions between the Commission and the Member States between 2013 and 2019 on bee-killing neonicotinoids. See, for example, Le Monde, 22 December 2018.
• See, for example, the work of Corporate Europe Observatory, which denounces the collusion between lobbies and European decision-makers.
• in particular the paper by David Demortain, a sociologist at INRA, part of the Interdisciplinary Sciences, Innovations and Societies Laboratory, Le Monde, 07 February 2018.
• Need we remind you of the case of the German BfR institute which copied, often word for word, the 8 the registration application filed by the industry to evaluate glyphosate (cf. Le Monde16 January 2019)?
• Stéphane Horel, Glyphosate: a victory for transparency, Le Monde10-11 March 2019.
• the means used to defend glyphosate (Stéphane Foucart and Stéphane Horel, Monsanto has registered almost 1,500 people in Europe, Le Monde8-9 September 2019).
• https://edelman.com/trustbarometer
• https://www.wbcsd.org/Overview/News–Insights/General/News/Realizing–systems–transformationWBCSD–embarking–on–a–refresh–of–its–landmark–Vision–2050
• https://www.greenfacts.org/pole3–pdf, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PZmNZi8bon8

 ^ix See, for example, Stéphane Foucart, Troubled links between public research and agrochemicals, LM, 18 June 2018.

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Claude WACHTELEAR and Eric MAERTENS, coordinators of the Group de Travail

The spread of digital technologies and their effects cover various fields: ethics, education, culture and work. AEPL is well aware that there are links between these fields. However, on the basis of the mandate given to the working group, this summary document specifically sets out the main findings and conclusions on work and employment in the era of the deployment of digital technologies in Europe. It concludes with a set of recommendations focusing on social policies at EU level.

This summary highlights the need for a significant change: that of endowing social and environmental standards with a legal force similar to that of economic freedoms. Some of the recommendations may be unrealistic in the short term, but they all point in the general direction of making fundamental social rights and respect for environmental criteria legitimate constraints on economic activity.

WORK AND TECHNICAL CHANGE

CHANGES IN THE WORKPLACE 

GOVERNANCE BY THE NUMBERS

A NEW EUROPEAN SOCIAL CONTRACT

A TRULY HUMANE WORKING REGIME

RECOMMENDATIONS

   *   *   *

WORK AND TECHNICAL CHANGE

CHANGES IN THE WORKPLACE

GOVERNANCE BY THE NUMBERS 

A NEW EUROPEAN SOCIAL CONTRACT

A TRULY HUMANE WORKING ENVIRONMENT

RECOMMENDATIONS

[1] Such as those set out in the 1961 European Social Charter, the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and the labour component of the 2000 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

[2] Report for the Commission of the European Communities with the collaboration of the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid: " BEYOND EMPLOYMENT. Transformations in work and the future of labour law in Europe. Under the direction of Alain SUPIOT, general rapporteur. Flammarion. March 1999

[3] COM(2016) 381

[4] https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digital-skills-jobs-coalition

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Paris, 9th February 2019

Claude Wachtelaer, President of the European Free Thought Association (AEPL)

The question that brings us together may come as a surprise.

Why should the notion of secularism - and in Paris this inevitably means the 1905 law - be a new idea?

At the very least, in France, secularism is a principle that has been known, documented and even, more often than not, applied for over a century. So what is the point of devoting a conference to it today?

On the other hand, examining the European institutions' vision of this issue is an opportunity to reflect on the strategies to be implemented to advance the values we defend, while taking into account the specific characteristics of the different Member States of the European Union.

If you want to know what the EU institutions - and I will confine myself to them for the moment - think about the question of relations between the Churches and the States, you need to refer in particular to Article 17 of the TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) and quote its first paragraph:

" The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States".

So, at first sight, the EU, in application of the principle of subsidiarity, does not wish to concern itself with Church/State relations and leaves it to the individual Member States to regulate them.

But things are obviously less simple than they appear, since Article 17 does not limit itself to this first statement and adds, in the second paragraph, that :

"The Union shall also respect the status under national law of philosophical and non-confessional organisations.

It should be pointed out that, by philosophical organisations, we must essentially, but certainly not exclusively, understand the Masonic obediences.

So far, there's been no reference to secularism.

The third paragraph is undoubtedly the most interesting. It states that :

" Recognising their identity and their specific contribution, the Union maintains an open, transparent and regular dialogue with these churches and organisations".

In other words, the EU grants these churches and associations a special kind of lobbyist status and gives them the opportunity to have regular contact with the institutions. An observation that will not fail to astonish supporters of an orthodox interpretation of secularism as defined by the French model. For philosophical and non-denominational organisations, this situation can be both an opportunity and a trap.

From a Belgian point of view, this model is less surprising.

I may surprise you, but in Belgium, the principles that form the basis of secularism have been enshrined in the Constitution since independence in 1831.

There is no doubt that the Belgian constituent, largely inspired by the thinkers of the Enlightenment, wanted to affirm the pre-eminence of the civil over the religious by stating that "all powers emanate from the Nation". (art. 33) and that there is no distinction of orders in the State". (art.10).

The 1831 constitution was an exception in its time in Europe, guaranteeing freedom of thought, association and the press; abolishing prior censorship; requiring civil marriage before religious marriage; and stipulating that no one could be forced to take part in religious ceremonies.

Finally, the Belgians (at the time more than 90 % Catholic) chose as their sovereign a Lutheran prince on whom the constituent imposed an oath - the oath of allegiance to the Lutheran Church. "I swear obedience to the Constitution and laws of the Belgian people". - without the slightest religious reference.

My French friends deplore two departures from the principles defined by the 1905 law. The problem of denominational education and the funding of religious denominations.

The question of the legitimacy of funding religious denominations, a concession designed to guarantee the freedoms I mentioned, arose very early on. And the answer was given as early as 1859 by Jules BARA, a liberal MP, Freemason and future Minister of Justice:

"The salaries of ministers of religion are an exception which has no influence on the constitutional principle [the separation of Church and State] since it does not imply any obligation on the part of the clergy towards the State, nor can it be said that privileges or favours should be granted to ministers of religion.

Jules BARA was setting out the principle that has governed relations between religious denominations and the Belgian State since 1831, a principle that specialists refer to as the "double incompetence. To put it simply, the State does not interfere in the affairs of religious denominations and religious denominations do not enjoy a privileged status that enables them to influence public affairs. The pre-eminence of the civil over the religious is preserved and there has never been a concordat between Belgium and the Vatican.

The system of recognised religions - which justifies funding - initially benefited Catholics and Jews. It was then extended to Anglicans (1835), Protestants (1839), Muslims (1974) and Orthodox (1985).

The Belgian legislator has always taken the view that recognition of a religion could not be based on its doctrine because, by virtue of the separation of church and state, the state has no jurisdiction to assess the relevance of a belief. This argument explains why there has never been any legislation against blasphemy in Belgium.ⁱ.

Recognition is therefore based exclusively on the social utility of the religion (and, since 2002, of organised secularism).ⁱⁱ); in other words, the role it plays in connecting society. Services such as chaplaincy, moral support, the organisation of various ceremonies and access to the public media all contribute to this bond and can therefore justify public financial support.

Finally, it should be noted that this system works without creating any obligation for citizens to declare any religious or philosophical affiliation, unlike in Germany with church tax, for example.

Belgium is a country where pragmatism is second nature. We are very comfortable with complexity and we have - sometimes too much, in fact - a certain taste for institutional engineering. A friend of mine often says "If someone explains to you how the Belgian institutions work and you understand, it's because they've explained it badly".. Mutatis mutandisThis analysis can also be applied to the EU institutions, where pragmatic solutions often work better than rigidly defined principles.

The European Free Thought Association (EFTA), taking into account the diversity of national approaches to church/state relations, has therefore deliberately omitted any explicit reference to the French model. However, we defend its main principles, while recognising that the ways forward must be adapted to the specific characteristics of the various EU countries.

It is also important, in order to ensure effective action, to understand how European governance is organised with regard to relations between the major religious and philosophical traditions and the EU.

In view of what Article 17 says, but also, more generally, when we analyse the EU's style of governance, it is clear that the EU's relationship with the Member States is not one of regulation. It cannot therefore be secular, in the sense that we understand it in this House, but it is not concordat either, and so those who speak of a Vatican Europe are caricaturing reality more than they are describing it accurately. On the other hand, the power of Catholic lobbying is obvious and is reinforced by the weight of the EPP (European People's Party) within the institutions; but the institutions are nonetheless obliged to observe a kind of benevolent neutrality.ⁱⁱⁱ.

European governance is therefore not adopting the the regulatory state. On the other hand, it is in line with the notion of d'État animateur insofar as it assumes the loss of centrality of politico-state actors in favour of multi-polar, multi-level, decentralised, informal and non-hierarchical action between the state and social groups.

Relations between the European institutions and religious and philosophical organisations are based on six principles:

• Subsidiarity ;
• Recognition of the positive social role of religion and non-confessional organisations ;
• Recognition of their specificity in relation to other civil society organisations;
• Positive neutrality of the institution with regard to the players ;
• Recognition of religious and philosophical pluralism ;
• A structured legal arsenal on non-discrimination on the basis of religion and belief.

This, whether we like it or not, is the reality we face and within which we are forced to act.

The dialogue organised within the framework of Article 17 is therefore a particular form - assumed by the partners - of lobbying or advocacy. And lobbying is a technique that involves persuasion and must take into account the notion of a balance of power.

The important thing, especially for weaker partners like AEPL, is to be active and relevant in the action. Because institutions are open to proposals from partners and, contrary to popular belief, it's not always the "big boys" who win.

Concrete examples to help me understand.

Our intervention with the EU Ombudsman to remove the theology criterion from the list of criteria for selecting members of the European Group on Ethics was acted upon at the renewal in 2017.

The renewal of the mandate of the EU Special Envoy for Freedom of Religion and Belief outside Europe, to whom we have made representations along with other organisations, has strengthened the recognition of the plight of non-believers, atheists and apostates in the resolution passed last January by the European Parliament.^iv.

The question is therefore how to harness its energy to achieve concrete results that have an impact on people's daily lives.

The question is also, more fundamentally, to see how we can, in relation to the EU, participate in the production of consensus. Should we stick to the cross-cutting consensus defined by John Rawls, pushing divisive issues, such as religious questions, back into the realm of the domestic forum?^v ? Or should we follow the path of consensus through confrontation, as theorised by Jürgen Habermas? As the philosopher Jean-Marc Ferry put it: 

"The model of consensus through confrontation therefore goes back to the principle or formula of dissociation between private values and public standards, or between private convictions and public reason. It relies on the very procedure of an ethic of discussion, conducted publicly and without reservation, to open up the prospect of a practical consensus, of a possible agreement on practical questions that arise in practice.^vi

Over the last forty years, this model has unquestionably worked in Belgium on ethical issues. With great difficulty, in the 1980s, in the case of termination of pregnancy. Much more serenely for the law on euthanasia and - almost naturally - for same-sex marriage. This consensus based on confrontation also served to change the law on abortion in Ireland.

If this model can be useful, it is because it generally leads to the conclusion that the best solution for resolving disagreement over fundamental values is to create a legal space that allows individuals to exercise their autonomous choice. Laws such as those authorising abortion or euthanasia do not force anyone to resort to them. Laws prohibiting these options, on the other hand, are laws that prevent individuals from exercising their freedom. In fact, the system enables secular principles to be put into practice.

In conclusion, rooted in the tradition of the Enlightenment, AEPL opts for a Europe made up of states that are not necessarily secular in the French sense, but impartial (taking up the notion of "secular"). Secular States ") :

• Where the broadest protection goes to the smallest minority, the individual, because citizenship is based on autonomous subjects capable of freely choosing what constitutes their personal identity.^vii.
• Where civil law takes precedence over any other source of law.
• Where there are no restrictions on equality between men and women.
• Where, with regard to a number of ethical issues that are the subject of debate, the authorities legislate in such a way as to enable individuals to make informed choices.
• Where the right to be different does not lead to different rights.
• Where, in terms of education funding, the neutrality of state schools constitutes an objective difference guaranteeing - at the very least - privileged treatment in relation to denominational schools.

We believe that these concrete objectives are achievable throughout Europe, despite the specific characteristics of each country. Progress will be all the faster if we create genuine solidarity between all those who support this approach.

It's not an impossible task. And the European institutions are far from impervious to these ideas.

Two examples to convince you.

Much has been made in recent months of a decision by the European Court of Human Rights of the Council of Europe, sitting in Strasbourg (ECHR), concerning the judgment of a Greek court in a divorce case.^viii. Some newspapers, some secular associations and Mrs Le Pen commented on this decision by declaring that the ECHR wanted to promote the

Sharia law in Europe. These assertions are based on a superficial and biased reading of the judgment, which considers that the Sharia - which Greece recognises by treaty as a source of law in civil cases concerning its Turkish-speaking minority in Thrace - could not prevent the plaintiff in this case from invoking Greek ordinary law to settle the dispute.

Curiously enough, another piece of information on the same subject has been completely ignored by the same newspapers, associations and personalities. This is Resolution 2253 adopted last January by the Parliamentary Assembly of the same Council of Europe on Sharia law, the Cairo Declaration and the European Convention on Human Rights. I will quote just two extracts which should put things into perspective:

The Assembly is also very concerned that Sharia law, including provisions clearly contrary to the Convention, is being applied officially or unofficially in several Council of Europe member states, in all or part of their territory.

The Assembly also recalls that it has repeatedly stressed its support for the principle of the separation of state and religion, one of the pillars of a democratic society, for example in its Recommendation 1804 (2007) on state, religion, secularity and human rights. It is important to continue to respect this principle.

The European Parliament can also adopt texts that should reassure us. Such is the case with its decision defining the mandate of the Special Envoy for the promotion of freedom of religion and belief outside Europe, adopted on 15 January. This text clearly reaffirms the importance of the separation of Church and State, described as an essential constitutional principle; it also insists on the guarantees that must be available to non-believers or people who want to break with or change their religion.^ix.

While the EU institutions are far from perfect, much of the criticism levelled at them is based on misconceptions or prejudices - in short, on a lack of information. This explains the need to develop education for European citizenship, which AEPL called for in a petition and which the EU recommended to the Member States in its declaration at the Göteborg European Social Summit in November 2017 and gave concrete form to in a recommendation approved in January 2018.^x

My experience shows that we can make significant progress in terms of the values we defend, but we can only do so by uniting on objectives and not dividing on definitions or models.

Contrary to what we too often think, the values of the Enlightenment are still progressing. But this progress is causing the enemies of freedom to tense up. The battle is never over, and deserves everyone's efforts. We are therefore obliged to return to this recommendation, to combine the pessimism of reason with the optimism of will.

• Freedom of conscience has always been dear to the hearts of Belgians, and Belgian Masons were pioneers in this field when, in 1872, they abolished the obligation for LLs to invoke the Great Architect of the Universe and the immortality of the soul. On this subject, read with interest the work by Hervé Hasquin Belgian Catholics and the FM, Foreword, Brussels, 2011
• Laïcité organisée brings together all the non-confessional organisations that make up the Conseil central des Communautés philosophiques non-confessionnelles de Belgique, or Conseil central laïque for short.
• On this complex subject, see MASSIGNON, B, Gods and civil servants, religions and secularism faced with the challenge of European integration ; Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2007.
• EU guidelines and the mandate of the EU Special Envoy on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EUP8_TA-PROV(2019)0013.
• The paradigmatic spectre in this respect is the war of religion. To prevent or ward off this ever-present risk in liberal thought, particularly that of John Rawls, the solution since Hobbes has consisted in privatising convictions and beliefs - in other words, in what I would call a 'political excommunication' of religion: public reason on the one hand, private conviction on the other. This is the pre-liberal formula for social pacification. This is the basis for the liberal model of consensus by overlap: it is assumed that members of society will be able to find in their private values the good reasons, still private, for adhering to common standards which are public''. (Ferry, Jean-Marc, Proceed democratically, in Revue Nouvelle, Bruxelles, 1-2/2003, pp 10-17), p. 17.
• Ferry, Jean-Marc,, p.16.
• As Stanislas de Clermont-Tonnerre famously said in a speech to the National Assembly in 1789, "The Jews must be denied everything as a nation [today we would say community]. and grant everything to the Jews as individuals. They must not form a political body or an order within the State. They must be individual citizens. This lapidary formula marks the refusal to inscribe the citizen in a membership that he has not defined himself. It should also be remembered that the first act of anti-Semitic regimes has always been to deprive their Jewish citizens of their citizenship, forcibly confining them to a "community" that they had not necessarily chosen (Otto Frank, Anne's father, had served as an officer in the German army during the First World War and certainly did not see himself as an outsider to the German nation).
• Molla Sali v Greece judgment of 19 December 2018
• Considering that the principle of the separation of Church and State is an essential constitutional principle worldwide and in Europe ;

Whereas freedom of religion and belief implies the right of the individual to choose what he or she believes or does not believe, the right to change or abandon his or her religion and beliefs without coercion, and the right to practice and manifest the thought, conscience, religion and belief of his or her choice, whether individually or in community with others or in private or in public; whereas the manifestation of thought, conscience, religion or belief may be expressed in worship, observance, practice and teaching ; that freedom of religion and belief implies the right of believing and non-believing communities to maintain or abandon their ethos and to act accordingly, as well as the right of religious, secular and non-confessional organisations to have a recognised legal personality; that the protection of persons adhering to any religion or to no religion and the effective combating of violations of freedom of religion and belief, such as discrimination or legal restrictions based on religion or belief, are essential conditions for individuals to enjoy this freedom on an equal basis.

EU guidelines and the mandate of the EU Special Envoy on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EUP8_TA-PROV (2019) 0013.

• Council recommendation on promoting common values, inclusive education, and the European dimension of teaching {SWD(2018) 13 final}

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CONTENTS

1) - The facts

2) - Rebuilding Europe: principles and values

            2-a) Solidarity, democracy and transparency

            2-b) A clearer project

            2-c) A shared European identity

            2-d) European sovereignty

3) - Means of action

            3-a) Un « noyau dur »?

                        - Groups of volunteer states                      

                        - The euro zone as the first circle

                        - The end of unanimous voting

            3-b) A budget to meet the challenges

                        - A budget for the euro zone

                        - Better-adapted programming

                        - New resources

            3-c) The right institutions

                        - The European Parliament

                        - The European Council

                        - The European Commission

4) - Community policies to be developed

            4-a) Common policies

            4-b) A genuine economic policy

            4-c) European defence

            4-d) From enlargement to the reunification of Europe

            4-e) A European response to migratory crises

            4-f) A language policy

            4-g) Education for European citizenship

            4-h) A community of values and individual freedoms

5) - Conclusion: The European dream

"EUROPE DIFFERENTLY

DE LA NÉCESSITÉ DE REFONDER L’EUROPE

Preamble

The European Association of Free Thought (AEPL) aims to promote the European project, respect for the fundamental rights of citizens and the separation of religions and the State. It brings together in a European network covering more than twenty countries SS and FF motivated by European integration and sharing humanist values and principles of peace and progress.

The document "Europe differently - the need to rebuild Europe"is the fruit of almost two years of consultation with AEPL members. In it, they express their conceptions of the future of a European Union capable of meeting the challenges of today's world while respecting their own values. This text is a summary of the responses received to date. It covers the main issues raised by our members and presents a coherent whole.

Above all, this document is intended to be the fruit of reflection by grassroots citizens. In this sense, it is a project built from the bottom up and not the other way round, thus fulfilling the wish of European leaders, who frequently declare that they are listening to citizens.

Introduction

Comme de nombreux citoyens européens ou responsables politiques, les membres de l’Association Européenne de la Pensée Libre sont préoccupés par le risque de voir le projet européen menacé, voire échouer. Tout en soutenant avec conviction le principe de la construction européenne, nous constatons que l’UE telle qu’elle fonctionne aujourd’hui n’est plus en mesure de répondre aux inquiétudes des nombreux citoyens confrontés aux bouleversements du monde. Ces citoyens ont le sentiment que l’Europe est indifférente ou impuissante. Des partis fondés sur le rejet de l’Europe sont en train de s’implanter durablement dans le paysage politique de nombreux États membres. Si l’on veut éviter l’échec de l’UE, il faut impérativement lui donner un nouvel élan, le statu quo menant à terme au fiasco.

C’est pourquoi nous souhaitons proposer le projet  d’une « Europe autrement » capable de relancer l’enthousiasme.

After a quick reportWe will be reiterating the need for a new foundation and a strong reaffirmation of our values.  principles and values which, in our view, must form the basis of this new European Union.

We will then define the means of action to be implemented. These resources may concern the decision-making processes or the different levels of integration desired by the Member States. The scope for action of a reformed Union is closely conditioned by the level and nature of the budgetary resources allocated to it. This issue will also be addressed. Finally, we will address the question of European governance and therefore the organisation of the Community institutions.

Some of today's major challenges are on such a scale that they are beyond the scope of any single state and call for joint responses on a European scale. Several examples of policies of community interest will be presented. We will look successively at the economy, defence, the response to migratory crises, enlargement policies, the possibility of a language policy and education for European citizenship.

To conclude, a final section will be devoted to what could be the european dream for a movement like ours, committed to the values of solidarity, humanism and progress.

1) - The facts

Nos membres font le constat que le contexte du début de la construction européenne, (celui de la guerre froide et de l’essor de l’économie de rattrapage au sortir de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale) a radicalement changé. La mondialisation des échanges commerciaux, la financiarisation de l’économie ainsi que sa dérégulation, la révolution numérique et robotique, l’explosion des inégalités, la montée de l’intolérance religieuse, les guerres contre des organisations terroristes internationales (Daesh et autres), les conséquences alarmantes des activités humaines sur l’environnement et le climat, l’épuisement des réserves de matières premières non renouvelables forment aujourd’hui un contexte d’instabilité anxiogène pour beaucoup de citoyens européens.

D’autre part, jamais l’Europe n’a été frappée par autant de crises majeures de façon simultanée :

• market uncertainties since the systemic global economic and financial crisis of 2008
• specific eurozone crisis
• political crisis in Western democracies (success of populism)
• crises within the EU (unprecedented fractures: North-South, East-West, old-new, regional separatism, Brexit)
• instabilité géopolitique périphérique, crises et conflits armés aux frontières extérieures  de l’Union européenne (Russie, Ukraine, Turquie, Proche-Orient…)
• crise de confiance avec l’allié traditionnel américain
• major refugee and migrant crisis.

L’absence de perspectives de solutions à court terme sur toutes ces questions, ainsi que la perte de repères due à la mondialisation, entretiennent des peurs qui conduisent de larges fractions de nos populations à se replier sur elles-mêmes et à se raccrocher aux repères historiques familiers. En Europe : le modèle de l’État–nation souverain avec le risque de dérive nationaliste, les religions avec le risque de l’intolérance, les identités supposées avec le risque du rejet de l’autre et du repli sur soi. Autant de risques de régressions qui menacent directement les fondements du projet européen.

2) - Rebuilding Europe: principles and values

2-a) Solidarity, democracy and transparency

Pour répondre à ces inquiétudes et à cette importante désaffection vis à vis de l’idée européenne, il faut donc repenser une Europe qui serait à la fois : plus démocratique, plus protectrice, plus solidaire, plus transparente, plus efficace et plus compréhensible.

Le respect des valeurs européennes, dont les libertés individuelles sont consignées aujourd’hui dans la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne[1], impose au projet de refondation d’être avant tout fidèle aux principes de dignité de l’individu, de liberté, d’égalité des droits, de solidarité et de liberté de pensée.  Cela passe par une réaffirmation des valeurs de démocratie et de droits de l’homme[2].

Refounding will in some cases mean profound changes, in others improvements. In particular, this Europe will have to free itself from the excessive postulates of neo-liberalism, which have been so damaging. Stimulating competition will lead the European project to its demise if we forget along the way the necessary solidarity that must unite both States and peoples.

2-b) A clearer project

These principles and values should be able to commit all the States involved in the project to relaunch the European Union.  These principles could be set out in a short text that could have constitutional status. This text would define the objectifs de l’Union and in particular the objective of creating a transnational entity through the agreed transfer of sovereignty, a text to be ratified, if necessary, after consultation of the citizens of the signatory states. The absence of a project clearly expressed at the outset by the Member States is a major handicap for the EU, fostering doubt and encouraging euroscepticism.

Un système institutionnel équilibré reconnaît des droits mais impose aussi des devoirs. Tout manquement d’un État aux règles communes ou aux valeurs démocratiques devrait pouvoir se traduire par des sanctions réellement appliquées. Pour respecter les principes d’un État de droit, il faudra maintenir les dispositions de l’article 2 du traité de Lisbonne sur les valeurs de l’Union[3]. En revanche, il conviendrait  a) de compléter l’application de l’article 7 (qui prévoit que l’État membre qui ne respecte pas ces dispositions peut perdre son droit de vote au Conseil) par un article prévoyant l’amputation de certains fonds et financements en cas de violation de l’article 2,  b) de remplacer la règle de l’unanimité par celle de la majorité qualifiée.[4]

2-c) A shared European identity

Ce qui nous rapproche en tant qu’Européens est plus important que ce qui nous sépare. Il existe maintenant, de droit, une citoyenneté européenne. Mais le plein exercice de cette citoyenneté nécessite de forger une identité européenne à côté de toutes les autres, qui se traduise par un sentiment d’appartenance avec ses droits et ses devoirs.

One of the essential conditions for spreading this sense of belonging is a better understanding of what Europe is. Getting to know it better means becoming aware of the eminent part played by the construction of Europe in recent decades in extending the freedoms, rights and advantages we enjoy today. It also means realising that all Europeans share a common history and heritage.

Le plein exercice de la citoyenneté passe aussi par l’information sur le fonctionnement institutionnel de l’Europe, d’une part, et de ses États membres, d’autre part. Aujourd’hui, ces questions sont essentiellement traitées par des médias nationaux et souvent à la rubrique «Monde», «Étranger» ou «International». Une actualité européenne bien informée, soutenue par une communication grand-public de la part des institutions, devrait avoir sa place en tant que telle pour symboliser non pas quelque chose d’étranger mais un espace partagé entre États membres au sein d’une même Union.  Le rôle de médias développant une offre attractive (à l’image du succès de la chaîne de télévision franco-allemande Arte) permettrait à un plus grand nombre de se former à une culture européenne et de cultiver la fierté d’être européen.

Pour cela, il faut généraliser et afficher les symboles de l’Europe : le drapeau, l’hymne, la devise « Unis dans la diversité » et la journée de l’Europe le 9 mai célébrant le discours fondateur de Robert Schuman, date qui devrait pouvoir être fêtée, partout en Europe, par des évènements symboliques.

2-d) European sovereignty

In a largely globalised and interconnected world, we know that policies dealing with global issues can only be fully effective if they are dealt with at Community level. It will therefore be necessary to transfer certain exclusive powers from the Member States to the Community level. These transfers will have to be transparent and freely consented to by a majority of the Member States who decide to do so. A redefinition of competences will naturally be necessary in order to have the means to have, for example, a common defence associated with a common foreign policy.

Si la compétence pour préserver les quatre libertés dans l’Union européenne (liberté de circulation des citoyens, des biens, des services et des capitaux) doit être réservée aux institutions européennes, il faut cependant rester vigilant quant au maintien des compétences dévolues aux États membres. C’est pourquoi la question de la subsidiarité[5] is fundamental and deserves to be re-examined. The main criticism is that this principle of subsidiarity, enshrined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and as it operates in practice, has had the effect of absolving the intermediate levels of decision-making (national, regional, etc.) of any real European commitment. It is all too easy to wrongly accuse "Brussels" of dictating its rules to the Member States. If subsidiarity is to be fully embraced by all those involved in political action, it must correspond to a proposal to delegate powers to the European level that comes freely from the local level (from the bottom up) and not be imposed from the top.

In areas deemed to be of mixed competence (EU/States or EU/regions) by the European Court of Justice, institutional mechanisms involving national parliaments in decision-making could nevertheless be preserved. However, if federalist tendencies were to prevail, the notion of mixed competence would surely disappear.

In a context of global crises and threats, European citizens will be better protected by sovereignty on a European scale than they will be by national sovereignty. This is one of the major challenges of the necessary rebuilding of a different Europe.

3) - Means of action

3-a) Un « noyau dur » ?

The original plan was for the Member States to move forward together towards an "ever closer union". But the ups and downs of history, national votes and successive waves of enlargement to include states with varying motivations for integration have meant that the reality is one of cooperation and integration à la carte. Not all states have signed up to all the union programmes. There are already de facto "circles" with different perimeters (euro zone, Schengen area, Customs Union, European Economic Area, Police and Judicial Cooperation Area, etc.) which do not overlap with the perimeter formed by the 28 (27) EU Member States.

- Voluntary groups of states. C’est donc l’idée de « noyau dur » ou d’une Europe à géométrie variable qui semble à beaucoup la plus prometteuse pour redonner un nouvel élan à l’Union. Un groupe d’États membres volontaires[6] peut ainsi renforcer son degré d’intégration mais à la condition que les autres ne puissent lui opposer de blocage. Ces pays, convaincus que l’échelon européen n’est pas une limitation mais la condition même de leur souveraineté, pourraient aller vers plus de fédéralisme, tandis que les autres les rejoindraient à leur rythme et s’ils le souhaitent. Cela devra se faire sans que les autres États membres ne se considèrent comme laissés pour compte, les acquis communautaires existants leur restant acquis.

Parvenir à ce résultat marque un saut fédéral, même si l’UE n’est pas un État fédéral en formation au sens classique. Toutefois, il convient de noter que l’UE  en possède déjà un certain nombre d’attributs importants, tels que la Banque centrale européenne (BCE), l’Euro, Schengen, l’Union bancaire, le Mécanisme européen de stabilité, la Cour des comptes européenne, les garde-frontières et garde-côtes, etc. Quant à l’approche consistant à passer d’emblée par un texte ayant valeur constitutionnelle, elle a peu de chances de réussite à court ou moyen terme, compte tenu des expériences récentes (l’échec du Traité constitutionnel de 2005) sauf modification des traités.

- The eurozone as the first circle. Beaucoup pensent que la zone euro, déjà fortement intégrée de par sa monnaie, pourrait constituer un des premiers « noyaux durs ». Il lui faudrait pour cela un budget propre, une coordination des politiques économiques et monétaires, ainsi que des procédures de  solidarité financière et d’harmonisation fiscale, sous l’autorité d’un ministre responsable de l’Union économique et monétaire (UEM). Cela aurait notamment pour effet de  pallier ses défauts de construction, d’améliorer son efficacité et de renforcer sa résilience aux crises. Un parlement de la zone euro pourrait voir le jour, composé de membres du Parlement Européen issus des pays formant ce « premier cercle ».

- The end of the unanimous vote. Dans une telle perspective, et pour éviter un blocage par des minorités, il est indispensable que les États membres volontaires qui accepteront pour être plus efficaces de respecter des règles plus contraignantes décident de poursuivre l’extension du champ du vote à la majorité qualifiée pour en finir avec le principe paralysant de l’unanimité. Il est en effet inefficace de devoir négocier comme aujourd’hui au prix de compromis boiteux qui comportent des exceptions pour obtenir une unanimité de façade. Et lorsqu’il s’agit de questions importantes de droit primaire de l’Union Européenne (nouveau traité ou modification de traité existant) un texte devrait pouvoir être adopté si les 4/5 des États membres l’ont approuvé, que ce soit sous forme parlementaire ou référendaire.

3-b) A budget that meets the challenges.

C’est un point essentiel : pour mener ces politiques, l’UE doit pouvoir disposer d’un budget adapté. Le budget actuel est très largement insuffisant (1 % du PIB, là où le budget fédéral des États-Unis est de l’ordre de 24 %) et il est trop dépendant des contributions des États, chaque fois remises en causes au prix de désolantes négociations. Le budget doit être considérablement augmenté (au départ au moins 5% à 10% du PIB de l’UE) pour assurer la crédibilité et la visibilité des actions menées par l’UE.

- A budget for the euro zone. Today, States outside the eurozone have the same power to take decisions on budgetary matters as States belonging to the eurozone. It would be logical for there to be one budget for the eurozone and another for all the Member States. The eurozone budget should pursue several objectives:

• provide incentives for Member States to carry out structural reforms
• financing investment in public goods
• ensure a form of solidarity in the event of an asymmetric shock
• give priority to policies with a social dimension
• act as a counter-cyclical instrument in the event of a severe recession in the eurozone.

- Better-adapted programming. The multi-annual planning of budget expenditure - which currently covers a seven-year period - should also be brought more into line with the five-year mandate of the Commission and the European Parliament. Greater flexibility between categories of expenditure and between years of programming would also be desirable and would make it possible to deal with new priorities imposed by current events, such as the management of migratory flows and the protection of external borders.

- New resources. A côté ou en remplacement des ressources actuelles liées à la TVA ainsi qu’au Produit intérieur brut (PIB) des États membres, ce budget devra nécessairement être renforcé par des ressources propres. Celles-ci pourraient par exemple provenir d’un pourcentage réduit de l’ensemble de la TVA intracommunautaire, d’un pourcentage de l’impôt sur les sociétés, de récupération d’impôts sur les géants du numérique pratiquant la défiscalisation, comme les  GAFAT[7], de certains droits de douane aux frontières de l’UE (ce qui permettrait de lutter efficacement contre les pratiques de dumping ou de privilégier les échanges avec les pays les plus vertueux au niveau social ou environnemental), d’une taxe carbone européenne permettant d’orienter l’économie vers une moindre utilisation des énergies fossiles, d’une taxe sur les transactions financières concernant de façon solidaire l’ensemble des États membres de l’UE, voire une taxe sur les matières plastiques.

-Financing transfers and transparency. Il faudra également saisir l’opportunité offerte par le Brexit pour promouvoir davantage de solidarité entre les pays riches et les pays moins riches et en finir avec l’obsession des soldes nets donnant lieu à compensation. Avec ce nouveau budget de l’UE, il y aura aussi un devoir d’explication et de communication pour améliorer le lien avec le contribuable européen qui doit pouvoir connaître sa participation et contrôler en toute transparence l’utilisation de ces fonds et l’efficacité de leur emploi. Enfin, pour assurer le consentement à l’impôt, si nécessaire dans l’exercice démocratique, il convient d’améliorer encore le contrôle en toute transparence de l’utilisation des fonds européens et la qualité des résultats obtenus sous le contrôle de la Cour des comptes européenne.

Parallèlement, il pourrait être judicieux de donner une compétence supplémentaire à la BCE en la chargeant aussi de combattre le chômage, comme c’est le cas pour la Banque fédérale américaine, tout en approfondissant la coopération avec la Banque européenne d’investissement comme dans le cas des plans Juncker qui permettent un important effet de levier sur les fonds du budget communautaire.

In short, this new Community budget, finally equal to the challenges, would make it possible to support, extend and increase the resources for a revival of the European economy, while maintaining strict control and freeing ourselves from the dogma of budgetary austerity.

3-c) The new European governance: appropriate institutions

To apply these policies, the European Union needs institutions that are efficient, democratic and understandable to its citizens. A few simple rules can be laid down as a preamble:

When you're part of a club, you accept all the rules, not just those that favour you. A state cannot exempt itself from those it does not like, as is currently the case on a number of issues, the most blatant being the Euro and social policy.

Il sera nécessaire de clarifier le triangle institutionnel européen qui s’est complexifié par traités successifs, souvent au gré des marchandages entre États membres, et qui manque aujourd’hui de cohérence pour gouverner de façon efficace et démocratique. Puisqu’il faudra engager de nouvelles politiques communes, il faudra aussi tendre vers une fédéralisation des institutions, seul mode de gouvernance à même de favoriser l’émergence d’une véritable société politique européenne.

This is also why we need to reduce intergovernmental management as much as possible and move towards greater federalism in vital areas (see chapter 4). Only a reform of the institutions will enable the efficiency thus achieved to go hand in hand with all the guarantees of a more democratic system.

We need to revisit the separation of powers, principally between the legislative and executive branches, with the judiciary currently regulated by the Court of Justice of the European Union. The legislature should be based on a classic bicameral system (a chamber of citizens and a chamber of states) with redefined roles and powers for each chamber:

- The European Parliament : Il constitue le pilier démocratique de l’UE. Le Parlement européen, chambre des citoyens, devrait voir ses pouvoirs augmenter, mais surtout être réorganisé dans sa composition et son fonctionnement pour être plus représentatif des peuples et moins des structures partisanes nationales.

It seems essential that voters should be able to vote for European parties and not, as at present, for purely national parties. Each party will have a European programme and its own vision of the future of Europe, which will enable citizens to make a clear decision on European political issues. This vote should take place symbolically at the same time in all the countries concerned.

The European Parliament should legitimately have a role of parliamentary initiative. The powers it will have to exercise include budgetary and fiscal power over the Union's resources, and control of the executive over its expenditure and the implementation of its actions. As at present, it will have the power of censure and the power of confidence. It will have the power to appoint the President of the Commission and each of the Commissioners.

The European Parliament should be made one of the two sources of the EU's legislative programme, which means reviewing the current monopoly held by the European Commission in this area. As part of its extended powers, the European Parliament should also be able to give an upstream opinion on mandates to negotiate international agreements, particularly trade agreements, which are currently given to the Commission alone.

- The European Council The Council should eventually become the second chamber, that of the States. It could also be organised into sectoral councils, as is currently the case with the Councils of Ministers. As the Senate, it will have to co-decide with the Parliament, which implies defining a system of mediation in the event of disagreement.

In this Senate, all the States could have the same number of representatives, as is the case in the American federal system. This is one of the conditions for more complete integration. Votes would be taken by simple majority to avoid paralysis of decisions following the right of veto. However, it must lose its exclusive role as the driving force behind European policy.

- The European Commission : Elle représente le pouvoir exécutif. Elle devra agir en se fondant sur un programme législatif général adopté par les deux chambres. Elle devra être issue de majorités politiques et avoir le soutien des organes législatifs devant lesquels elle sera pleinement responsable. Selon les usages des démocraties parlementaires, le chef de cet exécutif sera le leader du parti ou de la coalition disposant d’une majorité au Parlement.

D’autres options font élire le président de la Commission par suffrage universel direct pour renforcer encore sa légitimité. Il représente alors le choix majoritaire des citoyens. Dans tous les cas, il devra conduire avec son gouvernement la politique pour laquelle il aura été élu. Il répond de sa politique devant le Parlement.

En tant que « chef de gouvernement », le président de la Commission devra pouvoir choisir lui-même ses commissaires qui ne seraient alors plus imposés par les États. Il pourra les choisir pour leur compétence, leur poids politique, pour leur engagement européen, leur probité, en respectant l’égalité femmes-hommes et l’équilibre entre les pays d’origine. Le collège des commissaires devra être réduit  pour plus d’efficacité et de cohérence : les 28 (bientôt 27) commissaires actuels seront remplacés par un nombre plus réduit de vice-présidents aux pouvoirs élargis, ayant sous leur tutelle des «ministères» permettant de porter au pouvoir un personnel politique de qualité issu de l’ensemble de l’UE.

L’objectif est de transformer la Commission en une institution plus politique, plus démocratique, plus efficace et ne dépendant plus des marchandages au sommet dont sont coutumiers les 28 (27) État-membres. Cela conduira à une Europe qui fonctionne selon un système plus simple, aux pouvoirs mieux définis et équilibrés tel qu’il a fait ses preuves dans la plupart des démocraties européennes et dont les compétences et responsabilités seront bien connues de tous les citoyens.

4) - Community policies to be developed

4-a) New common policies

Pour redonner confiance aux citoyens, l’UE devra pouvoir mener, parallèlement aux politiques régaliennes qui seraient déjà devenues communautaires, un certain nombre de politiques dont les résultats pourront lui être attribués en toute transparence. Les citoyens européens doivent pouvoir associer clairement l’Europe à une amélioration concrète de leurs conditions d’existence.

This is the case in areas where a single State cannot reasonably hope to achieve satisfactory results. Only Community action can mobilise sufficiently powerful resources to be truly effective. To move towards ever closer union between Member States, we can draw up a list of areas of convergence where the Community level is already or would be the most relevant.

Les priorités retenues concernent un renforcement des compétences fédérales dans les domaines de la politique économique, fiscale et budgétaire, l’environnement et l’énergie, la politique sociale, la défense et la politique étrangère, des politiques de coordination de la police, du renseignement de la justice, la coordination et la coopération en matière d’asile et d’immigration. On peut en proposer ici une liste non exhaustive et non classée dans un ordre prioritaire :

Social and environmental

• Stimulus policies and the protection of European social models
• Policy to combat global warming
• Energy security policy
• Protection de l’environnement
• Quality agricultural production policy

Defence and security

• The fight against terrorism
• Fighting international crime
• Common defence policy
• Intelligence policy and cyber protection
• Fond d’intervention civile en cas de catastrophe
• Politique de surveillance aux frontières extérieures de l’UE

Migration and cooperation

• Responses to migration crises
• Politique de coopération et d’aide au développement

Economic and commercial policy

• A policy of massive investment in new technologies
• Commercial negotiating power against China, the USA, etc.
• Counterweight to the power of the global digital mega-corporations (GAFAT)
• The fight against tax havens
• Fair intra-European tax policy
• Building resilience to financial crises

Pour ce qui est de la justice, après le mandat d’arrêt européen, il y aurait lieu de renforcer Europol, de mettre en place Eurojust et un Parquet européen avec à sa tête un Procureur général européen. Le but étant de faire avancer la collaboration des autorités judiciaires des États membres dans la lutte contre la  criminalité transfrontière, dont la fraude à la TVA. Dans un deuxième temps, il conviendra de prévoir une compétence pour créer des tribunaux européens.

We therefore need to move towards politicising the European Union in order to provide the means for effective action whose positive effects can be measured by citizens.

4-b) A genuine economic policy

The laudable aim of organising free and undistorted competition internally[8]cannot take the place of a single principle in a Europe that wants to maintain its position and influence on the world stage. Vigilant monitoring of internal economic competition, which prevents major European companies from holding a monopoly position, must not result in their being deprived of any chance of competing with the global giants.

Concevoir l’Europe autrement impose de rechercher les moyens à mettre en œuvre pour favoriser le développement des entreprises européennes afin de les rendre compétitives dans l’économie globalisée. Cela passe par une impulsion forte venant des institutions dans les différents domaines stratégiques : recherche et développement, investissements, soutien au secteur industriel,  politique d’innovation, soutien aux pépinières d’entreprises (par ex. start-up), aux nouveaux métiers et nouveaux modes de production.

A significant increase in budgetary resources for incentives, direct funding and leverage effects would enable these objectives to be achieved in a federal spirit of solidarity.

Une stratégie européenne en matière économique se doit de respecter le double objectif de réussite : économique et sociale. C’est la recherche d’une économie dynamique et performante permettant une juste répartition des rémunérations entre investisseurs et salariés, dans le double but de fidéliser les investisseurs et de protéger les salariés.

The Europe of the future must be a policy of consultation, coordination, control, ethics and solidarity in the face of the technologies of the future (digital, neuroscience, biology, transhumanism, artificial intelligence, etc.) that will have a direct impact on our lives and our future. There is no question of erecting illusory customs barriers, but Europe must demand that imported products be ethically produced (no slavery, no child labour, humane conditions of employment in terms of working hours, safety and social protection). If these conditions are not met, then we should be able to apply a taxation mechanism on entry to the EU or refuse entry if necessary. These conditions should be validated by independent bodies (World Trade Organisation, etc.).

Concerning developing countriesThe European economy should also be able to direct investment towards innovative projects. While the principle of a sufficient level of aid to these countries should not be called into question, the process needs to be controlled. And to do this :

– Revoir les méthodes d’évaluation pour éviter la corruption et permettre une meilleure prise en compte des besoins réels des populations

- Establish closer collaboration and partnership with the countries receiving aid, which are often in the best position to understand their needs because of their local knowledge.

– Réactualiser les aides en fonction de l’évolution des priorités (changement climatique, intérêts géostratégiques, mise en place d’une véritable politique étrangère et d’une diplomatie dont l’aide au développement pourrait être un des instruments…)

Thus, while being open to the global economy, the EU must be able to exercise a degree of protectionism at its external borders and equip itself with the means for a genuine economic policy that guarantees its values and interests in global competition.

4-c) European defence

The need for a common defence was apparent from the outset of the European Union project. Blocked in 1954 by the refusal of the French Parliament, the idea of a European Community defence is now back on the agenda.

Alors que les menaces augmentent, l’Europe peine à régler ses questions de sécurité. Depuis la fin de la guerre froide, les Européens ne cessent de se désarmer et les efforts d’armement des États membres sont très inégalement répartis. Les Européens se sont habitués au parapluie que constitue l’OTAN financée à 75% par les États-Unis. Mais aujourd’hui, les États-Unis ont d’autres intérêts stratégiques, notamment en Asie–Pacifique. Quant au Royaume-Uni, il risque en se retirant d’affaiblir de façon significative le potentiel militaire de l’UE, même si des accords bilatéraux avec l’UE pourront prendre le relais. L’Europe se trouve aujourd’hui de plus en plus isolée. Une défense commune serait une composante essentielle pour une Union européenne qui se veut plus influente au niveau international car aujourd’hui, le soft power de l’UE ne suffit plus .

This new situation has rekindled interest in finding pooled resources                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                and autonomous forces capable of ensuring the defence and security of the European Union. This concern for pooling also responds to public demand for greater efficiency in defence spending in Europe, at a time when the resources allocated to public spending are becoming ever smaller. Some have proposed the creation of a very large European defence fund. The idea has even been put forward of transferring almost all defence budgets, including their debt since they joined the eurozone, to a dedicated fund guaranteed by the Member States. Be that as it may, the answers to the financing questions are central to the feasibility of an integrated defence.

But the prerequisite for the development of a doctrine What is undeniably shared is the existence of a Europe that is more united politically, diplomatically, economically and fiscally, but also morally. The defence of Europe by Europeans and for Europeans seems to us to be a necessity, but there are still profound disagreements between Member States depending on their traditional position (neutral, Atlanticist or Europeanist). As with all issues where a vanguard of states should be able to proceed by enhanced cooperation, l’Europe de la défense devrait faire partie du noyau dur. On peut envisager que la France, de par son expérience et son potentiel militaire actuel puisse y prendre sa part de leadership, étroitement épaulée par l’Allemagne et bientôt renforcée par d’autres États partageant une même vision de la mutualisation des efforts de défense pilotés grâce à un état-major centralisé, qui existe déjà à l’état embryonnaire dans l’UE, à Bruxelles. Mais on peut aussi imaginer que l’Europe de la défense pourrait plus aisément recruter son premier « noyau dur » en regroupant des États moins peuplés et de tradition moins souverainiste, comme c’est le cas des États baltes ou du ceux du « Benelux ».

4-d) From enlargement to the reunification of Europe

Le principe d’élargissement s’inscrit dès le départ dans le projet européen. L’Europe s’est bâtie sur le refus des nationalismes et le dépassement des frontières, sa vocation étant de rassembler l’ensemble du continent autour du noyau des six pays fondateurs. La réunification de l’Europe reste l’objectif de tous ceux qui souhaitent sincèrement bâtir un espace de paix et de prospérité partagé par tous les Européens.

The Franco-Dutch "no" vote in the 2005 referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty was already largely motivated by the ill-prepared arrival in 2004 of 8 new countries from Central and Eastern Europe. This enlargement enabled these countries to really catch up economically. But after the beginnings of democratic normalisation, some of them ended up drifting towards authoritarianism and ultra-nationalism, questioning public freedoms and adopting a purely utilitarian relationship with the Union. Enlargement has been an economic success, but is proving to be a political failure that is undermining the cohesion of the EU.

Is it now necessary to integrate all the countries of the Western Balkans who have requested it[9] ? The problematic enlargement of 2004 shows that, even if they end up meeting the Copenhagen criteria[10], les pays candidats des Balkans ne sont pas prêts, comme ne le sont pas non plus les citoyens des États membres, alors qu’il s’agit de les convaincre de la nécessité de refonder l’Europe. Une solution transitoire pour ces pays candidats pourrait être leur participation, avec l’aide de l’UE, à un marché commun balkanique leur permettant d’abord de renouer entre eux des liens pacifiques, de bon voisinage et de confiance nécessaires. Il ne sera guère aisé de convaincre les Européens de l’utilité de telles adhésions, aussi longtemps que ces liens ne seront pas établis.

Similarly, it has become essential to reassure the citizens of Europe by definitively abandoning the accession process concerning the Turkey. This accession would be against the wishes of the people of Europe, and we must now have the clarity to recognise this and the courage to draw the consequences.

Europe urgently needs to deepen its integration first, avoiding any uncontrolled enlargement that could result in citizens rejecting the European project itself.

4-e) A European response to migratory crises

The influx of migrants and refugees due to the attractiveness of Europe, a rich and ageing continent, seen as an area of peace and prosperity with a long tradition of welcoming displaced populations, continues to represent a major factor of political destabilisation for the States of the European Union. This crisis has reawakened reflexes of nationalist withdrawal in Europe and encouraged the rise of populist and xenophobic forces that threaten the humanist values of solidarity that are the foundations of European integration. It is an illusion to think that Europe can protect itself with walls. Border wars, climate crises, poor governance, demographic imbalances and the lack of prospects in some of Europe's neighbouring regions will continue to attract people to Europe.

While we must safeguard our legitimate interests, we must also respect our obligations in terms of fundamental rights, in particular the right to asylum arising from international treaties relating to the victims of war, but also those due to displaced and threatened persons. In order to maintain the bond of solidarity that must prevail between Member States, it is imperative that we abandon the intergovernmental management of today's European Council in favour of an intergovernmental approach. community welcome and integration policy migrants and refugees. This policy must be accompanied by European diplomatic action to stabilise and contribute to restoring peace and security in the countries of origin.

Concernant la gestion par les États de l’entrée des réfugiés et des migrants dans l’espace européen, il est devenu évident que le système Dublin 3 ne fonctionne plus. Il n’est pas logique de laisser l’enregistrement, l’accueil et les charges de logement et d’intégration aux seuls pays d’entrée que sont le plus souvent la Grèce et l’Italie.

Il faut donc prévoir un mécanisme européen qui s’occupe de l’enregistrement des migrants, capable de distinguer entre réfugiés et migrants économiques, qui prenne en charge leur accueil dans des conditions dignes et se charge de leur répartition équitable dans les pays de l’Union. L’abandon des systèmes nationaux et la création d’ un Système d’asile européen est prévu dans le Traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne (TFUE).

Au delà de son rôle symbolique, la création d’une frontière extérieure communautaire entre l’Europe et pays limitrophes est également nécessaire, accompagnée des moyens de la contrôler (renforcement de l’agence  FRONTEX).

4-f) A language policy

La diversité des langues parlées en Europe est un fait incontournable.  Si elle peut être considérée par certains comme un obstacle à l’intégration européenne, cette diversité peut tout autant se révéler une chance pour l’Europe. Beaucoup des principales langues d’échange parlées dans le monde sont déjà des langues parlées en Europe. C’est un atout essentiel pour l’Europe dans son rapport au monde.

Not all Europeans are destined to speak the same language one day, be it an adopted language like English, or an artificial language like Esperanto. Many European languages will continue to coexist for a long time to come. To enable dialogue and mutual understanding between Europeans, the spoken word, as well as the received word, will therefore have to be exchanged through languages. This is why it will be necessary for the younger generations, in addition to their mother tongue, to master at least two other European languages including English. This should be the subject of a proactive language policy at European level.

On pourrait conforter ce programme par une vaste politique d’échanges d’enseignants qui deviendraient autant d’ambassadeurs culturels à travers toute l’Europe. Au-delà de l’enseignement secondaire, il faudrait renforcer, là encore, le multilinguisme en favorisant et en finançant largement les séjours de tous les jeunes européens dans d’autres pays membres (un « Erasmus pour tous »…), en réservant des chaires universitaires à des professeurs d’autres pays, en multipliant les séminaires et colloques multilingues, en passant par la traduction de langue à langue plutôt que de recourir systématiquement à l’anglais, en soutenant les revues et ouvrages multilingues, en privilégiant partout la diffusion de films (documentaires, fictions, animations…) en version originale sous-titrée. En effet, toute langue étant le reflet d’une ou de plusieurs cultures, ces mesures permettraient de mieux se comprendre et d’unir davantage les États membres tout en maintenant la diversité de leurs cultures. Une inter-compréhension des citoyens à l’échelle de notre continent européen représenterait une grande avancée vers le partage d’un sentiment d’identité commune, et renforcerait les liens de solidarité entre tous les citoyens européens.

4-g) Education for European citizenship

Knowledge of our common European history should be part of a compulsory set of basic notions taught throughout their studies to all young Europeans. This should be taught in such a way as to ensure that diversity is presented without prejudice and without nationalist or religious ulterior motives.

A petition to the European Parliament was filed in 2017 under the title: " Petition in favour of citizenship education for secondary school pupils ». Son objectif est de favoriser le renforcement d’une citoyenneté supranationale fondée sur les droits et les devoirs partagés et non pas sur des sentiments identitaires excluants. Un programme permettant d’aider à «combattre les fanatismes et de favoriser le vivre ensemble, dans une société multiculturelle et diversifiée, comme l’est la société européenne» en se fondant sur plusieurs articles des traités fondateurs de l’Union européenne. De façon concrète, un élève du secondaire devrait acquérir une connaissance minimale des autres États membres et de ses concitoyens européens, une connaissance du fonctionnement des institutions de l’Union et de ses mécanismes de participation citoyenne, socle nécessaire pour un exercice sain de la démocratie.

This petition, which is to be submitted to the Council via the European Commission, is based on a European Parliament resolution which stresses that ". connaître et comprendre l’histoire et les valeurs communes de l’UE et de ses États membres est une clé pour la compréhension mutuelle, la coexistence pacifique, la tolérance et la solidarité, de même que comprendre les principes fondamentaux de l’Union européenne ".

4-h) A community of values and individual freedoms

We need to emphasise what brings us together, i.e. the values of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Art. 2 of the Treaty on European Union.[11] comme la dignité de l’individu, l’égalité, la liberté, la solidarité et la tolérance, nécessaires pour dépasser les clivages culturels, politiques, religieux, linguistiques ou ethniques. Ce sont les valeurs d’humanisme de l’Europe qui pourraient le mieux constituer un ciment de l’Europe du futur.

5) - Conclusion: the European dream

The idea behind the dream of a different Europe is also the idea that the challenges are not just economic or institutional, but above all human. Europe must be understood as a human communitywhose diversity is both an asset and a challenge. The promise of peace, freedom and prosperity must benefit everyone, thanks to a common goal of social progress fostered by the European framework. To achieve this, every citizen must be able to feel the benefits of a Europe that protects them by exercising their sovereignty more effectively, and to which they feel closer because it has been able to renew itself, democratise its operations and listen to its citizens.

The Europe of dreams would be :

• a Europe that guarantees freedom: all public freedoms, freedom of thought guaranteed by the strict neutrality of institutions with regard to religious dogma, freedom of expression, freedoms that are currently under attack in several Member States
• a Europe that is concerned with the equality of human beings: equal rights between genders, origins and sexual orientations. Although these rights are formally guaranteed by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, we know that there is still progress to be made in many Member States.
• a Europe of greater solidarity and humanity, a Europe concerned with the development of countries with which it has long-standing relations and which expect better conditions for cooperation
• a Europe that is more effective in its decision-making than it is today, while at the same time becoming more democratic, more transparent and more comprehensible
• a Europe where the pursuit of happiness, like the pursuit of quality of life, could become a fundamental right of every European citizen.

L’Union européenne doit être capable de faire la démonstration qu’elle apporte une véritable valeur ajoutée. C’est ainsi qu’elle pourra faire reculer le désamour dont elle est en partie victime aujourd’hui. Cette Europe nouvelle qui pourrait être proposée aux citoyens européens devrait être une Union d’États-nations ouverte au monde, avec un projet intellectuel et politique de long terme si l’on ne veut pas que nos sociétés se ferment au monde contemporain; un projet consistant à reconstruire un modèle politique, économique et social proprement européen conciliant la liberté, la solidarité, les valeurs porteuses d’identité commune, la protection et le pouvoir d’influence internationale. L’Europe ne pourra tenir son rang dans la concurrence mondiale que si elle reste fidèle à son projet garantissant la paix et le progrès humain. Alors une telle Europe, refondée par rapport à celle que nous connaissons aujourd’hui, aurait une valeur d’exemple dont le monde pourrait s’inspirer.

BRUSSELS, 25 March 2018

[1]          The European Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights is a directly applicable binding legal instrument, whereas the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is (alas!) no more than a UN resolution.

[2]          This essential question of Fundamental Rights will be addressed in a document devoted specifically to the subject, which will be published at a later date.

[3]          Article 2 du Traité sur l’Union européenne : L’Union est fondée sur les valeurs de respect de la dignité humaine, de liberté, de démocratie, d’égalité, de l’État de droit, ainsi que de respect des droits de l’homme, y compris des droits des personnes appartenant à des minorités. Ces valeurs sont communes aux États membres dans une société caractérisée par le pluralisme, la non-discrimination, la tolérance, la justice, la solidarité et l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes.

[4]          A qualified majority must be achieved by at least 55% of the Member States (i.e. a minimum of 16 States) and 65% of the population, or 72% of the States and 65% of the population when the Council does not act on a proposal from the Commission or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

[5]          Art. 5 du TUE : La Communauté agit dans les limites des compétences qui lui sont conférées et des objectifs qui lui sont assignés par le présent Traité. Dans les domaines qui ne relèvent pas de sa compétence exclusive, la Communauté n’intervient, conformément au principe de subsidiarité, que si -et dans la mesure où- les objectifs de l’action envisagée ne peuvent pas être réalisés de manière suffisante par les États membres et peuvent donc, en raison des dimensions ou des effets de l’action envisagée, être mieux réalisés au niveau communautaire. L’action de la Communauté n’excède pas ce qui est nécessaire pour atteindre les objectifs du présent Traité.

[6]          At least 9 countries according to the European treaties.

[7]          GAFAT: Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Twitter

[8]          Articles 105 and 106 (ex 85 and 86) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)

[9]          The Western Balkan countries that are official candidates are Montenegro, Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Albania. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are potential candidate countries or have applied for membership.

[10]         A country's accession to the European Union is subject to certain criteria defined at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993:

1. The presence of stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
2. A functioning market economy and the ability to cope with market forces and competitive pressure within the EU;
3. The ability to assume the obligations of membership, including the capacity effectively to implement the rules, standards and policies forming the body of EU law (the acquis communautaire) and to embrace the objectives of political, economic and monetary union.

[11]         L’article 2 dispose : «L’Union est fondée sur les valeurs de respect de la dignité humaine, de liberté, de démocratie, d’égalité, de l’État de droit, ainsi que de respect des droits de l’homme, y compris des droits des personnes appartenant à des minorités. Ces valeurs sont communes aux États membres dans une société caractérisée par le pluralisme, la non-discrimination, la tolérance, la justice, la solidarité et l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes.»

The post Rapport AEPL « L’Europe Autrement » appeared first on Association Européenne de la Pensée Libre.

I have been asked to present the Belgian and Dutch models of Church-State relations. I will start by giving you some historical background. I will then look at the legal aspects of the question and, finally, I will give you some information on the impact of these first two subjects on the daily lives of citizens in both countries.

The kingdoms of the Netherlands and Belgium are neighbours with a shared history. Belgium and the Netherlands were a single country under Spanish rule until 1581, when the 7 northern provinces declared their independence and remained a Republic until the French Revolution. The southern provinces, present-day Belgium, remained under Spanish, then Austrian and French rule for the same period. The two countries were reunited in 1815, but this last attempt at unification came to an end in 1830 when the Belgians rebelled against Dutch domination.

The Belgian Revolution began in Brussels with an opera song - celebrating the rebellion of the people of Naples against the Spanish - on the evening of 25 August 1830. It was a troubled time in many European countries, as you know in Poland, and Brussels, inspired by its French neighbour, was also full of hope.

The Church opposed the King because he was Protestant. But also because it wanted to put an end to the Caesaropapism it had suffered during the Napoleonic period. This doctrine subordinated the Church to the King or Emperor, and it was also the doctrine that guided King William I. Under the influence of the French Catholic priest Félicité de LAMENNAIS, one of the inspirers of Christian democracy, the Belgian Church was convinced that liberal freedom would, when the time came, see the triumph of Catholic truth.

On the other hand, the liberals were influenced by the Enlightenment, Voltaire, the Glorious British Revolution and the American and French Revolutions. Those of them who were Christian also wanted to get rid of Caesaropapism, but many were also clearly anti-clerical and wanted to limit the influence of religion on politics and other aspects.

Few people are familiar with their country's constitution, and Belgians are no exception. This is a pity, because the provisional government, which ran the country before the election of a new king, succeeded in drafting a remarkable text in less than a year. The Belgian Constitution of 1831 was an almost perfect application of the ideas contained in Montesquieu's Esprit des lois, and was very progressive for its time.

At a time when the Poles were fighting the Russians for their freedom, when the Spanish still had to fear the Inquisition, when the French could expect another 40 years of authoritarian rule, the Belgian constitution was a real achievement. The text guarantees freedom of association, which leads to political freedom, freedom of thought and religion, and freedom of the press, abolishing any possibility of censorship. There is no law on blasphemy and civil marriage must precede religious marriage (the latter having no legal value in itself). Finally, the Concordat with the Catholic Church, which had existed during the Napoleonic period, was abolished.

Of course, these liberal victories were not achieved without a price to pay to the Catholic Church. The first was the funding of recognised religions (there were three at the time and two of them [Jews and Protestants] were marginal). This meant that priests, but also pastors and rabbis, would be paid by the State and that the deficit in parish church budgets would be borne by the local authorities. But this did not mean that - unlike in the Napoleonic period - religious personnel would become civil servants.

The second concession concerns schools. The Constitution states that "education is free". This means that anyone can open a school in Belgium. But it essentially recognises the fact that in 1831, education was almost entirely controlled by the Catholic Church. And as the Church said at the time, the State should only play a subsidiary role in education.

Be that as it may, the freedoms protected by the Constitution have paved the way for a democracy moving towards broad secularisation. And, despite the large Catholic majority among its citizens, this means that Belgium must be considered secular from the outset.

This is clear from the following articles of the Constitution:

Article 19 guarantees freedom of religion, its public exercise and freedom of expression.

Article 20 stipulates that "no one may be compelled to take part, in any form whatsoever, in the acts and ceremonies of a religion, nor to observe its days of rest".

Article 21 denies the State the slightest right of supervision over the life of the Church, but stipulates that "civil marriage must always precede the nuptial blessing".

Relations between the Churches, including the Catholic Church, and the State are therefore based on a principle that specialists call "double incompetence". The State does not intervene in religious affairs (it does not appoint priests or other members of the hierarchy, for example) and the Church has no privileged influence on politics. Admittedly, the Catholic Church was powerful and influential, but this was due to the number of Catholics, not to a concordat.

Of course, the idea of funding churches recognised by the State is open to criticism, as it seems incompatible with the idea of secularism (a concept that did not exist at the time). The issue gave rise to lengthy debates. In 1859, Jules Bara, a future Liberal minister, attempted to draw a dividing line: "The salaries of ministers of religion are an exception that has no influence on the constitutional order [...], since the payment of salaries does not impose any special obligation on the clergy vis-à-vis the State, nor can it be argued that privileges or favours should be granted to ministers of religion".

This peaceful start - a period known in Belgium as Unionism as I mentioned earlier - did not last and things deteriorated rapidly. The quarrel began in 1834 with the creation of the University of Brussels. This followed by a few months the opening of the future Catholic University of Louvain and was made possible by the efforts of the Brussels Masonic Lodges. The University's basic principle was free research and it wanted to avoid any religious interference in teaching.

At this point, it's time to correct two common errors about 19th-century Belgium.

The first mistake is to think that the struggle I have just described was between Catholics and non-believers. The men who supported the creation of the University, who also contributed to the drafting of the Constitution, who were liberals, were also Christians, often Catholics, sometimes deists. But they were all anti-clerical and very much in favour of freedom of thought.

The second mistake would be to think that the language problem that exists in Belgium today was a major concern in the 19th century. As all the bourgeoisie spoke French, the debate on Flemish and French did not yet exist and the main source of division was the problem of schooling. We will return to this issue later.

The Belgian Catholic Church of the time became more ultramontane, and therefore more subject to the authority of the Pope. Conflicts became inevitable. Seeing the Masons, an organisation that had already been condemned by the Church for a century, create a university that challenged religious control of higher education could only exasperate the Belgian bishops. A second conflict began in 1837 when the Belgian bishops renewed their condemnation of Masonry and reminded Catholics that they had to make a choice and that they could no longer be both good Catholics and Masons. This approach helped to secularise Belgian Masonic lodges and make them increasingly anti-clerical. In 1872, five years before the French Freemasons did the same, the Masonic lodges went as far as their members' freedom of thought by abolishing the obligation to invoke the Great Architect of the Universe.

Let's leave Belgium for a moment and turn to the Netherlands.

The issue of religious tolerance goes back a long way in the country's history. During the Wars of Religion in the 16th century, the seven provinces that were to become the Netherlands rebelled against Spanish domination and the persecution of Protestants. After fruitless efforts to reach an agreement with the King of Spain, the 7 provinces asserted their independence by signing the Union of Utrecht in 1579. This important text established religious freedom and made the country an exception in Europe, particularly in terms of tolerance towards the Jews. However, it would be wrong to idealise the situation. While freedom of worship was guaranteed, religious minorities (mainly Catholics and Jews) were not allowed to practise in public and the Protestant religion retained the privileges of a quasi-state religion.

As in Belgium, the situation changed at the time of the French Revolution. Religious freedom was preserved, but the authorities, as in France, exercised greater control over the churches. This was in line with Napoleon's idea that one priest was worth two gendarmes.

After the Emperor's defeat, the Constitution of 1814 preserved religious freedom but maintained major inequalities. The King could only be a member of the Reformed Church, and that church was the only one to receive funds from the State. This principle was revised in 1815 when Belgium became part of the Netherlands, which led to the Catholic Church receiving funding.

In the Netherlands, the principle of 'double incompetence' to which I referred earlier has never been applied as strictly as in Belgium. The constitutional revision of 1848 and, in 1853, the law on religious communities, led to the establishment of complete religious freedom, including the right for religious communities to organise themselves without state intervention. But major differences remain between the two countries.

The Belgian constitution organised the funding of "recognised religions" (established religions, if we use the American term) but did not require citizens to register as Catholics, Jews or Protestants. On the contrary, the Dutch constitution of 1801 required citizens to register, while recognising their right to change their affiliation if they so wished. This system lasted until 1994. This meant that the religious affiliation of Dutch citizens was known to the civil authorities, which was never the case in Belgium.

The constitutional reform of 1983 brought about a major change by abolishing the payment of salaries to ministers of religion. Thus, in the Netherlands, priests are no longer paid by the State but by the religious communities.

Other questions are more trivial but illustrate differences in sensitivity.

The Dutch national anthem, the Wilhelmuslied (whose lyrics date from 1570), has a strong religious connotation that is not found in the Belgian anthem (the Brabançonne, dating from 1831). Dutch coins often bear the text "God be with us", but you will never find any religious text or symbol on Belgian coins. Blasphemy has never been criminalised in Belgium, but it was in the Netherlands between 1930 and 2014.

However, Belgium has sometimes forgotten that churches and the State are separate.

Whether you were a believer or not, you had to swear before God in court until 1974. This was a vestige of Napoleonic legislation, and only in a judicial context.

There is no reference to God in the oath taken by kings since 1831, nor in that taken by civil servants thereafter.

Crucifixes can be found in many official buildings, particularly courthouses, which are gradually disappearing, and the Vatican representative is the first in the order of protocol for official ceremonies.

Thus, after 1850, despite these differences, it can be considered that the two countries were neutral and largely secular, that Church and State were separate and that civil liberties were well guaranteed. But ideological and religious affiliations remained strong, and the way society functioned in both countries led to the development of a system known as "pillarisation".

What is a pillar? A pillar groups together a series of organisations sharing the same ideology: schools, health insurance, hospitals, trade unions, newspapers, political parties, etc. under a religious or political label. These pillars had a fundamental influence on the organisation of society because they relied on the personal loyalty of their members. Even forty or thirty years ago in Belgium, you couldn't be a candidate for the Socialist Party if you weren't also a member of the Socialist trade union and the health insurance fund. And you couldn't be a teacher in a Catholic school and a member of the Socialist Party without risking problems with both camps. In other words, and perhaps more so in Belgium than in the Netherlands, this system gave rise to furious disputes until the 1990s.

One emblematic conflict was the "school question". As I wrote earlier, at the time of Belgium's independence, the Catholic Church had a monopoly on education. This did not satisfy the liberals. In the second half of the 19th century, a series of laws were passed to allow local authorities to open schools. But the very conservative Catholic Church opposed liberal ideas in favour of expanding education, especially for the poor. The battle between the two opponents reached its climax in 1878. After winning the election, the Liberals created the first Ministry of Education, abolished compulsory religious instruction and replaced it with a science course. This victory was short-lived.

The first school war began. Intolerance flared up, and the Catholic Church threw all its energies into the fight against the "godless schools", which children entered as children and left as ruffians. The weekly prayer imposed by the bishops, "From the godless schools, protect us, O Lord", had a strong political impact and the Liberals, who lost the next election, did not return to power for forty years.

The Liberals then tried another strategy. Local authorities, and provinces where the Liberals and the newly formed Socialist Party had a majority, developed their schools, leading to the development of two competing networks, one religious, the other secular, which still exist today.

The second school war, between 1954 and 1958, led to a kind of peace treaty, the Pacte scolaire. The war had become more economic than ideological and the state increased funding for both networks, resulting in costly satisfaction.

Since the 1960s, the progress of secularisation has led to a depilarisation in both countries. Loyalty to the pillars has been replaced by choices based on the quality of the services offered by the various components of the pillars. Today, you can be a member of the socialist party and the Christian trade union. You can even be a disbeliever and send your children to a Catholic school, and the reverse is also true.

Both Belgium and the Netherlands can now be considered as "depilarised pluralist countries".

What can we conclude from these stories? Certainly that both countries have succeeded in achieving the ambition of creating an impartial state where religion is not consigned to the wardrobe, but where the expression of religious beliefs does not take precedence in everyday life over what Habermas calls 'consensus through deliberation'.

Issues such as abortion and euthanasia in Belgium and the Netherlands are good examples of this development. The issue of abortion was very controversial in Belgium between the 1970s and 1990, when the law was passed. The debate lasted 20 years. Catholics were opposed to the idea of lifting the ban on abortion, while at the same time they knew perfectly well that hospitals belonging to the secular pillar performed abortions all the time under good health conditions. The law was finally passed with the support of a key member of the Catholic pillar, the Catholic women's movement "Vie Féminine". It was also passed after the King refused to sign the bill, forcing Parliament to declare him temporarily unfit to reign. For the anecdote, Parliament used an almost forgotten article of the Constitution, drafted in 1830 to take account of the difficulties that the health problems of British King George III had created in this country!

The issue of euthanasia was much less controversial and the law was passed in 2002 after lengthy but very respectful debates. The way in which this important ethical issue has been dealt with reflects a form of appeasement in a country where pluralism is now a strong reality. The Netherlands is ahead of Belgium in both situations. Abortion was authorised in 1984 and euthanasia in 2001. And in the Netherlands too, consensus through deliberation has become a common way of dealing with ethical problems. It's hard for us to imagine demonstrations against same-sex marriage, for example, like the "Manif' pour tous" in France.

Both countries are now, as I said, largely secularised. The situation today is very different from that which prevailed in the 19th century, but which was initially made possible by the Constitutions of the two countries.

Secularisation is a cultural and sociological process sanctioned by law. And while a legal process can produce its effects in a relatively short time, it takes longer to change the dominant culture. The religious policies of the Netherlands, where Catholics and Protestants have lived side by side since the sixteenth century, and those of Belgium, whose population was almost 98 % Catholic at the time of independence, have had to follow different paths towards greater secularisation.

The most problematic issue in Church-State relations is, of course, funding. From the French or American point of view, the answer is simple: there is no question of it. The French see it as the cornerstone of secularism, while the Americans see it as prohibited by the First Amendment and the wall of separation (although it should be pointed out that they compensate for this position with substantial tax exemptions).

In Belgium and the Netherlands, the question has been answered in different ways over the years, leading to the theorisation of an important principle: equal treatment. Equal treatment has become a problem as a result of the spread of unbelief. If, as is or was the case in both countries, churches receive public funds to support their work, what about citizens who are not interested in what churches do? What about the moral support to which religious people are entitled, but which is not available to non-believers? As well as organising religious ceremonies for weddings, funerals, etc., churches are also able to provide moral support in hospitals, prisons, the army and the city. And non-believers were not.

In Belgium, the humanist movement began seeking legal recognition on an equal footing with religions in 1974. The process lasted 20 years. It was preceded by a series of changes in specific areas. Access to public radio and television was granted in the late 1950s; humanist moral counselling in hospitals and prisons in the 1970s; in the army in the 1990s. A similar development took place (often before that of Belgium) in the Netherlands. The Free Universities of Brussels (French-speaking and Flemish-speaking) are organising a master's degree in moral counselling, and the University of Humanist Studies in Utrecht is doing the same in the Netherlands.

There are, however, a few differences. For example, Dutch humanists have developed a large network of housing for the elderly which has no equivalent in Belgium, and teachers of humanist ethical education are civil servants in Belgium but work under the authority of a humanist organisation in the Netherlands.

A final subject I'd like to address is the relationship between the separation of Church and State and the growth of Islamic communities in our countries. Of course, the Islamic religion is treated like any other religion, for example it has become a "recognised religion" in Belgium, Islam can be taught in state schools like Catholicism, Judaism, etc. and both countries allow Muslims to set up Islamic schools. Nevertheless, problems have arisen in recent years and are not dealt with in the same way in the Netherlands and Belgium. Once again, Belgian and Dutch sensibilities diverge somewhat.

En 2001, la Commission néerlandaise pour l’égalité de traitement a jugé que le rejet de la candidature d’une personne portant le foulard à un poste de fonctionnaire violait la loi sur l’égalité de traitement. Les tribunaux belges en ont toutefois décidé autrement. Les tribunaux belges ont également rejeté les demandes d’élèves souhaitant porter le voile dans des écoles où cela était interdit. Dans les deux cas, les tribunaux belges ont fondé leur jugement sur l’article 9 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme qui admet la possibilité pour une autorité publique de limiter la liberté religieuse si cela est fait pour maintenir l’ordre public. En fait, on peut voir ici que les autorités néerlandaises ont eu dans ces cas une approche plus « anglo-saxonne » des problèmes et que les autorités belges sont plus influencées par l’idée de protéger la neutralité des services publics.

Malheureusement, la Belgique a violé ses propres principes à plusieurs reprises lorsqu’elle a tenté de traiter avec le groupe musulman

L’islam est devenu une « religion reconnue » en 1974. Le problème est que la religion islamique n’était pas vraiment organisée en Belgique. Faute d’association ou de représentant à qui s’adresser, le gouvernement belge a fait un choix discutable et a choisi de discuter avec l’Arabie Saoudite. Je ne m’étendrai pas, mais il s’agissait d’une violation manifeste d’un principe bien établi, la reconnaissance impliquant l’existence, au moins, d’un nombre significatif de groupes organisés et identifiables.

Deux autres violations du principe de « double incompétence » se sont produites après la précédente. La première concerne le contrôle de sécurité des candidats à la nomination du nouvel organe représentatif des musulmans de Belgique. Même si le gouvernement a invoqué la nécessité de prévenir tout risque de radicalisation ou de menace, cela contredit le fait que les autorités ne sont pas censées interférer dans l’organisation interne des organismes religieux. Cette semaine même, la question se répète à travers la création d’une formation universitaire visant à délivrer des diplômes aux futurs imams. Là aussi, la question se pose : le gouvernement peut-il décider quel est le bon islam qui doit être enseigné en Europe ? Ce problème spécifique montre certes les limites de nos systèmes, mais je dois dire que les réponses offertes par les modèles britannique ou français ne semblent pas plus satisfaisantes.

Il est temps de conclure. Je vais d’abord essayer de le faire en référence au Manifeste laïque rédigé par les organisateurs de ce Congrès et tenter de le comparer à la situation actuelle aux Pays-Bas et en Belgique.

Tous les droits et libertés de l’homme et du citoyen sont pleinement respectés, sans aucune référence à la religion.

Bien que j’aie l’impression que les Pays-Bas sont un pays légèrement plus religieux que la Belgique (qui est devenue largement indifférente à l’enseignement de l’Église), je pense que nous pouvons considérer que les deux pays remplissent cette condition. Cependant, lors de mes recherches pour ce discours, une anecdote m’a surpris. Dans son article, une chercheuse néerlandaise considérait qu’il serait problématique pour un policier de ne pas admettre qu’un juif orthodoxe devrait être autorisé à refuser de présenter sa carte d’identité le jour du shabbat parce que cela devrait être considéré comme du travail ! Je doute fort qu’un tribunal belge suive ce raisonnement.

Un autre document que j’ai lu sur la situation néerlandaise considérait que la séparation entre l’Église et l’État n’équivalait pas à la séparation entre la religion et l’État. Cette nuance ne serait pas facilement acceptée en Belgique non plus. Je pense que cela peut s’expliquer par une réminiscence de l’influence calviniste qui subsiste dans la culture néerlandaise.

Le soutien de l’État aux églises ou aux associations religieuses repose sur les mêmes principes que pour les ONG laïques.

Les deux pays ont clairement atteint cet objectif. Une question demeure : ce financement est-il réparti équitablement ? En Belgique, la question est très problématique car les gens ne sont pas censés s’identifier comme membres d’une église ou d’un groupe laïque. Avec une fréquentation moyenne des messes de 11 % un dimanche ordinaire et une part de plus de 80 % du budget accordée aux religions et aux humanistes, on ne peut pas parler d’une situation équilibrée entre l’humanisme et le catholicisme. Mais cela évoluera inévitablement. Une des idées est de créer une consultation, en même temps que l’échéance électorale, qui donne l’occasion aux citoyens d’exprimer à quel groupe religieux ou laïque leur argent devrait aller.

Cela conduirait à un financement plus équilibré tout en protégeant le secret de l’affiliation individuelle religieuse ou philosophique.

Le caractère laïque de l’enseignement public est garanti par l’État.

Cet objectif est clairement atteint dans les deux pays. Bien sûr, l’éducation religieuse n’est pas – contrairement à la situation française – complètement exclue des écoles publiques, mais l’éducation publique doit être neutre et préservée de toute influence religieuse.

Toutes les institutions publiques et les cérémonies d’État sont exemptes de symboles et de rituels religieux.

Il s’agit d’une question très délicate. Pour la Belgique, je dirais que le taux de réalisation est de 90 %. Mais une enquête approfondie révélera probablement des violations de ce principe et il doit en être de même aux Pays-Bas. Mais si l’on considère que la sécularisation est un succès, ces situations peuvent être corrigées car elles contredisent le principe généralement admis. Il faut aussi considérer qu’un nombre important de cérémonies civiles organisées en France n’échappent pas à des entorses à cette règle d’or.

J’espère vous avoir donné une description générale du degré de sécularisation de nos deux pays. Je ne prétends pas que mon discours ne puisse pas être critiqué, voire contredit sur certains détails, mais c’est le prix à payer quand on veut parler d’un sujet complexe. Et une expérience de 30 ans dans le domaine m’a convaincu que la sécularisation est une question très complexe. Elle touche de nombreux aspects de la vie sociale et politique d’un pays et espérer obtenir un modèle unique en Europe semble totalement irréaliste.

En fait, la sécularisation est un travail en cours.  La plus grande erreur serait de croire que l’on peut trouver une sorte de solution idéale, la mettre en œuvre et s’endormir tranquillement pendant un siècle. Les forces qui s’opposent à la sécularisation ne dorment jamais parce qu’elles sont convaincues, qu’elles connaissent la vérité et qu’elles veulent l’imposer à tout le monde. Nous ne faisons que prôner la liberté, la liberté pour l’individu de faire ses propres choix, et de profiter des années que nous passons sur cette terre, mais nous ne devrions jamais cesser de rester éveillés.

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