Hedi Blili-Gouyou and Guy T'hooft

I. INTRODUCTION - THE EUROPEAN PARADOX

The dominant narrative on Europe's digital strategy has crystallised around an alarmist observation: Europe is irretrievably losing the "race to artificial intelligence". This rhetoric of predicted defeat is now shaping political debates and guiding budgetary decisions, fuelling a form of strategic fatalism. Faced with the American and Chinese ecosystems, the European Union would appear to be condemned to a subordinate role: that of a fussy regulator, incapable of generating its own technological champions, entangled in its own regulatory contradictions.

This note sets out to show that this diagnosis stems from a fundamental methodological error. It mechanically transposes to Europe success criteria forged elsewhere, without questioning their relevance or sustainability. The absence of European counterparts to OpenAI or Tencent is only a weakness if we implicitly accept that the oligopolistic concentration model represents the ultimate horizon for technological innovation.

Our central thesis turns this perspective on its head The structural characteristics of the European ecosystem - institutional fragmentation, high standards, priority given to fundamental rights - are not temporary handicaps to be overcome, but the foundations of an alternative economic model that is potentially more resilient and more profitable in the long term. Ethics are not an external brake on innovation, but an infrastructure of trust that can become a sustainable competitive advantage.[1].

This hypothesis is based on a systemic analysis of four presumed 'weaknesses' in European strategy: the absence of industrial champions, the complexity of the AI Act, the ambiguity of the 'third way', and critical technological dependencies. For each, we will show how a fresh strategic reading can identify transformative levers for action.

The stakes go far beyond economic competition. It involves Europe's ability to embody a form of technological power that does not renounce the civilisational achievements of liberal constitutionalism.[2]. No other geopolitical area bears this responsibility - or has the historical legitimacy to do so. The question is therefore not to choose between innovation and fundamental rights, but to prove empirically that one cannot exist in the long term without the other.

II. THE ABSENCE OF INDUSTRIAL CHAMPIONS: RETHINKING THE POWER MODEL

A. The classic complaint: a techno-nationalist interpretation of competitiveness

The diagnosis of the failure of the European strategy is based on a triptych of seemingly implacable arguments. Firstly, the absence of technological giants comparable to OpenAI, Google DeepMind or Anthropic points to a structural inability to mobilise the resources needed for disruptive scientific breakthroughs. Secondly, the fragmentation of the market into twenty-seven national ecosystems would prevent the emergence of the economies of scale that are essential for driving competitive foundation models. Thirdly, the chronic under-capitalisation of European start-ups - which raise on average four times less than their American counterparts at the Series B stage - would condemn European innovation to a form of congenital dwarfism.

This approach, however widespread it may be in decision-making circles, suffers from a fatal flaw: it naturalises a model of technological power - oligopolistic concentration - without questioning its hidden costs or sustainability. As the report by the European Court of Auditors (2024) points out[3]In the same vein, "performance assessment cannot be limited to quantitative indicators of market capitalisation, at the risk of missing out on the qualitative transformations of the innovation ecosystem".

B. The strategic counter-reading: monopoly vulnerabilities and distributed resilience

1. The systemic fragility of concentration

The current architecture of the global digital infrastructure is based on a dangerous paradox: almost total dependence on a small number of private players for functions of vital importance. The outage of Amazon Web Services on 7 December 2021, which lasted less than six hours, caused global economic losses estimated at €3.5 billion and paralysed essential services - from public health to air transport. This vulnerability is not cyclical but structural: it is a direct result of the concentration model that Europe is supposed to reproduce.

Conversely, a distributed ecosystem - precisely what European fragmentation spontaneously produces - generates a form of systemic resilience. The multiplication of innovation points, far from being a waste of resources, functions as a strategic redundancy. In a geopolitical context marked by increasing risks of disruption (cyber attacks, trade tensions, energy crises), this decentralised architecture represents an undervalued sovereignty asset.

2. Vertical excellence as an alternative strategy

The case of ASML, a Dutch company with a virtual world monopoly on extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography, empirically invalidates the 'generalist champion' thesis. The fruit of twenty-five years of patient investment - during which the company made no profit - ASML illustrates a radically different innovation trajectory to the Silicon Valley model. Its market power comes not from network effects or aggressive acquisition strategies, but from in-depth technological mastery in an ultra-specialised segment. And this approach is precisely what Europe's comparative advantages are all about: scientific excellence, cooperation between industry and research, and the capacity to invest for the very long term.

The European AI ecosystem already has this sectoral morphology: Mistral AI (sovereignty and open models), DeepL (multilingual language processing), Siemens and SAP (industrial and enterprise AI). Rather than lamenting the absence of a European Google, the strategy should aim to consolidate these vertical leadership positions, while accepting that they do not generate the same media visibility as generalist unicorns.

3. Patient capital" as a competitive weapon

The model of the German Mittelstand - family businesses with a multi-generational time horizon, investing massively in R&D without pressure for quarterly returns - offers a precedent for thinking about an AI economy that escapes the logic of rapid "exit". The European Commission, in its Action Plan for an AI Continent (2024-2025)[4]implicitly recognises this specificity by calling for "funding mechanisms adapted to the long cycles of technological maturation". However, this call remains largely programmatic.

C. Operational recommendations

Proposition 1 Create a European "Long-Term AI" investment fund, endowed with 15 billion euros over fifteen years (i.e. 1 billion euros per year), with an explicit clause prohibiting requirements for a return on investment before ten years.

This amount represents an annual investment equivalent to that currently devoted by the EU via Horizon Europe and the Digital Europe programme (approximately €1 billion per year according to the European Commission, 2024, etc.).[5]). However, unlike existing programmes which finance 3-5 year projects, this fund would focus exclusively on 10-15 year horizons, enabling breakthroughs in science-intensive segments where Europe can aim for world excellence: explainable AI, neuromorphic computing, optimisation under constraints. This amount is also consistent with the Coordinated Plan's objective of mobilising €20 billion a year (public + private) between now and 2030.[6] The Long-Term AI fund would contribute 5% of this objective, focusing on very long-term fundamental research.

Proposition 2 Refocus the criteria for valuing European innovation. Replace unicorn rankings - which essentially measure the ability to raise funds - with sectoral technological leadership indicators: key patents, technical standards adopted, market share in high added-value segments.

III. THE AI ACT: FROM BUREAUCRACY TO A REGULATORY WEAPON

A. The classic complaint: regulatory paralysis

The four hundred pages of the AI Act crystallise all the criticisms levelled at the "European model": Kafkaesque bureaucracy, ignorance of technical realities, unbearable extra costs for start-ups. These criticisms, amplified by the American industrial lobbies and complacently relayed by certain European analysts, build up the image of punitive regulation, designed to compensate for Europe's inability to innovate by fussy control of the innovation of others.

This representation deliberately ignores two major historical precedents. On the one hand, the same arguments were mobilised against the RGPD in 2016-2018: it was supposed to "kill the European digital economy", cause "the exodus of start-ups", and enshrine "the definitive domination of the GAFAMs". Seven years on, the RGPD has become a de facto global standard, generating a European privacy tech industry valued at €2.5 billion and forcing the American giants to make structural changes to their business models. On the other hand, the history of the European economy shows that strong standards have historically been a driver of competitiveness - from the metric system to ISO standards, not forgetting car safety standards.

B. The strategic counter-reading: the "Brussels Effect" as a power strategy

1. The RGPD effect: regulation as market infrastructure

The RGPD illustrates a mechanism of normative power that the political scientist Anu Bradford has theorised under the expression "Brussels Effect": the European Union's ability to unilaterally export its regulatory standards, transforming its internal norms into quasi global constraints. This phenomenon is based neither on military coercion nor on economic domination, but on three structural factors: the size of the European market (450 million consumers), the effect of non-divisibility (impossible for multinationals to maintain differentiated standards by jurisdiction beyond a certain threshold of complexity), and strategic anticipation by private players who prefer to adopt the most demanding standard in advance.

The AI Act has all the characteristics needed to reproduce this effect. As the Internet Policy Review (2025) notes[7]The first empirical signs confirm this trend: several American states (California, New York) are studying legislation directly inspired by the AI Act, while governments in South-East Asia are seeking technical expertise from the European Commission. The first empirical signals confirm this dynamic: several American states (California, New York) are studying legislation directly inspired by the AI Act, while governments in South-East Asia are seeking the Commission's technical expertise to develop their own regulatory frameworks.

2. Compliance as a barrier to entry and a competitive moat

The standard economic analysis of regulations presents them as dead costs, reducing margins and holding back innovation. This view systematically overlooks their function as a barrier to entry. A demanding regulatory framework penalises opportunistic players - whose business model is based on outsourcing risks - more than established players capable of internalising the costs of compliance.

A study by the IAPP (International Association of Privacy Professionals, 2024)[8] reveals that 67% of organisations that have integrated privacy governance into their AI strategy say they are confident about their AI Act complianceThis is a sign of an emerging competitive advantage for companies that have anticipated the regulatory requirements. This "trust premium" is becoming increasingly apparent in B2B tenders, where certification is becoming a decisive selection criterion.

On a more structural level, European certification is gradually becoming a passport for access to public contracts - worth €500 billion a year in the EU. Public tenders are increasingly systematically incorporating AI Act compliance clauses, creating a de facto captive market for European players or multinationals that have invested in compliance.

3. The hidden cost of non-regulation: the collapse of trust

The Meta/Cambridge Analytica case offers an instructive counter-factual. Between March and July 2018, the company lost up to 134 billion dollars[9] in market capitalisation at the peak of the crisis - not because of regulatory sanctions, but because of a loss of confidence on the part of advertisers and users. Recurring scandals linked to algorithmic biases (discriminatory recruitment systems, racist facial recognition, toxic chatbots) generate reputational costs that far exceed the investment required for preventive regulatory compliance.

The AI Act thus functions as collective insurance against the risk of a systemic collapse of trust. In regulated sectors with high stakes - health, justice, finance, security - the absence of a robust regulatory framework does not produce unbridled innovation, but institutional timidity. Hospitals, banks and public administrations will only adopt technologies on a massive scale if they are certified and auditable. Far from hindering the deployment of AI in these sectors, the European regulatory framework is a precondition for it.

C. Operational recommendations

Proposal 3 Transform the "Trustworthy AI" label into a European ISO standard, negotiated as a technical standard in international bodies (ISO, ITU). Mobilise European economic diplomacy to impose this standard as a prerequisite in free trade agreements.

Proposal 4 Create a one-stop compliance shop for SMEs, with a budget of 500 million over five years (i.e. 100 million euros per year).

This amount represents approximately 0.5% of the total GenAI4EU budget (€700 million according to the Commission, 2024-2025).[10]), but dedicated exclusively to helping SMEs achieve compliance. By way of comparison, the EIC Accelerator programme allocates up to €2.5 million per start-up for technological innovation; the one-stop shop would make it possible to support around 200 SMEs a year with grants of €500,000, covering auditing, certification, staff training and systems adaptation. The aim is not just to facilitate compliance, but to build a European AI audit and certification industry - an industry that can then be exported to jurisdictions adopting similar frameworks.

Proposal 5 Launch aggressive "standards diplomacy", making access to the European AI market (for non-European companies) conditional on regulatory reciprocity clauses. This strategy - already successfully employed for environmental standards - would accelerate the international dissemination of European standards.

IV. THE "THIRD WAY": SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY OR STRATEGIC IMPASSE?

A. The classic complaint: the illusion of a credible alternative

The official rhetoric of the European Union presents its AI strategy as a "third way" between American surveillance capitalism and Chinese digital authoritarianism. This formulation appeals to European political circles because it transforms a position of objective weakness - the absence of technological champions - into a distinctive ethical stance. However, strategic analysts are increasingly sceptical.

Critics are converging on the same diagnosis: this "third way" runs the risk of being nothing more than an "ethical museum" - an area of harmless virtue, producing standards without being able to enforce them, principles without the capacity to project them. Faced with massive American investment (the private sector has invested $67 billion in 2023) and Chinese strategic management (a national AI plan worth $150 billion over ten years), Europe would appear to be condemned to a role of moral commentator on transformations over which it has no control.

B. Strategic counter-reading: the emergence of a trust market

1. The underestimated scale of the demand for regulation

Eurobarometer 2024 reveals that 73% of European citizens reject the use of unregulated AI systems[11] in sensitive areas (health, justice, employment). This figure expresses not just an abstract cultural preference, but a real economic constraint: in liberal democracies, no technology can be deployed on a massive scale unless it is socially acceptable. But this constraint is not confined to Europe. The repeated scandals in the United States - from the racist facial recognition of Rekognition (Amazon) to the dangerous hallucinations of medical assistants - are generating a growing demand for regulation, including among the technological elites.

More structurally, the most dynamic economic sectors with the highest added value - precision healthcare, algorithmic finance, predictive legal systems - are precisely those where the need for regulatory compliance is greatest. In these areas, competitive advantage is not built on raw computing power or the size of datasets, but on the ability to produce systems that can be audited, explained and certified. And these attributes correspond exactly to the priorities of European research over the past fifteen years - from explainability (XAI) to formal certification, via frugal AI.

2. The 'second mover' advantage: learning from the failures of others

Strategic theory classically distinguishes the advantages of the "first mover" (capturing market share, defining standards) from those of the "second mover" (observing the mistakes of the pioneer, optimising processes). In the field of AI, Europe structurally occupies this position of second mover - not by strategic choice, but by objective lag. Rather than deploring this situation, the strategy is to take advantage of it.

The massive deployment of AI systems in the United States and China has produced an empirical body of failures from which Europe can learn: structural discriminatory biases, authoritarian drifts, security vulnerabilities, accelerated obsolescence of skills, concentration of power. European AI solutions - precisely because they incorporate ethical, security and explicability constraints right from the design stage - avoid some of these pitfalls. This qualitative difference translates into tangible competitive advantages: medical AI systems certified in Europe penetrate markets (Japan, Singapore, Canada) where unregulated American solutions come up against regulatory barriers.

3. Sovereignty through interoperability: open standards versus walled gardens

The dominant contemporary AI model is based on closed proprietary ecosystems (iOS/Android, AWS/Azure/GCP, GPT/Claude/Gemini), generating massive 'lock-in' effects. This architecture produces a form of geopolitical dependency: adopting a player's ecosystem also means accepting the jurisdiction of its country of origin and the risks of access being cut off unilaterally.

Precisely because it does not control any dominant ecosystem, Europe has an objective interest in promoting open standards and interoperability protocols. This strategy is finding increasing support from governments seeking to avoid exclusive dependence on Sino-American technologies. The strategic partnerships that Europe is forging with medium-sized powers (ASEAN, African Union, Latin America) are not based on the supply of foundation models - an area in which it cannot compete - but on the transfer of regulatory and technical capabilities enabling these countries to build their own sovereign ecosystems.

C. Operational recommendations

Proposition 6 Launch a research programme for 3 billion euros over five years (i.e. 600 million euros per year) specifically dedicated to explainable and auditable AI.

This amount represents a 40-fold increase in the current European effort on AI transparency and reliability. Indeed, Horizon Europe has allocated €112 million for AI and quantum in 2024, of which only €15 million for transparency and reliability (European Commission, 2024). The €600 million-a-year programme would enable what today appears to be a regulatory constraint to be transformed into a disruptive technological advantage: developing architectures that natively enable traceability, interpretability and formal certification. By way of comparison, this investment is still less than the GenAI4EU annual budget (€700 million), but it focuses on a technological segment in which Europe can aim for global excellence rather than compete head-on with the American foundation models.

Proposition 7 Building a strategy of partnerships with the Global South, not on the model of development aid, but as an alliance of mutual interests. Europe offers its regulatory expertise and certified technologies; its partners offer fast-growing markets and diplomatic support for the adoption of European standards in international forums.

V. STRATEGIC DEPENDENCIES: THE ACHILLES HEEL THAT HAS BECOME A MOBILISING EMERGENCY

A. The brutal facts: anatomy of a systemic vulnerability

The report by the European Court of Auditors (2024) makes an unequivocal diagnosis: Europe's digital infrastructure is critically dependent on non-European players in three key areas. Firstly, cloud computing: 70% of storage and computing capacity is available in Europe.[12] used in Europe come from three American suppliers (AWS, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud Platform). Secondly, semiconductors: 90% of the world's production of advanced chips (smaller than 7 nanometres) is concentrated in Taiwan and South Korea. Thirdly, foundation models: the entire European generative AI ecosystem depends on models developed by OpenAI, Anthropic, Google and Meta.

This triple dependence is not just a matter of economic vulnerability - it constitutes a geopolitical risk of the highest order. The semiconductor crisis of 2021, triggered by logistical disruptions linked to COVID-19, paralysed the European automotive industry for eighteen months, destroying €110 billion in added value. A military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, a unilateral decision by Washington to ban access to AI technologies for national security reasons, or a massive cyber attack on US data centres would have even more serious systemic effects.

The French Court of Auditors, in its report on the national AI strategy (2025), points out that "technological dependence also generates normative dependence: systems designed according to non-European legal logics incorporate biases and priorities that run counter to European values". This observation points to a dimension that is often overlooked: over and above material vulnerability, technological dependence erodes Europe's ability to define its own civilisational priorities in a sovereign manner.

B. The window of opportunity: transforming constraint into mobilisation

1. The post-Ukraine geopolitical awakening: from rhetoric to investment

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 produced a strategic shock comparable, in technological terms, to that of Sputnik for the United States in 1957. It brutally revealed the fragility of European supply chains and the illusion of peaceful interdependence. This shock has triggered a significant reorientation of the budget: the EuroHPC (supercomputer) programme has seen a substantial increase in its budget; the Gaia-X sovereign cloud project, moribund in 2021, has been relaunched with substantial industrial commitments.

More significantly, the European Chips Act (2023) will mobilise €43 billion.[13] to reduce Europe's dependence on semiconductors, with the aim of increasing world production from 10% to 20% by 2030. The initiative InvestAIannounced in February 2025 at the Paris Summit, marks a major qualitative breakthrough: mobilise 200 billion euros[14] for AIof which 20 billion specifically earmarked for 4-5 gigafactories[15] AI each equipped with 100,000 latest-generation chips, i.e. four times the capacity of current infrastructures.

The President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, compared this project to a "CERN for AIThe aim is to create an open infrastructure that will give all European scientists and companies - not just the giants - access to the resources they need to develop cutting-edge models.

Budgetary context : According to the Coordinated AI Plan (2021), the objective was to achieve 20 billion euros a year of combined investment (public and private) between now and 2030. Until the launch of InvestAI, the Commission was investing around 1 billion euros per year via Horizon Europe and the Digital Europe programme. OECD-Commission estimates (2023) show that the EU had already achieved around 25.7 billion euros in annual investment[16] in 2023, exceeding the 2030 target by seven years. InvestAI aims to multiply this effort by 10 over the next five years.

European economic history shows that major technological leaps are often the result of prior humiliations. Airbus was born of the realisation in the 1960s that total dependence on Boeing was an unacceptable vulnerability. Fifty years and €1,000 billion of public and private investment later, Airbus holds 50% of the world civil aviation market. This precedent shows that a long-term European industrial strategy, adequately resourced and politically supported, can produce world champions - provided we accept time horizons that are incompatible with electoral cycles.

2. Differentiating technological bets: selective sovereignty

The natural temptation, in the face of identified dependencies, is to aim for total self-sufficiency - an ambition that is as illusory as it is ineffective. No economy, not even Chinese or American, masters the entire technological value chain. The relevant strategy is one of "selective sovereignty": identifying three or four critical technological segments in which Europe can reasonably aim for global excellence, and accepting dependence in the other areas, managing it by diversifying suppliers.

Three technological bets seem particularly promising. Firstly, frugal AI and edge computing: in the face of the energy crisis and climate constraints, the ability to train and deploy high-performance models with limited computational resources is becoming a major competitive advantage. European research in this area (notably the PRAIRIE Institute in Paris and the ELLIS Network) is at the forefront of the world. Secondly, quantum computing: the technological race is still on, and Europe has considerable scientific assets (40% of world publications). Thirdly, specialised semiconductors for AI: rather than trying to catch up with Taiwan on generalist chips, Europe can aim for excellence on specific architectures (neuromorphic computing, processors dedicated to explainable AI).

3. Strategic alliances: diversifying to reduce dependency

Reducing dependency involves not only relocation, but also the geographical diversification of partners. It is in Europe's interest to forge technological alliances with medium-sized powers that share its concerns about sovereignty: Japan (semi-conductors, robotics), South Korea (electronics), Israel (cybersecurity) and Canada (ethical AI). These partnerships enable us to pool R&D costs, gain access to complementary skills and reduce our bilateral dependence on the United States or China.

The CERN (European Organisation for Nuclear Research) model offers an institutional precedent: a collectively funded fundamental research infrastructure, operating over multi-decade timeframes, and having generated massive economic spin-offs (the web itself was invented at CERN). The InvestAI, explicitly compared to a "CERN for AI".The aim is to create a shared, open and collaborative infrastructure that will give the entire European ecosystem - researchers, start-ups, SMEs and large companies - access to the computational resources they need to develop cutting-edge AI models.

C. Operational recommendations

Proposal 8 Identify formally three technologies critical to European AI sovereignty (e.g. quantum computing, frugal AI, neuromorphic semiconductors) and y concentrate 70% of public investment in R&D IA.

Justification The Coordinated Plan is targeting €20 billion a year in combined investment between now and 2030, including around €7 billion from European public sources (Commission + Member States). Concentrating 70% of this public envelope (i.e. around €5 billion per year) on 3-4 critical technologies would make it possible to achieve sufficient critical mass to aim for global excellence in these segments, rather than dispersing resources across the entire technological spectrum. This strategic focus breaks with the current dispersal of resources and is inspired by the Japanese model of sector concentration.

Proposal 9 Negotiate bilateral technology partnerships with Japan and South Korea, explicitly aimed at reducing mutual dependence on the USA and China. These partnerships should include technology transfer and co-development clauses, not just trade agreements.

Proposal 10 : Consolidating the initiative InvestAI as a permanent infrastructure of European AI sovereignty, based on the CERN model.

InvestAI is already mobilising €200 billion (€50 billion from the EU public sector + €150 billion from the private sector via European AI Champions), including €20 billion specifically for 4-5 gigafactories. This initiative should become a permanent structure - a "European AI Infrastructure Corporation" - bringing together the Member States, the EIB and industrial partners. Its mission: to build and operate the strategic computing infrastructures and datasets required for European sovereignty, while making them available to the research ecosystem and start-ups. The governance model should be inspired by CERN (annual budget of €1.3 billion, funded by 23 Member States over the past 70 years): collective funding, multi-decade horizon, open access for the entire European scientific and industrial community.

VI. CONCLUSION - THE ENFORCEMENT IMPERATIVE

Summary: from constraint to advantage

This note has shown that the four structural 'weaknesses' of the European strategy - absence of champions, regulatory complexity, ambiguity of the third way, technological dependence - are the result of a mistaken diagnosis. They are handicaps only in relation to a model of technological power - American oligopolistic concentration - whose economic, social and democratic sustainability is increasingly contested.

The European distributed ecosystem is generating systemic resilience in the face of shocks. Far from paralysing innovation, the AI Act is building an infrastructure of trust that can become a sustainable competitive advantage, via the "Brussels Effect". The "third way" corresponds to a growing global demand for technologies that comply with democratic standards. Finally, strategic dependencies have triggered unprecedented budgetary and political mobilisation - illustrated by InvestAI and its €200 billion - opening up the possibility of technological leaps in high added-value niches.

Ethics are not an external brake on innovation, but an infrastructure for competitiveness. In high added-value sectors such as health, finance, justice and security, the ability to produce systems that can be audited, explained and certified is a sine qua non for deployment. And these attributes are precisely what European research has been focusing on for the past fifteen years.

The fatal risk: indecision

The danger is not the European model itself, but our collective inability to fully embrace it. For twenty years, Europe's digital strategy has oscillated between two contradictory temptations: mimicking the American model ("creating unicorns") and asserting its difference ("ethics first"), without ever really choosing. This strategic indecision produces the worst of both worlds: neither the financial clout of the US, nor the consistency of standards needed to project the European model.

The choice is not between copying others or making our own way - that's a false dilemma. What is urgently needed is to move from a regulatory framework, now established with the AI Act, to coordinated industrial action. This implies three breaks. Firstly, accepting massive public investment in strategic infrastructures - InvestAI is a case in point - and assuming that technological sovereignty has a cost, albeit less than the cost of dependence. Secondly, impose strategic discipline: concentrate resources on three or four technological bets (70% of public R&D), instead of scattering budgets over the whole spectrum. Thirdly, build an aggressive standards diplomacy, transforming the AI Act into a weapon of commercial conquest rather than a self-inflicted handicap.

Resolving the apparent tension: open standards and concentrated sovereignty

This strategy may seem paradoxical: on the one hand, promoting interoperability and open standards (Proposal 7); on the other, massively concentrating investment on a few critical technologies (Proposals 8-10). But in reality, these two axes are complementary rather than contradictory.

Open standards and interoperability are our geopolitical offering This is what Europe is offering the rest of the world to avoid the Sino-American walled garden. This is our comparative advantage in technological diplomacy. By promoting open protocols, interoperable architectures and shared datasets, Europe is positioning itself as a credible alternative for all players - governments, businesses, researchers - seeking to avoid exclusive dependence on proprietary American or Chinese ecosystems.

Conversely, the concentration of investment in 3-4 critical technologies is a matter of selective sovereignty. Identify the segments where dependence would be strategically unacceptable (quantum computing, specialised semiconductors, frugal AI, explainable AI) and build real autonomy. It's not a question of total self-sufficiency - a costly and ineffective pipe dream - but of mastering the technologies that determine our ability to define our own rules of the game.

The key is that these sovereign technologies must themselves respect our own standards of openness.. In other words : sovereignty in capacities, openness in protocols. ASML, our paradigmatic example, is a perfect illustration of this synthesis: technological monopoly (sovereignty) in an open, international ecosystem (interoperability). Similarly, InvestAI aims to create European gigafactories (computational sovereignty) while guaranteeing open access to the entire scientific and industrial ecosystem (open standards).

This dialectic between strategic concentration and systemic openness is not a contradiction, but our unique value proposition: offering the world an alternative to the dominant closed models, while guaranteeing our autonomy in critical segments. It is precisely this synthesis that can transform Europe's "third way" from a rhetorical aspiration into a geopolitical reality.

The civilisational challenge: historical responsibility

Beyond economic competition, Europe's AI strategy raises a fundamental question of political philosophy: can a technologically advanced society sustainably preserve the achievements of liberal constitutionalism - the rule of law, separation of powers, protection of minorities, individual autonomy? Or does technological progress necessarily imply, as some authoritarian theorists maintain, a weakening of democratic constraints in the name of efficiency?

Europe alone bears the burden of proving empirically that the first option is viable. Neither the United States - where AI regulation is largely left to corporate self-regulation - nor China - where AI explicitly serves social control objectives - can embody this synthesis between technological innovation and fundamental rights. This responsibility stems directly from European history: it was in Europe that individual freedoms (habeas corpus, freedom of expression) and the industrial revolution were invented simultaneously. It was in Europe in the twentieth century that the gamble of democratic regulation of economic power was taken. It was in Europe that the institutions of liberal constitutionalism survived the totalitarian catastrophes.

This historical legitimacy gives rise to a strategic obligation: to demonstrate that ethics and innovation are not antagonistic, but mutually constitutive. Europe's failure in AI would not just be an economic defeat - it would signal the impossibility of a technological modernity that respects human rights, thereby validating authoritarian theses on the incompatibility between democracy and technological efficiency.

So the final question is not a technical one, but a political one. Does the European Union have the collective will to transform these potential assets into real power? Does it have the strategic discipline to stay the course over the next twenty years, regardless of electoral changes and tensions between Member States? Can it overcome the temptation to turn inwards to build the common infrastructures that are essential to continental sovereignty?

These are not issues for forward-looking analysis - they call for immediate political decisions. The time for strategic thinking is over. Now is the time for execution. History will judge Europe not on the quality of its principles, but on its ability to embody them in durable technological institutions. Our generation bears responsibility for this verdict.

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[1] Bradford, A. (2020), The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the WorldOxford University Press.

[2] Acemoglu, D. and Johnson, S. (2023), Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and ProsperityPublic Affairs.

[3] European Court of Auditors (2024), Special report on artificial intelligence in the EULuxembourg. https://www.eca.europa.eu/fr/publications/sr-2024-08

[4] European Commission (2024-2025), Action plan for an AI continent. https://france.representation.ec.europa.eu/informations/intelligence-artificielle-la-commission-propose-un-nouveau-plan-daction-pour-renforcer-son-2025-04-09_fr

[5] European Commission (2025), A European approach to artificial intelligence. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/fr/policies/european-approach-artificial-intelligence

[6] OECD (2024), OECD AI Principles: Turning from Aspiration to ActionOECD Digital Economy Papers. https://www.oecd.org/digital/artificial-intelligence/

[7] Internet Policy Review (2025), "Brussels Effect or Experimentalism? Journal of European Public Policyvol. 14, no. 2. https://doaj.org/article/c45f5940910c487dab59787b2a907062

[8] IAPP (2024), AI Governance and Regulatory Confidence Survey.

[9] Meta/Facebook public financial data, March-July 2018.

[10] European Commission (2025), GenAI4EU: Funding opportunities. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/genai4eu

[11] Eurobarometer 2024, European Commission data.

[12] IT for Business, "Digital sovereignty: cloud, AI agents and dependencies". https://www.itforbusiness.fr/souverainete-numerique-cloud-agents-ia-et-dependances-99757

[13] European Chips Act (2023), European Commission.

[14] European Commission (2025), EU launches InvestAI initiative. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/eu-launches-investai-initiative-mobilise-eu200-billion-investment-artificial-intelligence

[15] European Commission (2025), InvestAI announcement, Paris Summit.

[16] OECD (2025), Progress in Implementing the European Union Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/progress-in-implementing-the-european-union-coordinated-plan-on-artificial-intelligence-volume-1_533c355d-en.html

The post Une stratégie pour l’IA de l’UE : transformer les contraintes en avantages compétitifs ! appeared first on Association Européenne de la Pensée Libre.

Key message: abortion is not an opinion, it's a right. The ECLJ and its allies want to restrict women's freedoms in the name of religious morality. Yet science, European law and the majority of citizens support abortion as a fundamental right. The real question is not "pro-life" or "pro-choice", but: do we want a Europe where women are free to decide about their bodies? Or a Europe where religious lobbies impose their dogmas on everyone? Let's take action to make the European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) "My Voice, My Choice" a reality!

AEPL's arguments

a) The European Citizens' Initiative "My Voice, My Choice": a movement for women's autonomy

L'European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) "My Voice, My Choiceregistered in April 2024, is a historic movement spearheaded by over 300 feminist and human rights organisations across Europe. Its aim: guarantee access to safe, legal and accessible abortion in all EU Member States. The ECI collected more than one million valid signatures, well over the threshold required to be examined by the European Commission.

This initiative is a response to the glaring inequalities in access to abortion in Europe. In some countries, such as Poland and Malta, legal restrictions force thousands of women to resort to clandestine abortions or to travel abroad, often in precarious and expensive conditions. "My Voice, My Choice" calls on the EU to set up a financial support mechanism to enable women to have access to safe abortions, in accordance with national legislation, and to making abortion a fundamental rightprotected by the European institutions.

The organisers, includingSlovenian Institute on 8 Marchemphasise the importance of a global approach These include sex education, free access to contraception and strong social policies to reduce recourse to abortion. Their message is clear: women's bodily autonomy is non-negotiable. The European Commission's response is expected by 2 March 2026.

b) The ECLJ's freedom-destroying activities: who are these ultra-conservatives?

The European Center for Law and Justice (ECLJ) is a non-governmental organisation founded in 1998 and affiliated to theAmerican Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ)an American conservative evangelical legal lobby. Led by Grégor Puppinck and Jay Alan Sekulow (Donald Trump's former lawyer), the ECLJ presents itself as a defender of "human rights" and "human dignity", but its agenda is clearly anti-abortion, anti-gay marriage and anti-euthanasia.

What you need to know

• Grégor Puppinck French lawyer, Director General of the ECLJ, known for his[1] for his stance against abortion, PMA for homosexual couples and "gender theory". He defends a vision naturalist and Christian of law, as opposed to moral relativism.
• Jay Alan Sekulow : American lawyer, founder of the ACLJ, close to[2] conservative evangelical circles. He has appeared before the US Supreme Court to defend religious causes.
• Financing : The ECLJ is funded primarily by the ACLJ, which raises millions of dollars from American evangelical donors. In 2019, the ACLJ contributed more than $1 million to the ECLJ.

Their anti-abortion lobbying

The ECLJ is conducting a aggressive campaign against abortion in Europe, organising conferences, publishing reports and appearing before the European Court of Human Rights. European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Their strategy is based on :

• Manipulating testimonies At a conference at the European Parliament in October 2025, the ECLJ invited women to talk about their "post-abortion suffering", citing a 2020 IFOP survey which found that 92 % of women would say that abortion leaves traces that are difficult to live with. However, this study is disputed by the scientific community for its lack of methodological rigour.
• Promoting pro-birth policies ECLJ: ECLJ praises the policies of Hungary and Italy, where financial aid is granted to families, but it does not consider that these policies are sufficiently effective. without guaranteeing women's autonomy. Their aim: abolish European funding for pro-IVG programmes and redirect these funds to "alternatives to abortion".
• Influencing MEPs At their conference, eight MEPs (including members of the EPP and ECR) supported their positions, demonstrating their commitment to the cause. ability to influence institutions.

Misleading and dangerous rhetoric

The ECLJ describes abortion as an "ideological trap" and an "act that is always traumatic". And yet, data from the WHO and the American Academy of Pediatrics show that the majority of women feel a relief after an abortion, especially when the decision is free and accompanied. Their rhetoric aims to making women feel guilty and restrict their rightsunder the guise of "protecting life".

c) Abortion, a fundamental right recognised by the European Union

L'Voluntary termination of pregnancy is a fundamental rightprotected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and European case law.

Legal bases

1. Human dignity (Article 1) The right to bodily autonomy is a pillar of dignity. Just as forcing a woman to have an abortion when she doesn't want to, forcing a woman to continue an unwanted pregnancy is a violation of her human dignity. violation of his physical and mental integrity.
2. Right to physical and mental integrity (Article 3) : Abortion protects women from the risks of unwanted pregnancy or clandestine abortion.
3. Respect for privacy (Article 7) : The decision to have an abortion is an intimate one. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) confirmed on several occasions that access to abortion is an essential protected right (judgment Tysiącz v. Poland, 2007).
4. Gender equality (Article 23) Refusing abortion exacerbates inequalities by limiting women's autonomy.
5. Non-discrimination (Article 21) : Restrictions on abortion discriminate against women in precarious situations who do not have the means to travel abroad.
6. Right to health (Article 35) : The WHO considers abortion to be a essential health service. Countries where abortion is legal have lower maternal mortality rate.

International recognition

• La CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women) encourages governments to guarantee access to abortion.
• L'WHO points out that legalising abortion reduces maternal mortality by 70 %.

Conclusion : Abortion is not a "privilege", but a "right". fundamental human rightprotected by European and international law.

d) Counter-arguments to the ECLJ's ideas: scientific and legal reality

The ECLJ uses Emotional and biased arguments to discredit abortion. Here's why their theses are unfounded :

1. "Abortion is always traumatic".

• Reality : Serious studies (WHO, Social Science & Medicine2018) show that relief is more frequent than regret. Post-abortion suffering is often linked to the social stigmanot the act itself.
• Methodological bias : The studies cited by the ECLJ (like the IFOP study) are unrepresentative and oriented. A 2018 meta-analysis concludes that women who have abortions do not have no greater risk of mental health problems than those who carry an unwanted pregnancy to term.

2. "Abortion denies the rights of the unborn child".

• Legal reality International law (ECHR, New York Convention) does not recognise the legal personality of the foetus before birth. The European Court recalled that women's autonomy comes first (A, B and C v. Ireland, 2010).
• Gradual approach European legislation (France, Belgium, Germany) recognises the growing rights of the foetus. without denying those of women.

3. "Pro-choice movements play down women's suffering".

• Reality The pro-choice movement do not deny the complexity abortion, but defend a woman's right to a safe and decide without stigma. Countries where abortion is legal and supported (Netherlands, Sweden) have fewer complications and fewer regrets than those where it is restricted.

4. "We need to fund alternatives to abortion".

• Reality Family support policies (benefits, parental leave, etc.) are a major source of support for families. necessary but insufficient. In Poland, where abortion is highly restricted, the number of illegal abortions remains high.
• Methodological bias Reducing recourse to abortion is based on three pillars: a) sex education, b) access to contraception, and c) strong social policies (housing, employment, childcare).

5. "Public money must not fund abortion".

• Reality : The EU cannot impose a single policy, but it must guarantee access to care. European funds finance global reproductive healthwhich reduce the number of abortions.

Conclusion : The ECLJ's arguments are based on selective data, biased legal interpretations, and a moralistic view of the world. sexuality. Their aim: restricting women's rights under the guise of "protecting life".

e) The decision to have an abortion belongs to women, not to clergy or partners

Bodily autonomy is a inalienable right. Here's why the decision to have an abortion must be yours for pregnant women only :

1. Bodily autonomy: a fundamental principle

• International law The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 3) protects physical integrity and personal freedom. Pregnancy requires major physical, psychological and social changes to the woman.
• Exclusive liability The risks (complications, maternal mortality) and consequences (mental burden, parental responsibility) weigh heavily on the mother's health. only on women.

2. The role of men: support, not decision-making

• Men can express their opinionbut cannot decide the place of women.
• Example In France, the Veil law (1975) recognised that "no woman has recourse to abortion out of the blue", but that banning it worsens suffering.

3. Criticism of religious interference

• Biblical biases : The sacred texts (Bible, Koran) were written in different languages. patriarchal contexts. For example, the Old Testament does not deal with abortion from the point of view of the woman's consent or right, but rather as a damage to the husband's property.
• Historical control Religious institutions have often served to controlling women's sexualitylimiting their freedom in the name of imposed morality.

4. Equality and social justice

• Worsening inequalities : Banning abortion penalises poor women who cannot afford to travel abroad.
• Example In the United States, following the cancellation of Roe v. WadeIn restrictive states, illegal abortions have increased.

Conclusion : The decision to have an abortion is a question of dignity, freedom and justice. Women must be able to choose without religious or male interference.

f) Religious dogmas: unverifiable hypotheses, not universal truths

The ECLJ's arguments are based on religious dogmaswhich are unproven assumptionsnot scientific facts.

1. Dogmas: statements that cannot be falsified

• Lack of empirical evidence No proof confirms the existence of a god or divine revelation. Believers invoke "faith", which places these beliefs at the heart of their beliefs. outside the scope of reason.
• Burden of proof In logic, it is up to the person who asserts the existence of God to prove it (Ockham's razor).

2. Sacred texts: human works, not divine words

• Historical background : The Bible and the Koran were written by men, in different cultures. patriarchal and slave societies. Their laws reflect standards of their timenot a universal moral.
• Factual errors These texts contain descriptions of the world now refuted by science (flat earth, creationism).

3. Separation of state and church: a necessity for peaceful coexistence

• State neutrality : In a pluralist society, imposing religious dogma to all is unjust. The separation of State and Church guarantees that laws are based on reason and democratic debatenot on questionable revelations.
• Principle : The separation of State and Church allows everyone to live according to their convictions without imposing them on others.

Conclusion Religious dogmas are cultural buildingsThey are not universal truths. They should not dictate the laws of a secular society.

g) Two-way tolerance: lay people do not censor the ECLJ

Unlike the ECLJ, which seeks to impose your religious values to all defenders of secularism are not calling for a ban on Christian dogma. They are simply asking that :

• Religious beliefs remain in the private sphere.
• Laws should be based on universal principles (human rights, equality, science), not dogma.

Example : No one is stopping the ECLJ from teaching its beliefs, but no one is stopping the ECLJ from teaching its beliefs, but no one is stopping the ECLJ from teaching its beliefs. impose these beliefs to those who do not share them.

Conclusion : True tolerance is accept that everyone should live according to their own convictions, without imposing them on others.

Summary of AEPL's arguments

This is why abortion must remain a fundamental right in the European Union:

1. "My Voice, My Choice A historic European Citizens' Initiative, backed by 300 organisations, to guarantee access to abortion safe, legal and financed throughout the EU. Over a million signatures have forced the European Commission to take a decision by March 2026.
2. The ECLJ, a dangerous anti-abortion lobby Funded by American evangelical donors, this group uses biased testimoniesand non-scientific studiesand a influence strategy with MEPs to restrict abortion. Their aim: abolish public funding for abortion and impose coercive birth policies.
3. Abortion, a right protected by the EU The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights recognises abortion as a right linked to the right to life. dignity, l'bodily autonomythe privacyand the health. The ECHR and the WHO confirm that legalising abortion saves lives.
4. The ECLJ's arguments are unfounded :

• False : Abortion is said to be "always traumatic". Reality The majority of women experience relief (WHO, 2021).
• False Abortion "denies the rights of the foetus". Reality International law protects women's autonomy first and foremost (ECHR, 2010).
• False The only thing that would suffice would be "family support policies". Reality Without sex education and access to contraception, these policies fail (e.g. Poland).

5. The decision belongs to women, not the clergy : Bodily autonomy is a human right. Religious texts written in patriarchal societies, cannot dictate the laws of a secular Europe.
6. Religious dogmas are not scientific truths : They are based on unverifiable hypotheses. A democratic society must base its laws on reason, not faith.
7. Tolerance works both ways Secularists are not calling for the ECLJ's beliefs to be banned, but they are refusing to allow them to be used as a pretext for their own religious beliefs. are binding on all.

Guy T'hooft, Past President of the AEPL

[1] https://genethique.org/author/gregor-puppinck
[2] Le monde diplomatique, "Évangéliques en France, chronique d'un essor politique", December 2024.

The post Plaidoyer pour la liberté fondamentale d’avorter (Contre les idées liberticides de l’ECLJ) appeared first on Association Européenne de la Pensée Libre.

I am here at the request of theEuropean Free Thought Association [AEPL] as aexpert in housing assistanceand as Chairman of the association Solidarité Logement.

Solidarité Logement is a non-profit association established under Belgian law in 2009. Its aim is to provide housing for two target audiences very much in line with today's issues :

• the young people aged 16 to 25 who are experiencing difficult transitions to independence, often with broken family ties, vulnerable and without resources; and
• the isolated womenThese women, with or without children, are even more precarious and vulnerable when they have been subjected to physical and psychological violence.

The real specificity of our association is to literally create housing for these beneficiaries. On this subject, let me digress for a moment to say how much I agree with Mr Gonçalvez, who spoke without the first panel and who insisted on renovating the existing housing stock, which is insalubrious and/or unoccupied, as opposed to constructing new buildings. In the 15 years of our existence, we have created more than 50 housing units for around 200 beneficiaries a year. Once the housing units have been made available, we work with specialist associations to support our beneficiaries. Beneficiaries are selected according to ethical criteria and total neutrality.

As our association is only active in Belgium, I have gathered information from a number of sources in order to put today's intervention at the level of the European Union. One of these sources is a document issued by the European Commission last year.

These are :

Social Housing and beyond.

An operational toolkit on the use of EU funds for investments in social housing and associated services".

This document, published under the aegis of Nicolas Schmit, then European Commissioner for Employment and Social Rights, is very comprehensive and stresses the following points the importance of services associated with the social housing dynamic. He makes a very useful observation for today's debate. It can be summarised as follows:

• House prices in the European Union rose by 48% between 2010 and 2023,
• Rental income amounted to 23%,
• In 2022, 8.7% of the Union's population spent 40% (or more) of their income on housing,
• At the same time, inflation and rising interest rates have had a considerable impact on rents and mortgages,
• Unaffordable housing in turn has an impact on social inclusion and participation in education and the labour market.

While the primary responsibility for investment policies in affordable social housing lies with the Member States, it is no less true that EU policy and funding instruments have a significant impact on the housing ecosystem in general and social housing in particular.

The document sets out a range of measures to promote social and affordable housing for the period 2021-2027. To this end, it reviews all the EU funds available to support investment in social housing and related services over this period. We can certainly not say that the Union is taking the subject lightly Between the European Regional Development Fund and the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, no fewer than 9 plans and programmes are directly or indirectly relevant to the issues we are dealing with. These funds and programmes are all financed by the EU budget, but differ in the way they are managed. There are three types of management:

• Direct management: EU funding is managed directly by the European Commission,
• shared management: the Commission and the national authorities jointly manage funding; and finally
• indirect management: funding is managed by partner organisations or other authorities within or outside the EU.

Secondly, this document analyses in detail no less than 19 projects and actions that have been carried out as part of the 2014-2020 programme, some of which are still being implemented or expanded. What has caught our attention is that these projects have been categorised along two axes:

• approach based on geographical locationThe focus is more on the territorial aspect;
• the person-based approach: the focus is placed on a single target group very specific.

Our experience on the ground shows that the two main factors in the success of our action - apart, of course, from the creation of housing - are :

• deliberately focusing on a well-defined target audience. With insecurity everywhere and of all kinds, it is imperative that we stay within the scope of our corporate purpose.
• support for beneficiaries until they are fully independent, provided by specialist associations in the same public of beneficiaries (young people in difficulty, women, single people, migrants, MENA, etc.). Commissioner Brunner said this earlier, but it's important to repeat again and again that social housing is not just about bricks.

To illustrate this, I'll take one of the 19 projects mentioned above. This is a project at Antwerp in 2017-2019. This involves the co-housing of young unaccompanied refugees, particularly those who reach adulthood (17-22 years) and lose the accommodation allocated to them as minors. This operation was a great success (75 co-housing units at an average rent of €250 for a period of 1 to 3 years) because - among other things - :

• The project went further than pure accommodation: co-housing with young Flemish people from Antwerp, education and language courses, social networking, psychological counselling and access to employment;
• it was supported by a number of recognised local associations active in the empowerment sectors mentioned above.

In our opinion, this project could be taken as a model for the future because it combines all the factors for success.

I would like to make it clear that our association was not involved in this project.

By way of conclusion, and perhaps I should have started my speech there, if we are all equal before the law (I remind you of the European Convention on Human Rights), the same is clearly not true when it comes to housing. Let's all work together to reduce this inequality.

Thank you for your attention,

Didier Giblet

Chairman of Solidarité Logement

Housing expert for AEPL

The post Logement dans l’UE : Stratégies pour les personnes, les familles et les jeunes générations appeared first on Association Européenne de la Pensée Libre.

Each year the Commission adopts its work programme, which lists the new policies and legislative initiatives it will propose to the legislative and budgetary authority, the European Parliament and the Council, during the year. This work programme shows how the political guidelines and mission statements sent by President von der Leyen to each member of the Commission will be implemented during the first year.

Adopted on 11 February 2025, this programme is then presented to the plenary session of the European Parliament and to the General Affairs Council. On the basis of this work programme and the priorities of the other institutions, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission draw up a joint declaration on the legislative priorities of the European Union (EU) for 2025 and joint conclusions on these priorities.

This year, the Commission will focus on :

1. Sustainable prosperity and competitiveness;
2. Strengthening defence and security ;
3. Supporting people and strengthening our societies and our social model;
4. Preserving our quality of life;
5. Protecting democracy and defending our values;
6. Use its power and partnerships around the world;
7. Preparing our union for the future.

The work programme is the result of close cooperation between the European Parliament, the Member States and the Council and advisory bodies of the EU (Committees of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee). It examines the areas in which the Commission will present new initiatives, withdraw pending proposals and review existing EU legislation.

This year's programme has a strong focus on simplification. The Commission intends to simplify EU rules, facilitate their implementation and reduce administrative burdens. The work programme is accompanied by a communication containing objectives and tools designed to lighten the regulatory burden and bring about rapid and significant improvements for citizens and businesses, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

The Commission is presenting three series of omnibus proposals simplifying various legislative acts, as well as a record number of initiatives with a strong simplification dimension. The former will contribute to achieving the objective of reducing administrative burdens by at least 25 % and by at least 35 % for SMEs. They also include an annual plan for quality assessments and evaluations to ensure the continuity of the simplification and burden reduction exercise.

The next two omnibus proposals will focus on simplifying investment, and the third on simplifying regulatory reporting requirements for small and mid-cap companies and eliminating the paper format.

A package of simplification measures will be proposed for the CAP, the Common Agricultural Policy.

The Commission's work programme proposes 51 new policy initiatives and 18 legislative proposals, 11 of which have a significant simplification dimension. A stock of 123 previous proposals remain to be examined by the Parliament and the Council, but 41 have been withdrawn as they have become obsolete or have no prospect of adoption.

The main priorities of the work programme are as follows:

1. Ensuring sustainable prosperity and competitiveness

This objective includes a number of initiatives and legislative proposals, which are mentioned below.

The competitiveness compass already proposed aims to tackle the structural problems that hamper European competitiveness: an unstable global environment characterised by unfair competition, fragile supply chains, rising energy costs, labour and skills shortages and limited access to capital.

A strategy for modernising the single market will be proposed to facilitate the cross-border supply of goods and services and fair and effective labour mobility.

The pact for a propre, also already proposed, is at the heart of the decarbonisation, sustainability and competitiveness project. It will help to achieve the objectives of the Green Pact for Europe. At the same time an action plan to make energy more affordablefor Europe will also be proposed. This will include a new framework for state aid and boost investment in clean energy. A roadmap will aim to put an end to Russian energy imports. The Commission will also present a 2025 indicative nuclear programme and a strategic plan for small modular reactors (SMRs) to support the acceleration of their deployment.

An action plan is planned for the chemical industry, with a targeted review of the applicable rules (REACH regulation) with a view to simplifying them.

A master plan will be proposed to move towards a Savings and Investment Union and create an internal capital market.

The Commission will also seek to harness the potential of data and information technology to improve the quality of life of its citizens. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and propose a strategy to stimulate biotechnologies. It will also present an investment plan for sustainable transport including a strategic framework to support sustainable fuel production and distribution.

Legislation on digital networks and the development of cloud computing will also be presented.

With the quantum strategy regulation, the world's leading position in this critical sector should be maintained, in particular with the strategy to strengthen Europe's quantum capacities. quantum technology research and developmentand produce devices and systems based on it.

With the European Business Wallet Business-to-business exchanges and exchanges with public authorities should open up new business opportunities.

Finally, the Commission will present space legislation to make the most of the benefits of the space economy.

2. Strengthening security and defence

As for European defence, this is becoming a matter of urgency in the face of the Russian threat to extend its claims beyond Ukraine in order to pick up the pieces lost when the former Soviet Union broke up.

This new defence area, the subject of the White Paper on the future of European defence, recently presented by the Commission to launch a wide-ranging consultation on establishing a European framework for defence investment needs, is accompanied by several other proposals in the field of security: a strategy for the EU crisis preparedness a strategy to prepare measures for dealing with the  threats to public health to reduce our dependence on external supplies critical medicines for the stockpiling of these drugs; for combat arms and drug trafficking, to improve cyber security hospitals ; protecting submarine cables telecommunications; ...

The Commission will also continue its efforts to implementing the Pact on Migration and AsylumThis includes the return of illegal immigrants.

3. Supporting people and strengthening our societies and our social model

The Commission will continue to strengthen social equity, with a new action plan for implementation of the european socle of social rights ;  Skills Union will tackle skills and labour shortages, ensuring that businesses have access to the skilled workforce they need to boost their productivity and competitiveness. It will also work to ensure that education and training systems have the right tools to prepare Europeans of all generations for a rapidly changing future, through high quality, inclusive education, training and lifelong learning, as well as through guaranteeing quality jobs with decent working conditions, high health and safety standards and collective bargaining.

The next consumer 2025-2030 will include a new action plan for consumers in the single market, guaranteeing a balanced approach that protects consumers without imposing excessive administrative burdens on businesses.

4. Preserving our quality of life: agriculture, food safety, water and nature

Europe needs a secure and affordable supply of high-quality local food produced in a socially and environmentally sustainable way, offering farmers a fair and sufficient income, guaranteeing the long-term competitiveness of European agriculture and respecting and protecting the natural environment.

Based on the results of the strategic dialogue on the future of EU agriculture, the Commission will present a vision for agriculture and food in order to guarantee a stable framework for farmers and a long-term perspective for economic operators, including farmers, fishermen, SMEs and other players in the food chain.

The oceans and seas play an important role in Europe's prosperity and security, not least through their unique ability to regulate the climate as the planet's primary carbon sink. It is essential to take action to preserve the oceans, both now and for future generations. The pact for the oceans will create a single frame of reference for all policies relating to the oceans and will define a global approach to the ocean in all its dimensions.

Sustainable water management is one of the greatest challenges facing Europe in view of the effects of climate change. Floods and droughts are becoming the norm, as evidenced by the tragic events that have affected Europe in recent years. With regard to the resilience in the water sectorThe Commission is proposing a "source to sea" approach, taking into account the very different challenges faced in different regions and sectors, to ensure that water sources are properly managed, to tackle water scarcity and pollution, and to increase the competitiveness of the European water industry.

5. Protecting our democracy and defending our values will be a priority.

A "democratic shield"The Commission will continue to integrate equality into all its policies, by presenting a number of new proposals. The Commission will continue to integrate equality into all its policies, by presenting a number of new initiatives. new strategies on LGBTIQ people and the fight against racism. A roadmap for women's rights will define, in terms of rights and principles, the ongoing commitment of the European institutions.

6. Use your power and partnerships around the world

On the external front, the priority will continue to be to work towards a stable and secure future for Europe.Ukraine within an enlarged Union, to develop a strategy for the Black Sea and a new pact for the Mediterranean in order to strengthen regional cooperation and develop a new EU-India Strategic Agenda.

7. Achieving our objectives together and preparing our Union for the future 

Over the past five years, the Union has embarked on an ambitious transformation while overcoming generational crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and the economic consequences that followed. The EU has adopted innovative legislation to advance the dual transition and strengthen our resilience. It is now essential to give the priority to implementation and to ensure that the Union is ready for the future, both financially and institutionally, by building on a strengthened relationship with the EU institutions.

The Commission will present a new long-term EU budget (multiannual financial framework covering 2028 to 2034). It will be better aligned with the priorities and objectives adopted, and flexibly oriented towards the areas where EU action is most needed. It will be simpler and more effective to operate, and will make better use of the European budget to mobilise more national, private and institutional funding.

Nearly 21 years after the largest wave of enlargement and driven by the ambition to strengthen the Union through an accession process based on merit, we must ensure that we are ready for an enlarged Union. Thanks to the lessons learned from previous enlargements, the EU is now better prepared to be a catalyst for progress and to deepen as it enlarges. The pre-enlargement policy reviews will assess in more detail the consequences and impacts of enlargement on all EU policies, identify gaps, clarify what needs to be done to turn challenges into opportunities, and explore ways to improve the EU's governance and its ability to act quickly, ensuring that policies can continue to deliver effective results in an enlarged Union.

La Commission strengthen its relations with Parliament and the Councilby ensuring transparency, accountability and improved communication and information flows. All Commissioners will have to be present at the European Parliament, engage in dialogue with the Member States and take part in Council meetings. corresponding to their competences. The Commission will rapidly propose a new framework agreement with the European Parliament, while strengthening cooperation on Parliament resolutions requesting the submission of legislative proposals based on Article 225 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and will duly justify the use of Article 122 in exceptional and urgent circumstances.

The AEPL's opinion during the dialogue with Parliament on 18 March.

It should be noted that AEPL was able to express its views on the Commission's priorities within the framework of the dialogue provided for in Article 17 of the TFEU. In a letter addressed to the EP VP responsible for this dialogue, Ms Antonella Sberna (Conservatives and Reformists Group, member of Fratelli d'Italia, G. Meloni's party in power in Italy), our main current concerns are the preservation of democracy and the rule of law, which are being called into question by the autocratic or extreme right-wing regimes that are on the rise, the establishment of a genuine Europe of defence and the controlled deployment of artificial intelligence and information tools.

In fact, the former are the object of all-out attacks, even by democracies: the United States of America is a case in point, where the President seems fascinated by strong regimes (Victor Orban in HU) or even dictatorial regimes, such as Russia, whose expansionist or even imperialist aims he does not hesitate to copy, such as the annexation of Greenland, Canada and the Panama Canal.

In the USA, the dismantling of a series of administrations, either to combat the values of diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) that the new President rejects, or that they are wasteful, or that they oppose conspiracy ideas aimed at advising against vaccines, or denying climate change, for example; the all-out attack on certain universities (Columbia in New York) which means that American researchers in the disciplines concerned by these values are turning to Europe; the insults and threats against judges not appointed by the new President. The repeated attempts to discredit and exclude journalists who dare to seek out the truth and check fake news, the showering of voters (even those of the far-right parties in Europe, cf. AfD) with mountains of dollars (Elon Musk) .... are, alas, practices that have an increasingly powerful echo in our Member States.

It is therefore important and urgent that the European Parliament and the European Commission continue to defend our society and our European values by involving and convincing our fellow citizens as much as possible.

The second priority expressed in this letter is to set up, at breakneck speed, a genuine European defence with all the necessary resources (strategic autonomy, massive support for Ukraine, strengthening our technological and industrial base, giving Europe an integrated political command, and permanent structured cooperation) is finally making concrete headway in the face of intensifying Russian threats and the contempt of the mercantilist Trump administration, whose support for the defence of Europe is becoming more unlikely every day.

The third priority is to give ourselves the means to combat disinformation and propaganda by defending our legislation and forcing it to be respected in the fields of Artificial Intelligence and information. The Twitter network, now X, is an emblematic example of what most of the major American operators in these fields would like to impose on us, as they shamelessly convert to the Trumpist dogmas of "Make America Great Again", abandoning all control over dangerous content on the networks, invoking freedom of expression, but forgetting about the censorship of thousands of web pages of administrations attacked by Trump's new ideology.

In short, AEPL calls on the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission to defend our values and our European way of life, before it is too late.

Taking into account the competences attributed at European level, do you consider that this work programme could be improved? Please let us know.

Eric Paradis

(paradispauleric@gmail.com)

Director, member of the editorial committee

The post Ce que propose la Commission européenne en 2025 (CWP 2025) appeared first on Association Européenne de la Pensée Libre.

AEPL has noted with interest the recent statement by COMECE calling for the creation of a coordinator for the prevention of anti-Christian hatred in Europe.[1].

This request, as reported in the COMECE and OIDAC press releases, raises a number of questions within our non-denominational association, which we would like to share with you.

a) The first question concerns the relevance of the very existence of these functions within the European institutions and the link they have with the freedoms guaranteed by Article 9 of the ECHR. The title of the post held by Ms von Schnurbein[2]aims to combat anti-Semitism in the broadest sense of the term, and not to defend the Jewish religion sensu stricto. This seems perfectly normal to us, since this anti-Semitism hardly makes any difference between believers and non-believers when it expresses itself.

As for hatred of Muslims, the misuse of the concept of Islamophobia fosters unfortunate confusion. between racism and the right to criticise beliefs. As CHARB so rightly pointed out shortly before he was murdered at Charlie Hebdo, Pierre or Marie, who have converted to Islam, are less at risk of discrimination in employment or housing than Fatima or Karim, who have become atheists.

b) A second question comes from some of the arguments used at the European Prayer Breakfast on 4 December 2024.

The first argument concerns acts of vandalism and damage to cemeteries or religious buildings. These acts are unquestionably reprehensible. However, it is not certain that they are all motivated by anti-Christian hatred. Many of them can be explained by more banal motives. The lure of profit or the unhealthy pleasure of destruction are also powerful motivations. We condemn them unreservedly, they do not seem to us to justify the creation of this new function.

The second argument poses even more of a problem for us. Ms Kruger seems to want to challenge the content of certain courses and invokes a right to conscientious objection for future doctors during their training. This is simply unacceptable. Some terminations of pregnancy are motivated not by the woman's free choice, but by imperative medical reasons. Can we imagine patients being confronted with doctors who are incapable of helping them because they had conscientious scruples during their studies? If we follow Ms KRUGER, there would be nothing more to prevent students rejecting the theory of evolution or equality between men and women.

c) Finally, AEPL questions on the practical impact that this new coordinator will have. Everyone knows that there is a balance to be struck between preserving freedom of expression and combating hate speech. By segmenting the notion of freedom of thought, religion and conscience, by creating functions assigned to different communities, it is not certain that the European institutions are choosing the best strategy. If the existing coordinators need to be joined by a new official to protect Christians, why stop there? Don't Hindus, Buddhists and even non-believers - who are also very often victims of intolerance - also deserve adequate protection? Nor can we accept that the fight against hate speech is gradually replacing the repression of blasphemy that secularisation has gradually eradicated.

As a partner of the Dialogue within the framework of Article 17, AEPL is totally in favour of combating intolerance and hatred motivated by racial, religious or ideological animosities. However, we do not believe that this objective can be achieved by operating in silos. The role of the EU is to guarantee, in accordance with the Treaties, fundamental freedoms everywhere and for everyone. Among these, the freedom to have a religion and to practise it, but also the freedom not to have one and not to be discriminated against on this ground, occupies an important place.

Convinced that the dialogue established by Article 17 must be inclusive and reflect the religious and philosophical diversity that exists in Europe, we do not believe that the COMECE proposal is the best way to achieve this..

However, we strongly recommend applying the following guidelines[3] adopted on 24 June 2013 by the Foreign Affairs Council, which, more than ten years ago, assigned responsibility for this to the Member States. Embassies[4] of the 27 EU member statesA detailed text on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief.

For the Board of Directors,

Claude Wachtelear Guy T'hooft

Past President of AEPL President of AEPL

[1] COMECE to the European Parliament: "The time has come to appoint an EU coordinator for combating anti-Christian hatred" - The Catholic Church in the European Union

[2] EU Coordinator on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life,

[3] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/137585.pdf

[4] See page 11, paragraph 47

The post Un nouveau poste de coordinateur « haine antichrétienne » à la Commission Européenne ? appeared first on Association Européenne de la Pensée Libre.

The European Commission.

Naturally, it was within the framework of this strategic programme that the political guidelines for the next European Commission, 2024-2029, were set out in the speech entitled "Choosing Europe", with which Ursula von der Leyen presented herself to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 18 July. With 401 votes in favour out of 720, i.e. 40 more than the absolute majority, she was elected more comfortably than in 2019, when she only had a margin of 9 votes. Although the vote was secret, we can assume that the following voted against her: Jordan Bardella's Patriotes, Orban's Europe of Sovereign Nations, the 33 non-attached members (the far right) and the radical right of the conservatives and reformers (Ms Meloni's ECR), plus Manon Aubry's far left The Left. It can be deduced from this that a number of MEPs from the current majority did not vote for her, including the Social Democrats (S&D), the centrist Renaissance group and the EPP, her political group, joined by most of the Green MEPs.

Ursula von der Leyen's competitors, who were much further to the right (Croatian and Greek prime ministers), she appears to be the most centrist in a context where the EP has become much more right-wing, if not more so.

It has undertaken to apply the recently adopted "Asylum and Migration" package (but already called into question by several countries), and has not given up on the "Green Deal", making a gesture in favour of the German car industry (non-polluting synthetic fuel after 2035 for internal combustion engines).

The MEPs wanted to ensure that the rejection of the outgoing President would not add a further element of instability to the current international and economic geopolitical context, which is likely to be further exacerbated by the US elections and ongoing wars.

The main sections of the guidelines are as follows:

1. A new plan for sustainable prosperity and competitiveness for Europe (making it easier for businesses to do business; impact for clean industry; improving the distinctiveness and resilience of our economy; boosting productivity through the spread of digital technologies; putting research and innovation at the heart of our economy; boosting investment tenfold; tackling skills and labour shortages).
2. A new era for European defence and security (making the European Defence Union a reality; a Union strategy for crisis preparedness; a safer and more secure Europe; stronger common borders; fair and firm action on migration)
3. Supporting people and strengthening our societies and our social model (social equity in a modern economy; restoring the unity of our society, supporting our young people; a union of equality...).
4. Preserving our quality of life (food safety, water and nature, adapting to and preparing for climate change and solidarity in this area)
5. Protecting our democracy, defending our values (strengthening the rule of law; putting citizens at the heart of our democracy)
6. Europe in the world: using our power and our partnerships; enlargement as a geopolitical imperative; a more strategic approach to our neighbours; a new foreign economic policy; reshaping multilateralism for today's world)
7. Reaching our goals together and preparing our Union for the future (a new budget to match our ambitions; an ambitious reform programme for Europe; acting in cooperation with the European Parliament).

The composition of her College of Commissioners was more laborious than last time: indeed, Mrs von der Leyen had once again sought a balance between men and women and had therefore asked the Member States to put forward two candidates - when the current Commissioner was not being reappointed. Unfortunately, few Member States complied with this insistent request. The resulting college, which obviously remains to be approved candidate by candidate and then the entire college by the relevant European Parliament committees, is therefore made up of 11 women, including the president and four vice-presidents, and 16 men, including two vice-presidents, i.e. 40 % women, compared to the 22 % proposed by the Member States. Only 6 were already members of the committee, so 21 are new candidates.

There is also a political imbalance between the weight of the political groups that emerged from the elections and the number of candidate Commissioners belonging to each: 12 candidate Commissioners are Christian Democrats, like the President. It is true that the EPP came out on top in the elections, but there were only 4 S&Ds, who came second, 5 liberals from Renew, who are now fifth in the Chamber, 4 independents and even the Italian candidate from Mrs Meloni's CRE group, the 'moderate' extreme right, who would inherit the cohesion and reform portfolio, i.e. the European structural funds. The cordon sanitaire has been breached! Just like in the EP for this group.

All in all, the Commission is becoming much more right-wing..

But it is obviously the content of the portfolios allocated to them that is most significant.

Concerning the vice-presidencies :

As first vice-president, Estonian Kaja Kallas has been proposed by the European Council for the post of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The second VP, Stéphane Séjourné, a short-lived French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs in the Attal government, is the last-minute replacement for Thierry Breton, whom Mrs von der Leyen no longer wanted. France, which complied, obtained a VP in exchange for giving up its outgoing Commissioner Thierry Breton. He has been appointed to the Prosperity and Industrial Strategy portfolio.

Spain has been awarded a VP to Teresa Ribera, until now No. 2 in the Spanish government, who will be responsible for a fair and competitive clean transition.

Finland will have a vice-president responsible for technological sovereignty, security and democracy.

Romania will look after people, skills and preparedness

The 6^th VP is the Italian R. Fitto (who was part of the Italian government) will be in charge of the very rich portfolio of cohesion and reforms, the second largest allocation in the European budget.

As far as the Commissioners are concerned, the first to note is the Commissioner Lithuanian A. Kubilius who will be in charge of the all-important defence and space. He will have to coordinate with Estonian VP Kaja Kallas.

As for Austria, its candidate Magnus Brunner will have to concentrate on implementing the pact on  asylum and migrationThis will be complicated by the outcome of the recent Austrian elections, which were heavily weighted towards the far right, which is hostile to the pact.

The Croatian Commissioner will be the first to take charge of the new portfolio for Mediterranean. The Dane will be the first housing, new portfolio and energy. The Hungarian commissioner will be in charge of the animal health and welfare. Close to Orban, he is not a member of his party.

The Irishman will be responsible for democracy, justice and the rule of law, a portfolio previously held by Belgian Commissioner Reynders. The Belgian representative is Mme Hadja Lahbib in charge of humanitarian aid and crises. Latvian V. Dombrowski wins his third term of office the economy and productivity.

Luxembourg-based C.Hansen will be responsible for agriculture and food The Maltese will be responsible for culture, youth and sport, as well as intergenerational equity; the Dutch will be responsible for the climate, carbon neutrality and clean growth; the very large the budget, the fight against fraud and administration returns to Piotr Serafin In particular, it must prepare the long-term budgetthe 7-year multiannual financial framework; Portugal's Ms Albuquerque will look after the very important savings and investment financial services Marco Sefkovic from Slovakia, in his fourth term of office, will this time be in charge of the trade and economic security the Slovenian for enlargement and the eastern neighbourhood, and the Swedish for the environment The aim is to promote the development of a sustainable economy, water resilience and a competitive circular economy.

As we can see, the "small" countries, particularly the Baltic states, are receiving extremely large portfolios to help them stand up to Russia through their support for Ukraine. The big countries, France, Spain and Poland, are also well served. There is a sort of north-south and especially west-east rebalancing.

The Commissioners' hearings will take place in November. During the parliamentary session from 16 to 19 December, the entire college will be put to the vote in the European Parliament, and the new Commission could take office on 1 December.^er January next year. Previous experience shows that Parliament does not hesitate to reject one or other candidate. This may also be the case this year with the Italian candidacy of Mr Fitto from the extreme right of Mrs Meloni.

Provisional conclusions

Unfortunately, the rise of the extreme right in all the institutions has to be seen. This is certainly in line with the trend in public opinion in most Member States, but we must continue to fight against these extremes before it is too late. The aim of these extremes is to replace the quest for European sovereignty with the re-establishment of multiple national sovereignties, by closing our borders and making scapegoats of migrants and sometimes simply of "the other". Our common home could then collapse, and it would be too late to realise, as the United Kingdom is painfully doing, that separately the European states no longer count for much on the world stage, and that it is only united that we will be able to preserve our European way of life and the values of democracy and the rule of law.

Eric PARADIS

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Every five years the European landscape is renewed. The European elections lead to a new Parliament. At the same time, the European Council, bringing together the Heads of State or Government, draws up a new programme for the next period, in this case 2024-2029, and proposes to Parliament a candidate for the Presidency of the European Commission and for the post of New Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The European Commission has also been largely recomposed. A new college and a new work programme, based on that of the European Council, have been presented to the European Parliament. The first step for this new Commission is, of course, the election of a new President by the plenary session in the month following the European elections. This year, on 18 July, the European Parliament elected Ursula von der Leyen after debating with her on the basis of the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029 set out in a document entitled "Europe's Choice". During the summer, the reappointed President asked the Member States to put forward their national candidates for the new team of Commissioners. The difficulty of the exercise led to some delay in communicating these candidates, and it was not until 17 September that Mrs von der Leyen was able to present her proposal for the new team and their respective portfolios. It is regrettable that the President's wish to be able to choose between a male and a female candidate could not be met, which unfortunately prevented her from presenting a Commission that respected gender equality. There will therefore be fewer women than in the previous Commission.

By looking first at the results of the European Parliament elections, then at the conditions of the re-election in July of its President, Mrs Metsola, accompanied by the election of the Vice-Presidents and the rest of the EP management team, followed by the formation of the new political groups, and the allocation of the chairs of the parliamentary committees, certain new orientations, as well as majorities that are more relative than during the previous legislature, we will see that certain policies, particularly in the areas of agriculture, the environment and of course immigration, will be impacted by this new configuration of the Parliament.

Secondly, we will be analysing the new Commission and, above all, its new architecture, with some entirely new portfolios to tackle the immediate challenges and those of the next five years, with the imperative of securing the support of a parliamentary majority still in favour of European integration. All the Commissioners-designate will be subject to hearings by the parliamentary committees concerned with the areas assigned to them by the President, before concluding with a vote on the College as a whole.

The new European Council, marked primarily by the appointment of its new President, Antonio Costa, a former social-democrat Prime Minister of Portugal, will also be examined, showing the evolution of the forces present and in particular the increased weight of the far right, a reflection of national governmental situations.

The European Parliament :

Although the majority of the European Parliament remains in favour of European integration, the elections were marked by a strong surge in support from far-right parties, most of which are Eurosceptic and in favour of national rather than European sovereignty. As a result, the pro-European groups (EPP, S&D, the liberals of Renew Europe and the Greens) will have to work together to find the compromises needed for each vote, and will sometimes have to face headwinds that could oppose their priorities, weaken or even distort them, or simply prevent them from being implemented.

The participation rate rose very slightly to just over 50 % (51.5 %).

The European People's Party came out on top in these elections with around 26 % of the vote. 188 of the 718 MEPs come from national parties that are members of the EPP: the conservatives of the CDU CSU, of which Mrs von der Leyen is a member, come first, followed by Poland (23) and Spain (22).

The expected surge from the far right resulted in a total of 187 far-right MEPs, just one less than the EPP, divided into the following groups:

- The European Conservatives and Reformists (CRE) ended up with 78 MEPs (compared with 68 previously), including the 24 from Fratelli d'Italia, Mrs Meloni's party in power in Italy. They are followed by the 20 Polish MEPs from Mr Kaczinsky's PiS party. The Reformers and Conservatives group (CRE) can be described as moderate eurosceptics, while the other groups are clearly more radical.

-A new group was formed under the aegis of V.Orban: " Patriots for Europe "This group comprises 84 MPs, including the former members of the now disbanded Identité et Démocratie (ID) group, which is dominated by Ms Le Pen's Rassemblement National (30), whose president, Mr Bardella, heads the group. This group is now the 3^th of the EP.

-The Alternativ für Deutschland (AfD) party also succeeded in forming a new group with its own 14 MPs, called "Europe of sovereign nations, with 25 MEPs, becoming the most radical far-right group in the new EP clearly anti European, immigration, green pact, aid to Ukraine, abortion, feminism, LGBTQ, federalism - in short, ultraconservative and very friendly towards Russia.

 Among the common features of far-right programmes are the promotion of traditional family values (against voluntary termination of pregnancy, opposition to gender policies and gay marriage), in terms of religion and culture: reference to religious roots (mainly Christian) and culture (invention or rewriting of a national novel). There is also criticism of the political and economic elites, who are accused of betraying the people, leading to calls for institutional reforms to bring power closer to the people (popular referendum). They also call for selective social protection that favours nationals or excludes immigrants altogether. To varying degrees, they all want to: strengthen the powers of the Member States at the expense of the European institutions; establish a more restrictive policy on migration and asylum, insisting on border controls both outside and inside the Schengen area; less regulation; call into question the climate objectives and support farmers by revising the CAP.

Normally, like Mrs Meloni, who is rather Atlanticist, the CRE group is in favour of supporting Ukraine against the Russian invasion. The others range from moderate support to rejection of this aid.

If we look to the left, we find the S&D Group of Social Democrats stable with 19% of MPs (136 compared with 140 before).

The centre :Renew Europe (77 MPs or 11% ) and the Greens (53 or 7%) were the big losers in these elections, which were clearly down on the previous legislature (102 and 71 MPs respectively).

. The extreme GUE left (46 MPs, i.e. 5% compared with 37 before) and the Non-attached Members (33) complete the picture.

 Despite this, the pro-European parties have significantly more MEPs (454) than far-right groups (187).

Finally, it should be noted that the outgoing President, Mrs Metsola, was re-elected without difficulty to her post. From the far right, only 3 RCEs were elected to the EP's governing body, the Bureau, including 2 vice-presidents. An examination by parliamentary committee shows that few presidencies and vice-presidencies were granted to the far right, represented by only 4 RCEs. A "cordon sanitaire" has therefore been put in place for the Europe of sovereign nations, and there are no Patriots.

The European Council :

At its meeting on 27 June, the European Council elected Antonio Costa as President of the European Council (and of the Eurozone) for the period from 1 January to 31 December.^er December 2024 to 31 May 2027. It also adopted the decision proposing to the European Parliament the candidature of Ursula von der Leyen for the office of President of the European Commission. With regard to appointments, the European Council considered that Ms Kaja Kallas of Latvia is the appropriate candidate for the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, subject to the agreement of the President-elect of the Commission. Finally, it adopted the Union's strategic programme for the period 2024-2029.

Made up of heads of state or government, the Council obviously reflects the political situation in the Member States. Two countries are led by far-right leaders: Italy (G.Meloni-FdI) and Hungary (V.Orban-Fidesz).

But many other governments include representatives of far-right parties and their survival often depends on their support. In Slovakia (R. Fico) is an ally of the far-right Slovak Nationalist Party. In Sweden, the government depends on the support of the Sweden Democrats, the second largest parliamentary party. In Finland, the centre-right Petteri Orpo depends on the far-right Finnish Party. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders, whose far-right party came out on top in the national parliamentary elections, failed to be appointed Prime Minister, but Dick Schoof is under the control of a coalition of parties including G. Wilders' and right-wing parties, including Mark Rutte's VVD, which has long represented the Netherlands on the European Council. In Austria, the FPÖ, led by Herbert Kickl, is on the brink of power against the conservatives represented by the current Chancellor (Nehammer), having won 29% of the vote. This party was founded in the 1950s by former SS and other Nazi groups. Kickl promised that if he won he would govern as Volkskanzler, a term once used by Adolf Hitler. The FPÖ is Eurosceptic, anti-immigrant and a supporter of Russia. Austria would thus join the bloc of eurosceptics and friends of Russia, which now includes several Central and Eastern European countries and will probably be joined by the Czech Republic after next year's elections.

There are still a number of countries currently represented by governments that declare themselves to be pro-European but favour anti-migrant policies: Germany (Scholz),Belgium( De Croo then probably De Wever); Denmark( Mette Christensen); Spain( Pedro Sanchez- PSOE) Portugal (Luis Montenegro); Greece (Mitsotakis)Ireland( S.Harris) Luxembourg (Luc Frieden); Poland (D.Tusk) and France (E.Macron but with a Barnier government under the watchful eye of the Rassemblement National). The 3 Baltic countries, which are the first line of defence against a threatening Russia and Belarus, are busy putting up barriers to defend themselves, and although they have welcomed and integrated Ukrainian refugees, they are also taking this anti-immigrant line, as are Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Croatia.

In short, the European Council is moving to the right, and even to the ultra-right. And they're looking for scapegoats... for the moment, following their voters' lead, immigrants are to blame for all their problems: the budgetary crisis and the crisis in purchasing power, climate disruption, the damaging effects of globalisation with the loss of traditional points of reference, the irruption of artificial intelligence... All we'd have to do is close our national borders, abolish the Schengen area, and all our problems would be solved if we could just get together!

The European Council has no legislative powers, but takes very important decisions and requires unanimity.

On the other hand, the negotiations were conducted in a more restricted circle, excluding Mrs Meloni for example.

In addition, the chairmanship of the Council of the European Union[1] (also known as the Council of Ministers) rotates and changes every 1^erJuly each year. It was Hungary's turn in the second half of 2024, and V. Orban made the most of it by inviting himself to the homes of "the world's great and good" on the pretext of a "peace mission" that nobody had given him: Zelensky in Kiev, to whom he called for a ceasefire; Putin, of course, but also Xi Jinping and Trump, at his Mar a Lago residence. Since then, Trump has been full of praise for Orban, whom he considers the best European head of state! Americans know more about V. Orban than any other European leader, thanks to Trump!

With regard to the 2024-2029 strategic programme, the European Council agreed on the priorities that it invites the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission to implement during the next institutional cycle. The Union's next multiannual financial framework must take these priorities into account so that the European Union's budget is adapted to the future and that European responses are provided to European challenges. The Council has undertaken to work on the introduction of new own resources. These priorities are outlined below:

1. A free and democratic Europe: defending European values within the Union and remaining true to our values at global level
2. A strong and secure Europe: ensuring coherent and influential external action; strengthening our security and defence and protecting our citizens; preparing for an enlarged and stronger Union; adopting a global approach to migration and border management.
3. A prosperous and competitive Europe: strengthening our competitiveness; ensuring the success of the twofold ecological and digital transition; promoting an environment conducive to innovation and favourable to business; moving forward together.

Eric Paradis

Distinguished Director of AEPL

[1] The Council of Ministers

The Council of the Union (of Ministers) The Treaty of Lisbon introduces a double majority system, with Article 16 TEU stipulating that a qualified majority "shall be defined as 55 % of the States, i.e. at least 16 States representing 65 % of the population of the Union (i.e. 292 million out of 449), it being stipulated that a blocking minority must include at least four members of the Council, failing which the qualified majority shall be deemed attained". Decisions which are not taken on a proposal from the Commission.

(CFSP) must bring together 72% from the States (19).

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On 9 April this year, the Court handed down its ruling on an application lodged by three young girls (or their legal representatives) challenging a Flemish Community circular banning the wearing of religious symbols in the schools it organises. (Application No 50681/20 Mikyas and Others v Belgium)

This text had been challenged by the applicants before the Belgian courts, who had brought the case before the Tongeren Court of First Instance. On 23 February 2018, the Tongeren Court of First Instance ruled that the ban at issue was incompatible with Article 9 of the Convention. It held that the provision in question had been introduced solely on general policy grounds relating to community education and that there was no concrete reason or problematic situation in the establishments concerned to justify the implementation of such a general ban. The Court declared the ban inapplicable to the applicants. The Flemish Community's education authority, GO, appealed against this decision and on 23 December 2019 obtained a ruling in its favour. Following this decision, the applicants brought the case before the ECHR.

What lessons can we learn from this case?

1° The Court finds that the Flemish decision is carefully reasoned and that the prohibition is intended to protect certain pupils against the pressure that others might exert, as emphasised in one of the recitals of the decision of the GO Education Council:

That the right to freedom of religion is compromised when the wearing of certain religious symbols is presented as an obligation, thus creating discrimination between those - whether or not they are followers of the religion concerned - who wear these symbols and those who do not, the members of the latter group being held to be inferior by those of the former group, who impose unacceptable pressure on them with a view to making them wear a religious symbol anyway, whereas one of the fundamental principles of the GO! educational project consists precisely in accepting the equal value of all.

2° The Court reiterates its case-law in which it recognises that the national courts have a wide discretion in determining the relationship between religious beliefs and the State. On several occasions in the past, it has confirmed that the religious freedom guaranteed by Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights is not absolute and may, in certain cases, be subject to limitations,

3° The Court also rejected the arguments of the third-party interveners that the impugned decision would prevent the young women from pursuing their studies in the normal way. These third parties relied on arguments put forward in various UN reports, including those of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination:

"The Committee is concerned that the decision of the Flemish Community's Autonomous Education Office to ban the wearing of religious symbols in all schools under its authority and the decision of the French Community to leave it to individual schools to decide on this issue may open the way to acts of discrimination against members of certain ethnic minorities".

In this respect, the Court notes that :

As to the positions of the United Nations bodies to which the third-party interveners refer (see paragraphs 35 and 36 above), the Court notes that many of them are very broad in scope in that they go beyond the mere prohibition on the wearing of convictional symbols in Flemish Community education. In any event, those positions could not be decisive for the purposes of the Court's assessment of the compatibility of the impugned prohibition with the Convention, the observance of which it ensures (Humpert and Others v. Germany [GC], nos. 59433/18 and three others, § 127, 14 December 2023), especially as it already has extensive case-law on the issue at stake (see paragraphs 62 to 66 above). In any event, it has not been established that the ban at issue was inspired by any form of hostility towards persons of the Muslim faith.

4° lastly, the Court found that in the present case GO and the Flemish Community had acted in accordance with the case-law of the Court and that there had therefore been no breach of Article 9. Above all, the Court emphasises that :

"The Court has already ruled in this respect that a ban on wearing religious symbols imposed on pupils could precisely meet the need to avoid any form of exclusion and pressure while respecting pluralism and the freedom of others. The Court has already held in this regard that a prohibition on pupils wearing religious symbols may be precisely what is needed to avoid all forms of exclusion and pressure while respecting pluralism and the freedom of others (see, among other authorities, Dogru, cited above, §§ 70-72, and Bayrak, cited above)".

In conclusion, it is to be hoped that this decision, like many others, will reinforce the view of those who want to protect pupils from the proselytising of their fellow pupils. The ban on conspicuous religious symbols (which, as in this case, included the headscarf as well as crosses and yarmulkes) is not Islamophobia. Contrary to what the ULB Equality Law Clinic maintained, the ban does not discriminate against ethnic minorities. On the contrary, it protects the right of certain members of these same minorities to practise free examination and to refuse to be confined by their identity. Freedom is not the freedom of groups, especially activists, but must always be the freedom of the individual.

Claude Wachtelaer,

Past Chairman

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Si on ne comprend plus vraiment si M. ONFRAY est toujours athée ou s’il défend encore les valeurs des Lumières, quelques idées fortes surnagent  dans un discours que je trouve de plus en plus confus. Ce qui ne fait pas de doute c’est que M.ONFRAY est souverainiste et anti-maastrichtien. Son obsession à l’égard de ce traité le conduit à des audaces intellectuelles parfois étonnantes. C’est le cas à l’occasion de la sortie du dernier numéro du trimestriel  FRONT POPULAIRE’[1] qu’il dirige et qu’il utilise comme une arme contre l’Union européenne dont le seul qualificatif de ‘maastrichtienne’, qu’il lui ajoute systématiquement, fait office de condamnation sans appel.

This issue brings together some fifteen contributions under the general title L’Europe démystifiée, vie et mort d’un empire. Sans surprise, tous ces articles émanent de souverainistes pour qui l’Union européenne représente la cause de tous les malheurs de l’Europe, mais surtout de la France.

C’est évidemment M. ONFRAY qui mène la charge dans deux longs articles. l’éditorial, qui porte comme titre The Totem is taboo, new occupation, new resistance, new collaboration[2], part d’un angle d’analyse assez surprenant et décrit un parcours pas très réjouissant.

Il s’agit évidemment de dénoncer toute la perversité du projet européen et d’espérer sa fin prochaine. Il faut donc commencer par rappeler que les civilisations commencent toutes par un meurtre aux propriétés fécondantes. On invoquera donc Caïn et Abel et le Christ pour en arriver à Louis XVI et à son fils.

Ce rappel historique, que j’ai abrégé, permet d’aboutir à l’Europe maastrichtienne et d’accuser celle-ci d’avoir fait mieux (ou pire) que le passé. Ses fondateurs seraient en effet les héritiers satisfaits de tous les totalitarismes du XXème siècle.

Si l’UE s’est donc construite sur un tas de cadavres, elle a aussi, affirme M. ONFRAY, profité du désert culturel qu’a produit la mort, pendant la première guerre mondiale, de nombreux intellectuels, mal remplacés par d’autresbroken brains par la guerre, qui produiront des idées que M. ONFRAY ne partage probablement pas. Surréalisme, dadaïsme, dodécaphonisme sont étiquetés du même qualificatif : nihilistes. À partir de là, notre philosophe peut glisser progressivement vers le fascisme et le nazisme qui, à bien relire le texte, est le but ultime de la démonstration. En faisant un long détour par REBATET, il s’agit de démontrer que l’Europe n’a qu’un vrai père, Walter HALLSTEIN et que le premier président de la Commission européenne était un nazi assumé.

L’accusation, dont on mesure la gravité, reprend quasi au mot prêt, celle qui figure dans un article du Figaro[3]dated 4 March 2019, signed by Eric RIOUFOL, which repeats statements made in a book by Philippe de VILLIERS[4]. Elle repose sur au moins un mensonge factuel, puisqu’ONFRAY accuse Wikipédia de masquer cette vérité, alors que la page consacrée à Hallstein, fait très clairement allusion à ses activités pendant la guerre.

La démonstration est renforcée par les accusations portées contre Jean MONNET et Robert SCHUMAN. Le premier est accusé d’être vichyste, parce qu’il aurait fréquenté l’école des cadres pétainistes à Uriage, mais ONFRAY ne dit pas comment MONNET aurait pu réussir l’exploit d’être à la fois en France et à Londres, puis à Washington pendant cette période. La source ici est, à nouveau, Philippe de Villiers et n’a peut-être pas été vérifiée soigneusement. En tout cas, si passage à Uriage il y eut, il fut bref et il faut rappeler aussi que l’école fut fermée par le gouvernement de Vichy parce qu’elle s’était rapidement engagée dans l’opposition au régime et puis dans la résistance.  Quant à SCHUMAN, s’il est exact qu’il a été frappé d’indignité nationale à la Libération (qui est l’argument retenu pour en faire un quasi-collabo), la vérité oblige à préciser que c’est parce que Schuman avait été nommé ministre par Pétain le 16 juin 1940 sans avoir été consulté et qu’il avait démissionné sans avoir siégé !

Ce qui est curieux aussi, c’est la sélectivité dont fait preuve Michel ONFRAY dans le choix de ses cibles. Si on l’en croit, il n’y aurait donc que trois pères de l’Europe, tous les trois suspects de sympathies scandaleuses. D’autres, qui ont tous pour point commun d’avoir résisté au fascisme ou au nazisme, sont curieusement absents. Il n’y aura donc pas un mot pour de GASPERI, MANSHOLT, SPAAK ou SPINELLI. Ils gênent sans doute la démonstration.

Mais tout cela n’a pas vraiment d’importance parce que nous ne sommes pas au bout du raisonnement. Que l’UE ait été créée par d’anciens collabos n’est pas une surprise puisque ces anciens collabos se sont en fait mis au service de nouveaux occupants. Collabo un jour, collabo toujours, quitte à changer de maître.

Et, donc, de dénoncer l’AMGOT (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories) que tout le monde a oublié. Manifestement, dans l’esprit de M. ONFRAY, cet éphémère projet américain de mise sous tutelle des pays libérés se poursuit aujourd’hui puisqu’il n’hésite pas à écrire que « de Gaulle s’opposa à ce projet, Mitterrand s’évertua à le rendre possible ». L’idée, née dans quelques cénacles américains et soutenue par ROOSEVELT, reposait sur l’existence ou non de gouvernements légitimes pour les pays libérés et sur leur capacité à gérer leurs contrées dévastées. Mais, si le cas de la France posait effectivement problème, l’AMGOT, n’eut jamais à se mettre en place dans d’autres pays; comme la Belgique où le gouvernement revint de Londres quelques jours après la libération de Bruxelles.  Au minimum, on aimerait comprendre comment un projet, jamais mis en place, peut avoir exercé son influence près de quarante ans plus tard, mais la force des fantasmes c’est qu’ils se passent de preuves sérieuses. Et, si l’on sait que les Américains avaient peur d’éventuels coups d’État communistes, notre auteur n’a aucune critique à formuler contre de Gaulle qui fit rentrer ceux-ci dans son gouvernement en 44 alors qu’ils étaient pourtant de grands admirateurs du grand Staline dont l’amour de la liberté est une caractéristique bien connue.

Les maastrichtiens, comme les appelle M. ONFRAY, sont aussi responsables d’un autre méfait. Non contents de soumettre l’UE aux volontés américaines, ils détournent, au profit de la construction de l’Europe, le célèbre discours  de Victor Hugo qu’il prononça en 1849[5] et qui appelait à la création des États-Unis d’Europe. Si vous pensiez que ce texte était le point de départ d’un beau projet humaniste qui se concrétisera par la réconciliation qui a suivi la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, vous vous trompez. M. ONFRAY va vous ouvrir les yeux.

Hugo a, bien dans l’esprit du temps, eu la maladresse de dire que son projet visait à ‘apporter la civilisation à la barbarie’. On peut considérer que, comme ceux de la plupart des intellectuels de l’époque, ces propos sont paternalistes et que vouloir faire le bonheur des autres contre leur gré est discutable. Mais c’est faire un grand écart intellectuel que d’en déduire, comme notre philosophe n’hésite pas à l’écrire, que « cette Europe, vantée par les maastrichtiens, propose clairement un projet colonialiste, racialiste, européocentré ».

ONFRAY boucle ainsi la boucle de sa démonstration. L’UE a été créée par de nazis et des collabos et s’est inspirée de Victor HUGO qui est un raciste pour construire un projet détestable. La seule alternative est le souverainisme : « Le souverainisme nomme la résistance à ce nouvel AMGOT. Quiconque refuse cette résistance, collabore’[6].

On pourrait penser que tout ce qui est excessif est insignifiant et laisser ONFRAY à ses délires. On pourrait aussi espérer qu’il en reste là. Mais non, M. ONFRAY a d’autres cibles qu’il attaque dans un second article intitulé ‘l’Homme nouveau européen’[7].

La première victime de la colère de notre souverainiste en chef est surprenante. Il s’agit de l’abbé GREGOIRE, grande figure de la Révolution française, connu pour avoir – en principe – milité pour améliorer le statut des juifs en France. Je dis en principe parce que, comme beaucoup d’autres, je croyais naïvement que l’abbé Grégoire était un humaniste. Mais M. ONFRAY m’a ouvert les yeux. Grégoire est, en fait un antisémite puisqu’en écrivant un « essai sur la régénération, physique, morale et politique des juifs’, il montre bien qu’ils sont … dégénérés !

ONFRAY, dans de nombreux écrits, fustige le wokisme. Il est curieux, en l’occurrence, de le voir tomber dans le piège d’un raisonnement typiquement woke. Quand il critique le texte de l’abbé et qu’il écrit « moins les juifs seront juifs, plus ils se débarrasseront de leur judaïsme et de leur judéité, plus ils seront acceptables, défendables, acceptables, légitimes. En un mot, moins les juifs seront juifs, plus ils seront citoyens républicains […]. », il s’inscrit dans la logique woke de l’assignation. La faute de l’abbé Grégoire serait donc d’avoir voulu sortir les juifs de leur condition et d’en faire des citoyens comme les autres, grand crime en effet.

En réalité, M. ONFRAY se fiche de l’abbé Grégoire, cette référence historique n’est qu’un prétexte. Robert BADINTER a préfacé l’essai de l’abbé et BADINTER est un valet de MITERRAND, l’ennemi juré de notre philosophe, cela justifie bien des circonvolutions intellectuelles.

Ce deuxième texte, que je n’analyserai pas en détail, est révélateur de la technique de M. ONFRAY. Une grosse couche d’érudition, mais peu d’argumentaires détaillés. Une progression de la démonstration par bonds successifs qui égare le lecteur et qui permet d’aller de Caïn et Abel à l’AMGOT en passant par le sort misérable de Louis XVII ; de l’abbé Grégoire à Elon Musk en passant par Guy Deleuze et Françoise Dolto. Tous ces détours aboutissant par ailleurs toujours au même point, Maastricht et l’UE, cause de tous nos maux. À cette méthode du cheminement en zigzag s’ajoute celle de l’éclairage sélectif des personnalités mises en cause. ONFRAY ne fait pas dans la nuance. S’il accuse l’abbé Grégoire d’antisémitisme, il a soin de ne pas mentionner que celui-ci fut aussi un pionnier de l’antiesclavagisme, comme il a soin de ne pas remettre le discours d’Hugo dans le contexte de l’époque. Ce qu’il dit de Monnet ou de Schuman est partiel, partial et mal documenté. Il a soin aussi d’occulter tout ce qui contredirait ses thèses.

Rien, dans tout cela, ne permet d’identifier clairement le projet politique de M. ONFRAY. Son souverainisme est purement incantatoire, comme celui  de la plupart des contributeurs du numéro. C’est le droit de chacun d’être favorable au Frexit, mais le moins que ses défenseurs puissent faire serait, par exemple d’expliquer les conséquences pratiques d’une sortie de l’Euro ou de la PAC. Le bien-être intellectuel et moral des Français ayant enfin arraché leur nom et leur drapeau des griffes des maastrichtiens maudits est une chose, les informer de l’état dans lequel sera leur portefeuille est aussi un sujet intéressant.

À trois mois des élections européennes, M. ONFRAY se range, résolument, dans le camp des ennemis de l’UE, c’est son droit. Mais est-il raisonnable d’affaiblir l’UE alors qu’elle a déjà bien assez d’ennemis à l’extérieur ? À quelques heures de vol, d’autres pays, d’autres modèles politiques existent. j’ai beau considérer que l’Europe des 27 est loin d’être le paradis sur terre, ce que me proposent la Russie de Poutine ou la Chine de Xi  m’inspirent beaucoup moins. À chacun ses goûts. Contribuer à faire évoluer un modèle européen intéressant, mais imparfait est une démarche citoyenne, alimenter le complotisme est un jeu dangereux pour la liberté.

Claude WACHTELEAR, Past Chairman

[1] Europe demystified, the life and death of an empireFront populaire n°16, March, April, May 2024.

[2]  Op. cit. pp. 2-9.

[3] RIOUFOL, Ivan, European Union: a stinking past <https://www.lefigaro.fr/blogs/rioufol/2019/03/la-peste-brune-racine-aux-raci.html>

[4] de Villiers, P., J’ai tiré sur le fil du mensonge et tout est venu, Fayard, 2019. The book provoked controversy, and a group of historians published a reaction in Le Monde under the title :"Philippe de Villiers has no right to falsify the history of the EU in the name of ideology". In an article published in Le Monde, a group of European academics specialising in contemporary history denounced the latest book by the former MEP, a convinced Europhobe, on the origins of European integration as "a tissue of pretence typical of conspiracy theories"., 17/12/2020

[5] Speech on the United States of Europe at the International Peace Congress in Paris in 1849,https://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Discours_sur_les_%C3%89tats-Unis_d%E2%80%99Europe_au_congr%C3%A8s_international_de_la_paix_en_1849_%C3%A0_Paris

[6] Op. cit, p.9.

[7] Op. cit. pp 54-63.

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The Court's decision clearly establishes that, in adopting these decrees, neither Flanders nor Wallonia violated Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects freedom of thought, conscience and religion, contrary to the applicants' arguments. The applicants include several organisations and members of the Muslim and Jewish communities who, since the adoption of these texts, consider that the decisions taken prevent them from practising their religion as they wish. 

In principle, the Court's ruling puts an end to a long debate. The debate began after the adoption of the two decrees and the decision by the Brussels parliament not to legislate on the matter. In Belgium, it has mobilised even the Constitutional Court (CC), which has asked the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling.

We know, or rather we should know, that religious freedom is not an absolute freedom and that the civil authorities may, to a certain extent, regulate it if the public interest so requires. These restrictions are provided for in paragraph 2 of Article 9 in the following terms: "The freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may not be subject to any restrictions other than those which, in accordance with the law, are necessary in order to prevent discrimination. a democratic society, public security, the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others".

The central question in this case, which has not escaped the attention of Belgian legislators, has been, from the outset, whether or not the ban on slaughter without stunning constitutes a restriction on religious freedom and whether, if the answer to this first question is in the affirmative, it complies with the requirement of paragraph 2. It is to this extent that the judgment goes beyond the Belgian context and will have an impact on the Court's case law in the future.

Was there any interference?

The applicants argued that the decrees seriously and unjustifiably restricted their religious freedom. They considered that the Convention did not guarantee the protection of animal welfare and that it only protected humans. In their view, this constitutes unjustified interference.[2].

The Court's responses are particularly interesting and echo theses that have long been put forward by Belgian legislators.

On this point, the Court recalls that, as guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion applies only to convictions which attain a sufficient degree of force, seriousness, coherence and importance. However, where that condition is met, the State's duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any power of appreciation on its part as to the legitimacy of religious convictions or the manner in which they are expressed. expressed (see Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 48420/10 and 3 others, § 81, ECHR 2013 [extracts], and S.A.S. v. France [GC], no. 43835/11, § 55, ECHR 2014 [extracts]). In fact, the Court is hardly equipped to engage in a debate about the nature and importance of individual beliefs. Indeed, what one person may hold to be sacred may appear absurd or heretical to another, and no legal or logical argument can be made against a believer's assertion that a particular belief or practice is an important part of his or her religious observance. (Skugar and Others v. Russia [dec.], no. 40010/04, 3 December 2009).

Contrary to a criticism commonly levelled at the Court, it is clear that it respects and supports the principle of the separation of church and state by refusing to rule on theological issues. In so doing, it is reverting to a doctrine of double incompetence that was already defended in the 19th century, during the debates on the first Constitution of the Belgian State.

" Civil law and religious law are distinct, one does not dominate the other, each has its own domain, its own sphere of action. Mr Defacqz has frankly stated that he wants civil law to exercise supremacy; he is clearly stating the principle that serves as his starting point. We adopt a completely opposite principle, we deny all supremacy to civil law, we want it to declare itself incompetent in religious matters. There is no more relationship between the state and religion than there is between the state and geometry.[3].

More or less the same argument was used fifty years later to demonstrate that it was impossible to punish blasphemy under Belgian law.[4].

That being the case, the Court was obliged to find that the two decrees at issue did indeed interfere in matters relating to religious practice and, logically, came to address the second question: was such interference by the civil authorities in religious matters legitimate under Article 9?

Legitimate interference?

The applicants' main arguments concerned whether or not the interference could be condoned on the ground of public morality. In the applicants' view, this is not the case. The animal welfare argument did not meet the criteria for compliance with that concept in order to justify the contested decisions. The applicants consider that :

Thus, to link the aim pursued to public morality would have the consequence of distorting the letter of the Convention as well as its spirit, and would constitute a radical paradigm shift by asserting the supremacy of the opinion of a section of the population concerned about the welfare of animals as a basis for reducing to nothing an aspect of the Convention that is of fundamental importance to the welfare of animals. freedom of religion of another part of the population.

In a lengthy argument, the Court refuted the applicants' contention. In so doing, it relied on the work of the Belgian regional parliaments, on a judgment of 17 December 2020 (Centraal Israëlitisch Consistorievan België and othersC-336/19, EU:C:2020:1031) of the CJEU, on its own case law, but also on the scientific consensus that exists on the subject.

The Court begins by acknowledging the quality of the legislative work and the CJEU's analysis of the problem.

"In this regard, the Court cannot but find that both the CJEU and the Constitutional Court have, in the course of their respective reviews, taken into take detailed account of the requirements of Article 9 of the Convention, as interpreted by the Court".

Finally, the Court considers that

"In the present case, the Court observes in particular that the decrees at issue state that, where animals are slaughtered in accordance with special methods required for religious rites, the stunning process applied is reversible and does not result in the death of the animal. On the basis of scientific studies and extensive consultation with interested parties, the parliamentary proceedings came to the conclusion that no less radical measure could sufficiently achieve the objective of reducing harm to animal welfare at the time of slaughter (paragraphs 25 and 28 above). Having found no serious evidence in the case-file submitted to it to lead it to question that conclusion, the Court notes that, in so doing, the Flemish and Walloon legislatures sought a proportionate alternative to the obligation of prior stunning, taking into consideration the right claimed by persons of the Muslim and Jewish faiths to manifest their religion in the face of the growing importance attached to the slaughter of animals.prevention of animal suffering in the Flemish and Walloon Regions. They have taken care to take a measure that does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the aim pursued".

From a legal point of view, we can probably consider that This ruling will encourage European countries that have not yet regulated ritual slaughter to do so, if only to limit exports of meat slaughtered using the old methods to countries that regulate this.

However, it is to be feared that the applicant religious authorities will be obstinate and that the information circulating in the communities will play on the sensitive issue of anti-Semitism or Islamophobia to mobilise their community against this decision. This argument has already paralysed the Brussels legislature, and it's a safe bet that it will be used again.

Claude WACHTELAER, Past Président, Leader du Groupe « Europe des Droits »

[1] Case Executief van de Moslims van België and Others v. Belgium, Applications no. 16760/22 and 10 others.

[2] In the United States, where freedom of religion and belief is guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution (known as the "free exercise clause"), Jurists - and in particular the Federal Supreme Court and the Supreme Courts of each state - are regularly called upon to rule on these questions of interference. The case law is based on an assessment of the "substantial burden"(substantial burden) that a law or regulation places on religious freedom and the extent to which this burden has a negative impact on free exercise. On this subject, see FALLERS-SULLIVAN, W., The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, Princeton University Press, 2018.

[3] JB Nothomb, national congress, session of 22/12/1830. Nothomb's words should not be misinterpreted. What he is aiming at is the temptation of Caesaropapism. After all, the memory of Joseph II, the sacristan emperor, has not entirely faded, and King William also liked to meddle in the running of cults. Obviously, this does not mean that civil law does not have supremacy ... in civil matters! JB Nothomb is not an apologist for clericalism.

[4] " Canonists define blasphemy as an enormous crime committed against the divinity by words or feelings that offend its majesty or the dogmas taught by religion. This consideration alone is enough to show that blasphemy should have no place in civil law. The purpose of society is not to avenge insults to God, and the State has no right to punish them, since it does not even have the power to know what does or does not constitute blasphemy.. Indeed, a law giving judges the task of punishing blasphemy should also tell them what it means by this. For, in this matter, we cannot rely on individual conscience, since it varies according to whether the judge assesses the offence from the point of view of one positive religion or another, or from the point of view of deism. What one judge would call heresy, another would call dogma. We cannot, therefore, leave it to the judiciary to decide. But in our public law, the legislative power is also incompetent, since it could not define blasphemy without proclaiming a State religion, without breaking the equality between all citizens, and without overturning the separation of Church and State, principles which are enshrined in our Constitution. - Giron, Droit public, n 0362.3, In Pandectes belges, Encyclopédie de législation, de doctrine et de jurisprudence belges, by Edmond Picard and N. d'Hoffschmidt (eds.), Brussels, Larcier, T. .XIII, 1884, coI. 710-712 ".

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